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Procedure as a Guarantee of
Democracy: The Legacy of the
Perestroika Parliament
Frances H. Foster*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, the author chronicles the rise and fall of the "perestroika
parliament." While Gorbachev's reforms were ultimately unsuccessful in
producing effective democratic representation, the author believes that the
history of these reforms provides some valuable lessons for post-Soviet
Russia. Specifically, Professor Foster concludes that current reformers in
Russia should learnfrom the failed perestroikaparliamentthat a democratic, "rule-of-law" state requires uniform lawmaking procedures with
constitutional safeguards to guarantee their integrity.

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law; Research Fellow, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; Fellow, Harvard University Russian Research Center. B.A., Princeton University, 1977; M.A., J.D., Yale University,
1981; J.S.D., Stanford University, 1987.
This Article is a substantially revised and enlarged version of my chapter entitled The

Soviet Legislature: Gorbachev's "School of Democracy," in

TOWARD THE "RULE OF
LAW" IN RUSSIA?: POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD 115

(Donald D. Barry ed., 1992). I thank M.E. Sharpe, Inc. for permission to reprint portions of the chapter in this Article. I am grateful to Gray Dorsey and Louise Shelley for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Sieglinde Talbott for her research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 21, 1991, eleven former republics of the USSR pledged
to build "democratic, law-governed states."" The transition from autocracy to democracy, 2 from rule by man to rule of law,' obviously will be
1. Alma-Atinskaia Deklaratsiia [Alma-Ata Declaration] (Dec. 21, 1991), PRAVDA,
Dec. 23, 1991, at 1.
2. Vast political science literature exists dealing with the process of transition from
authoritarianism to democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have de-

1993]

LEGACY OF THE PERESTROIKA PARLIAMENT

long and hard fought. Recent events reveal just how stubbornly persistent are traditional authoritarian methods of government. Since late
1991, new states of what was once the Soviet Union have instituted in
rapid succession broad executive powers to respond to national crisis.'
Demokratizatsiia and pravovoe gosudarstvo are terms startlingly familiar to observers of recent Soviet history. It was under these very stanfined "transition" as "the interval between one political regime and another," the period
between an institutionalized authoritarian regime and "the installation of some form of
democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternatiVe." GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS
FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES

6 (1986). See Dankwart Rustow, Transitionsto Democracy: Toward a Dynamic

Model, 2 COMP. POL. 350 (1970).
Scholars have concentrated their research largely on Latin American and Southern
European case studies. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS: STOPPING THE PENDULUM (Robert A. Pastor ed., 1989) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS];
GEOFFREY PRIDHAM, THE NEW MEDITERRANEAN DEMOCRACIES: REGIME TRANSITION IN SPAIN, GREECE AND PORTUGAL (1984); DEMOCRATIZING BRAZIL: PROBLEMS

OF TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION (Alfred Stepan ed., 1988). More recently, however, they have turned their attention to political developments in Central and Eastern
Europe. See, e.g., Rudolf L. Tikes, Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and
Change, 1989-90, 39 PROBS. COMMUNISM 44 (Nov.-Dec. 1990); Stephen White, Democratizing Eastern Europe: The Elections of 1990, 9 ELECTORAL STUD. 277 (1990).
Scholars are beginning to make similar evaluation of political reforms in the former
USSR. See, e.g., Gavin Helf & Jeffrey W. Hahn, Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party
Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990, 51 SLAVIC REv. 511 (1992).
3. See generally FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYER, THE RULE OF LAW (1975); Gianmaria

Ajani, The Rise and Fall of the Law-Based State in the Experience of Russian Legal
Scholarship: Foreign Patterns and Domestic Style, in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW"
IN RUSSIA?: POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD 3

(Donald

D. Barry ed., 1992) [hereinafter TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW"]; E.V. Kuznetsov &
B.F. Savel'ev, Pravovoe Gosudarstvo (iz istorii russkoi pravovoi mysli) [The Law-Governed State (From the History of Russian Legal Thought)], 4 PRAVOVEDENIE, no. 1, 49
(1991).

4. See, e.g., Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR Ob Organizatsii Ispolnitel'noi Vlasti v Period Radikal'noiEkonomicheskoi Reformy [RSFSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On the Organizationof Executive Power During the Period of Radical
Economic Reform] (Nov. 1, 1991), ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA, Nov. 5, 1991, at 1; Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 0 Pravovom Obespechenii Ekonomicheskoi
Reformy [RSFSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On Legal Support for the Economic Reform] (Nov. 1, 1991), ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA, Nov. 5, 1991, at 1; Law of Ukraine On
Changes and Additions to the Constitution (FundamentalLaw) of Ukraine (Feb. 14,
1992), translated in F.B.I.S.-USR, May 1, 1992, at 76; Law of Azerbaijan Republic on
State of Emergency (Feb. 4, 1992), translated in F.B.I.S.-USR, May 5, 1992, at 152;
M. Zaripov, Prezident Poprosil Polnomochii [President Requests Powers], Soy. RosSIIA, Dec. 4, 1991, at 2 (reporting that Tatarstan president was granted additional powers until January 1993).
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dards that Gorbachev launched his program for comprehensive political
and legal reform.' Similarly, the contemporary justifications for sweeping presidential rule raise the specter of Gorbachev. The death knell for
the evolving Soviet democratic, law-governed state was precisely that

now invoked by Gorbachev's successors-"national emergency." 6

5. See Tezisy Tsentral'nogoKomiteta KPSS K XIX Vsesoiuznoi PartiinoiKonferentsii [Theses of the CPSU Central Committee For the Nineteenth All-Union Party Conference] (May 23, 1988), PRAVDA, May 27, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter May Theses].
6. The first major use of "national emergency" to justify enhanced executive authority at the expense of the new legislature occurred on October 2, 1989. Prompted by the
blockade of the Trans-Caucasian and Azerbaijan railways, the Council of Ministers submitted a resolution asking the Supreme Soviet to grant it broad emergency powers to ban
all strikes and to introduce order in railway transport and vital sectors of the economy.
See L.A. Voronin, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Oct. 2, 1989), Moscow Domestic
Service, Oct. 2, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 3, 1989, at 58. Supreme Soviet
deputies rejected the government proposal, adopted a less sweeping compromise version,
and called for swift preparation of a comprehensive law regulating state of emergency
situations. See M. Rostarchuk & L. Telen, No Delays Tolerated, SESKAIA ZHIZN', Oct.
4, 1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 4, 1989, at 74. The approved resolution,
despite its substitution of the term "urgent" for "emergency" measures and less restrictive strike prohibition, nonetheless transferred extensive and largely-undefined powers to

the Council of Ministers. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Neotlozhnykh
Merakh Po Obespecheniiu Bespereboinogo Funktsionirovaniia Zheleznodorozhnogo
Transporta i Bazovykh OtrasleiNarodnogo Khoziastva [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On Urgent Measures to Ensure the UninterruptedFunctioningof Railroad Transport and Basic Sectors of the National Economy] (Oct. 3, 1989), IZVEsnIA, Oct. 5,
1989, at 1. Soviet commentators and deputies did not ignore the potential ramifications of
this delegation of legislative authority. For example, in an interview published the following week, a SotsialisticheskaiaIndustriiacorrespondent queried whether these measures could possibly intensify "calls... from both the right and left to step up authoritarianism, . . . give special powers to the President and dissolve the Supreme Soviet." E.

Leont'eva, U Cherty Chrezvychainykh Mer [At the Limit of ExtraordinaryMeasures],
SoTs. INDUSTRIIA, Oct. 10, 1989, at 2, 3. Her words proved prophetic indeed.
Constitutional amendments of March and December 1990 (Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh

Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob Uchrezhdenii Posta Prezidenta SSSR i Vnesenii
Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu (Osnovnoi Zakone) SSSR [USSR Law On Establishing the Post of USSR President and Making Amendments and Additions to the
USSR Constitution (FundamentalLaw)] (Mar. 14, 1990), 12 Vedomosti SSSR, item

189 (1990) [hereinafter March 1990 ConstitutionalAmendments Law]; Zakon Soiuza
Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob Izmeneniiakh i Dopolneniiakh Konstitutsii
(Osnovnogo Zakona) SSSR v Sviazi s Sovershenstvovaniem Sistemy Gosudarstvennogo
Upravleniia [USSR Law On Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution
(FundamentalLaw) in Connection with the Improvement of the System of State Management] (Dec. 26, 1990), PRAVDA, Dec. 27, 1990, at 2) established a strong presidential
system with virtually unlimited emergency powers. See KoNsT. SSSR arts. 127/3 &
127/5 (as amended Dec. 26, 1990). They resulted in the effective disintegration of the
Soviet legislature. See infra part IV.C.3.
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This chilling repetition of the past is perhaps not surprising. In the
rubble of the USSR, leaders and citizens alike grapple with the day-today problems of survival rather than the morals of history. To most, the
legacy of the Gorbachev era is deterioration of the economy, fragmentation of the political system, breakdown of social stability and order, and
erosion of spiritual values. Unfortunately, with this wholesale condemnation of the Soviet socialist past are lost its lessons for the post-Soviet
democratic future.
One of the most maligned experiments of the Gorbachev era was the
"perestroika parliament."'7 Hailed as a "school of democracy" 8 at its inception in May 1989, it ended its days thoroughly discredited for its
failure to defend democracy against authoritarian challenges first from
Gorbachev9 and then from the August 1991 coup organizers.1 0 This focus on its inglorious conclusion, however, obscures its promising beginnings. During its first year of existence the reformed Soviet legislature
burst the functional and structural confines established for it by the
Gorbachev leadership. With more enthusiasm than experience, federal

For an interesting discussion of the relationship between "national emergency" and
Stalinism, see G. Bordiugov & V. Kozlov, Vremia Trudnykh Voprosov: Istoriia 20-30kh

Godovi Sovremennaia ObshchestvennaiaMysl' [A Time of Difficult Questions: The History of the Twenties and Thirties and ContemporarySocial Thinking], PRAVDA, Oct. 3,
1988, at 3. The authors concluded that the coercive, authoritarian Stalinist system entered "through the gates of emergency measures." They identified several distinct periods
of social and economic chaos that beset the young Soviet state during the 1920s and
1930s. They argued that in each of these so-called "crisis points" the Soviet leadership
and people confronted two basic alternatives, resort to emergency measures or "preservation of democratic traditions." By consistently opting for the former, the communist party
and country made the "wrong choice" with far-reaching tragic consequences. Id.

7. Iurii Feofanov, Vzlet i Padenie Perestroechnogo Parlamenta [Rise and Fall of
the PerestroikaParliament],IzvEsTnA, Sept. 3, 1991, at 2.
8. K. Vitaliev et al., Smotrit i Slushaet Vsia Strana [The Whole Country Is Watching and Listening], IZVESTIIA, May 30, 1989, at 1.
9. See, e.g., At the Crossroads-Forthe Umpteenth Time, Moscow NEws, Jan. 613, 1991, at 5; Aleksei Emel'ianov, Pochemu Ia Vyshel Iz Verkhovnogo Soveta [Why I
Left the Supreme Soviet], LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, Jan. 9, 1991, at 2; L. Shevtsova,

Recoil; Postscriptto the Fourth USSR Congress of People'sDeputies, KoMSoMoL'SKAA
PRAVDA, Jan. 8, 1991, at 2. But see Iurii Kalmykov, Izbirateli, Deputaty, Parlament
.. . [Voters, Deputies, Parliament.. .], PRAVDA, June 6, 1991, at 3 (countering criticism of Supreme Soviet as "submissive").
10. See, e.g., Aksar Akaiev, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Aug. 26, 1991), Moscow Central Television, Aug. 26, 1991, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 28, 1991, at
28; Iurii Iu. Boldyrev, Speech to Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies
(Sept. 4, 1991), in IZVESTIIA, Sept. 7, 1991, at 4; Aleksandr Bovin, Pobeda! Chto
Dal'she? [Victory! What Next?], IZVESTIIA, Aug. 24, 1991, at 1.
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deputies developed the embryo of a genuinely representative, professional, and independent legislature, a body that increasingly threatened
the authority of Gorbachev himself.11
The early efforts of the Soviet legislature produced both theoretical
and practical lessons. They present a case study for examining the abstract notions of democratic institutionalization,"2 transition,'" and consolidation 4 that are hotly debated in Western political science literature.
They offer insights into the evolution of political interest groups and
their impact on legislative decisionmaking, a central focus of current
United States legal scholarship. 5 They provide concrete precedent and
guidance for today's reformers in their quest for optimal mechanisms to
introduce into post-Soviet systems meaningful popular representation
and participation in the political process, effective separation of govern-

11.

In fact, as I argue elsewhere, "it was the success, not the failure, of the federal

legislature that dictated Gorbachev's return to authoritarian methods of rule." Frances
Foster-Simons, The Soviet Legislature: Gorbachev's "School of Democracy," in ToWARD THE "RULE OF LAW," supra note 3, at 115, 117.

12. The seminal work on institutionalization is SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLrrI(1968). For an examination of the Soviet legislature in light of Huntington's model, see Thomas F. Remington, ParliamentaryGovernment in the USSR, in PERESTROIKA-ERA PoLITIcs: THE NEW SOVIET LEGISLATURE
AND GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL REFORMS 175 (Robert T. Huber & Donald R. Kelley
CAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES

eds,, 1991) [hereinafter PERESTROIKA-ERA POLrrIcs].
13. For information on transitions literature, see supra note 2.
14. The term "democratic consolidation" refers generally to the period between the
first "founding" election of a democratic government and the establishment of a stable
democracy. See White, supra note 2, at 286. See also Giuseppe DiPalma, Parliaments,
Consolidation, Institutionalization:A Minimalist View, in PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE (Ulrike Liebert & Maurizio Cotta eds.,

1990). Political scientists have suggested a wide variety of frameworks and standards by
which to judge completion of a democratic consolidation. These include "objective conditions" (e.g., rotation of political parties in government), popular acceptance of democratic
norms and institutions, and elite strategies. See, e.g., GIUSEPPE DIPALMA, To CRAFT
DEMOCRACIES 137-44 (1990); Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of the

Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 47 (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986); Laurence Whitehead,
The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies:A Discussion with Illustrations, in DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 2, at 76. An outstanding review of political science
literature on democratic transitions and consolidations appears in Juliet Kaarbo, Coali-

tion & Opposition Parties in Democratic Consolidation: Hungary's First Year of Democracy 1-6 (1992) (paper delivered at Midwest Slavic Conference, Columbus, Ohio,
May 1-3, 1992, on file with author).
15. An outstanding symposium on public choice appears in 74 VA. L. REV. 167-518
(1988). For a thoughtful critique of public choice, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
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mental powers, and enforceable guarantees of fundamental human rights
and liberties.1 6
This Article's concern is an equally important but more subtle legacy
of the perestroika parliament-the discovery of an integral relationship
between legislative procedure and democracy. From 1989 to 1990, Soviet
deputies gradually realized through trial and error that a critical
prerequisite for legislative independence and legitimacy is a set of binding, regularized rules created by the legislature. This experience has serious implications for the future of democratic, law-governed states in
the former USSR. It suggests that current reformers must direct their
attention not merely to the content and enforcement of laws but also to
the very lawmaking process itself.
This Article, then, is more than a chronicle and evaluation of legislative development in the Gorbachev era. It is also a call for change.
Drawing on recent decisions by the new Russian Constitutional Court"'
and writings by Hans Linde"8 and Laurence Tribe,"9 it recommends the
adoption of a constitutional standard of "due process of lawmaking."20
This linkage of Russian and United States legal theory and practice is
not as outlandish as it might appear at first blush. After all, when Sergei
Stankevich announced in December 1989 that he and his fellow deputies

16. A recent collection of essays on the Soviet legislature contains relevant studies of
each of these key points. See PERESTROIKA-ERA PoLIcs, supra note 12.
17. See infra part V. The founding legislation of the Russian Constitutional Court
was enacted on July 12, 1991. Zakon RSFSR 0 Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR
[RSFSR Law On the RSFSR Constitutional Court] (July 12, 1991), Vedomosti RSFSR,
no. 30 (1991). The Fifth Congress of Russian People's Deputies elected and swore into
office thirteen justices on October 29-30, 1991. See Tamara Zamiatina, TASS, Oct. 30,
1991, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 31, 1991, at 50. The Constitutional Court decided its first

case on January 14, 1992. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RSFSR Po Delu o
Proverhe Konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidenta RSFSR ot 19 Dekabria 1991 Goda No.
289 "Ob Obrazovanii Ministerstva Bezopasnosti i Vnutrennykh Del RSFSR" [Decision
of the RSFSR Constitutional Court On the Constitutionality of RSFSR Presidential
Decree No. 289 of December 19, 1991 "On the Establishmentof the Ministry of Security and Interiorof the RSFSR"] (Jan. 14, 1992), RoSSIISKAIA GAZETA, Feb. 4, 1992, at
3.
Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976).
These works include LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw,
ch. 17 (2d ed. 1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFS. 66 (1972) [hereinafter Tribe, Policy Science]; Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975).
20. Linde, supra note 18. Farber and Frickey have identified three "strands" of due
process of lawmaking: "institutional legitimacy," "legislative deliberation," and "procedural regularity." FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 118-31. In this Article, the
term "due process of lawmaking" refers solely to the third, procedural strand.
18.

19,
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had "learned the value of procedure as a guarantee of democracy" 21
surely one could hear the echoes of Justice Frankfurter's statement fortyfive years earlier that "[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small
measure, the history of procedure."2 2
II.

RULE BY LAW: GORBACHEV'S VISION OF THE DEMOCRATIC,
LAW-GOVERNED STATE

In his first appearance as General Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union [CPSU] in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed as his "fundamental goal" the "further improvement and development of democracy and of the entire system of socialist self-government."' 23 Subsequent speeches revealed that the cornerstone of this
reform process was to be the creation of a deniocratic, professional, yet
distinctively socialist lawmaking body.
Gorbachev chose as the prototype for his new federal legislature the
"Leninist" 24 tradition of soviets of people's deputies. The soviet system
had a long and tumultuous history.25 It had been forged on the anvil of
revolution in 1905, refined and embellished by Lenin in the early years
of communist rule, and subsequently disfigured by Stalin and his successors. In the ideal, it consisted of a network of broadly representative,

21. Narodnye Deputaty: Slovo Pered S'ezdom [People's Deputies: Words Before the
Congress], Sov. KULTURA, Dec. 12, 1989, at 3, 3 (comment by Sergei Stankevich).
22. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1944) (Frankfurter, J. separate
opinion).
23. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to Plenary Session of CPSU Central Committee
(Mar. 11, 1985), PRAVDA, Mar. 12, 1985, at 3.
24. Although Gorbachev and many Soviet commentators have described the soviets as
a "Leninist" model, in fact, these representative bodies originated in the Revolution of
1905. See A.A. Sentsov, Razvitie Formy Rossiiskogo Gosudardstva v Nachale XX v.
[Development of the Form of the Russian State in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century], PRAVOVEDENIE, no. 4, 88 (1990).
This insistence on "Leninist" origins extended to the 'entire complex of Gorbachev
reform proposals. See generally John Gooding, Lenin in Soviet Politics, 1985-91, 44
Sov. STUD. 403 (1992). On the "Leninist" bases of legal reforms see, e.g., MiKHAIL S.
GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 105-06 (1987); E. Chekharin, Pravo i Perestroika [The
Law and Restructuring], PRAVDA, Mar. 1, 1988, at 3.
25. For background information on the history of soviets, see generally A.P.
Butenko, PoliticheskaiaVlast' i Borba Za Nee Pri Sotsializme [PoliticalPower and the
Struggle for It At Socialism], Soy. Gos. i PRAvo, no. 3, 121 (1989); A.V. Ivanchenko,
Demokraticheskie Instituty v Istorii Sovetskogo Gosudarstva [Democratic Institutions in
the History of the Soviet State], Soy. Gos. I PRAVO, no. 1, 118 (1989); Alexander Rabinowitch, The Evolution of Local Soviets in Petrograd,November 1917-June 1918: The
Case of the First City District Soviet, 46 SLAvic REV. 20 (1989).
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independent assemblies with supreme legislative, administrative, and supervisory authority at their respective levels. In practice, however, it deteriorated into a scheme of purely ornamental legislative bodies convened
briefly each year to rubber-stamp laws prepared in advance by CPSU
authorities.2 6
In 1988 the soviets entered a decisively new phase of development. On
July 5, the Nineteenth All-Union Party Conference followed
Gorbachev's lead and approved a blueprint for comprehensive political
reform. This dramatic plan sought to restore the soviets as the "bases of
socialist statehood and self-management." 2 The party program received
official legal status five months later when the Soviet legislature amended
the Constitution to provide for a wholesale reorganization of the political
structure and process at the federal level.2 This set the stage for unprecedentedly open, competitive elections in March 1989 and, finally, the
historic inauguration in May 1989 of the new supreme governing organ
of the USSR, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.
A.

The Impetus for Legislative Reform

Gorbachev proposed democratization not as an end in itself but rather
as an instrument to further rapid development of the Soviet economy."

26. See generally JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, IDEOLOGY, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
IN THE SOVIET UNION 164 (4th ed. 1978); MARY McAuLEY, POLITICS AND THE SOVIET UNION 204 (1977); Demokratia, Zakonnost', Vlast' [Democracy, Legality, Power],
IZVESTIIA, May 31, 1988, at 2. But see Stephen White, The USSR Supreme Soviet: A

Developmental Perspective, in COMMUNIST

LEGISLATURES INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 125, 155 (Daniel Nelson & Stephen White eds., 1982) (arguing Supreme Soviet
was of "more considerable ... importance ... than the 'rubber-stamp' stereotype").

27. Rezoliutsii XIX Vsesoiuznoi Konferentsii KPSS: 0 Demokratizatsii Sovetskogo
Obshchestva i Reforme Politicheskoi Sistemy [Resolutions of the Nineteenth All-Union
PartyConference: On the Democratizationof Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System] point 2 (July 1, 1988), PRAVDA, July 5, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter Political
Reform Resolution].
28. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Izmeneniakh i Dopolneniakh Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) SSSR [USSR Law On Amendments and
Additions to the USSR Constitution(FundamentalLaw)] (Dec. 1, 1988), PRAVDA, Dec.
3, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Constitutional Amendments Law].
29.

For example, Gorbachev unambiguously stated this proposition in an April 1985

report: "We must always bear in mind Lenin's idea that socialist democracy cannot be
understood in the abstract. It has been and remains a tool for the development of the
economy, the growth of man's activeness and the communist upbringing of the masses."

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, On Convening the Regular 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks
Connected with Preparingand Holding It, PRAVDA, Apr. 24, 1985, at 1, translatedin
37 CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS [CDSP], May 22, 1985, at 1.
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This linkage of political and economic change explains the emphasis

placed on the USSR legislative system. To the Soviet leadership, a reformed legislature could serve as an effective mechanism to combat two
fundamental causes of economic stagnation under the Stalinist system:
public apathy and alienation; and regulation of the economy by arbitrary, inconsistent administrative and party regulation. Accordingly,
from 1985 to 1988, two30 main objectives drove-Soviet legislative reform
policies and, ultimately, laws. These were political participation of the
citizenry and professionalization of the lawmaking process.
Beginning in 1985 the first and most significant goal of legislative reform was to provide a democratic stimulus to energize the masses for the
monumental task of modernizing the Soviet economy. Official speeches,
party resolutions, and press commentaries all advocated the strategy of
economic mobilization through political participation. The basic argument was that if the Soviet citizenry had a real stake in political decisionmaking, it would be more likely to give its enthusiastic backing and
creative contribution to the process of economic restructuring.3 1
Initially, Soviet leaders and commentators expressed this participation
goal in broad, hortatory terms. They harked back to Lenin to explain
the inextricable connection between socialist democracy and economic reform, the critical importance of encouraging citizens' active involvement
in state and public administration, and the longstanding communist
party commitment to realizing genuine democracy and socialist self-government in the form of soviets of people's deputies.3 2
With the drafting of a new CPSU program in the latter half of
1985,11 discussion of political and legislative reform shifted in a more

concrete direction. As a result, the Soviet party and state leadership reinterpreted participation to encompass increased public input into and information about the legislative process. The enhancement of actual public influence on the staffing of legislative bodies, however, remained
30. A third, less important goal, expansion of the administrative and monitoring
functions of soviets also existed. See Foster-Simons, supra note 11, at 119.
31. See, e.g., E. Klopov, GlavnaiaSotsial'naiaSila Usk reniia [The Main Forcefor

Acceleration], PRAVDA, Oct. 24, 1986, at 2.
32. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to the Third Session of the Eleventh
USSR Supreme Soviet, PRAVDA,July 3, 1985, at 1; I. Ilinsky & I. Rozhko, Questions of
Theory: The Democratism of the Soviet PoliticalSystem, translatedin 37 CDSP, Nov. 6,
1985, at 24.
33. Gorbachev chaired the committee that drafted the CPSU program. See V Politbiuro TsK KPSS [At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo], PRAvDA, June 30, 1985,
at 37. He summarized the basic provisions and goals of the program in a report to the
CPSU Central Committee in mid-October 1985. PRAVDA, Oct. 16, 1985, at 1.
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largely unaddressed. Thus, the February 1986 Political Report of the

CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress directed the Supreme Soviet to "place greater emphasis on discussing proposals submitted by trade unions, the Komsomol, and other social organizations" and called for a system of regular reports by soviet executive
committees to work collectives and general meetings. While it recognized the need for "corrections" in election procedures, the Report stated
that the party would "continue to see to it that deputies are elected from
among the worthiest people who are capable of effectively running state
affairs."3' 5
The January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee formally
extended the participation objective of legislative reform from indirect to
more direct public involvement in the political process. In a dramatic
opening speech, Gorbachev called for a series of radical political reforms,
including multicandidate elections.36 The Plenum responded by endorsing experimental elections in June 1987, 3 7 which allowed approximately
five percent of local-level soviet deputies to be chosen in competitive elections.3 " After a year of intense political debate, the CPSU approved the
introduction of multicandidate elections at the federal level as part of a
total overhaul of the USSR government structure.3 9
The overarching aim, however, was to create a legislative body that
would represent all social strata and interests in a way consistent with
basic Leninist theory and practice. Thus, the leadership did not favor
direct, independent election by the Soviet citizenry of all federal deputies.
Rather, it advocated continued control of the electoral process from above

34. Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Feb. 25, 1986), in MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV,
POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITrEE TO THE 27TH PARTY CONGRESS 70, 72 (1986).

35. Id. at 71-72.
36. 0 Perestroikei Kadrovoi Politike Partii:Doklad General'nogoSekretar'ia TsK
KPSS M.S. Gorbacheva na Plenume TsK KPSS 27 Ianvar'ia 1987 Goda [On Perestroika and the Party'sPersonnelPolicy: Speech by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary
of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee
on January 27, 1987], IZVESTIIA, Jan. 28, 1987, at 1-5.
37. See Postanovlenie Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii
Sovetskogo Soiuza 0 Perestroike i Kadrovoi Politike Partii [CPSU Central Committee
Plenum Resolution On Perestroikaand the Party'sPersonnelPolicy], PRAVDA, Jan. 29,
1987, at 1; TASS, Feb. 17, 1987, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 19, 1987, at R18.

38. For a detailed description and evaluation of the June 1987 elections, see Jeffrey
W. Hahn, An Experiment in Competition: The 1987 Elections to the Local Soviets, 47
SLAVIC REV. 434,(1988).

39. Political Reform Resolution, supra note 27, point 2.
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through such mechanisms as selection of a portion of deputies by established social organizations rather than by the Soviet populace at large.4"
Moreover, as the Nineteenth All-Union Party Conference stated clearly
in an official resolution, any reform of the political system, including
changes in electoral procedures and increased public participation in
government, "must correspond in content and method with Lenin's idea
' As a concrete method to assure
of the party's leading role in society." 41
continued party dominance over the new legislative structure, the CPSU
approved Gorbachev's proposal to nominate for the posts of chairmen of
soviets, as a rule, the first secretaries of the corresponding party
42
committees.
The second major goal of Soviet legislative reform was to create effective bodies capable of producing an appropriate statutory framework for
successful accomplishment of Gorbachev's perestroika program. The
leadership placed particular emphasis on reform at the highest, federal
level, highlighting the special responsibility of the Supreme Soviet to
"improve" legislation.4 3 In reviewing the past, Soviet officials and commentators attributed many of the country's current economic woes to the
de facto shift of lawmaking authority historically from the legislature to
administrative organs. 4 4 This resulted in unpredictable, inconsistent regulation of the economy by ad hoc normative acts and instructions. 45 The
proposed solution was a genuine working legislature with the authority,
influence, and professional competence to replace the labyrinth of administrative regulations with a comprehensive and coherent legislative
scheme.
To ensure a legitimate and effective legislature, the Soviet leadership
called for eradication of the Stalinist command-administrative system of
economic and political management. Initially, Gorbachev and his adherents levelled their attack on government agencies and personnel.4 They

40. See, e.g., May Theses, supra note 5.
41. Political Reform Resolution, supra note 27, point 7.
42. Id. point 2. See V. Liubitskii, Sovet: Vchera i Zavtra [The Soviet: Yesterday and
Tomorrow], PRAVDA, July 26, 1988, at 2; I. Shvets, Chto Dast Sovmeshchenie Postov
...[What Will the Combination of Posts Provide... ],PRAVDA, Sept. 27, 1988, at 2.
43. See, e.g., Gorbachev, supra note 32.
44. See, e.g., Iurii Feofanov, Sovety: Vozvrashchenie K Sebe [Soviets: Return to
Themselves], IZVESTnA, Feb. 16, 1988, at 1.
45. See, e.g., lurii Feofanov, Esli By Moi Sobesednik Byl Direktorom [If My Interviewee Was a Director], IZVESTnA, Jan. 3, 1986, at 3; Priznany Ultrativshimi Silu
[Deemed to Be No Longer in Force], EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA, no. 12, 4 (1988).
46. See, e.g., Editorial, Byt' Khoziannom, a Ne Gostem v Svoem Dome [Be Master,
Not Guest, in Your Own Home], PRAVDA, Oct. 2, 1986, at 1.
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advocated the transfer to soviets of effective control over all matters arising within their respective jurisdictions as a "powerful antidote to the
viruses" of "bureaucratism, parochialism and departmentalism."47 This
policy led to the adoption by the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers of the
July 1986 resolution entitled On Measures to Enhance Further the Role
and Increase the Responsibility of Soviets of Workers Deputies for Accelerating Social and Economic Development in Light of the Decisions of
the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Congress.4 8 Throughout 1985 and 1986, the
leadership placed particular emphasis on the role of soviets as watchdogs
over the activities of the administrative apparatus that was now both
practically and formally to be subordinated to them. For example, in an
October 1986 speech, Gorbachev praised Supreme Soviet deputies for
giving the highest officials of the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machinery "a good hiding, figuratively speaking-and they deserved it."'49
Beginning in late 1986, Gorbachev and his supporters broadened their
assault to include individual party organs and members.50 Under this
new line, they traced many of the "deformations" of the past to a gradual usurpation by local party committees and cadres of the powers that
Lenin had properly assigned to the elective organs. 51 Accordingly, the
CPSU leadership proposed a drastic reform of the political structure to
revive the soviets as full-fledged, autonomous bodies of people's power
and to institute a strict demarcation of party and state functions. 52 As

47. Ilinsky & Rozhko, supra note 32, at 24.
48. See V Politbiuro TsK KPSS [At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo],
PRAVDA, July 30, 1986, at 1. But see TASS, V Prezidiume Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
[At the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium],PRAVDA, Mar. 7, 1988, at 3 (detailing failure
to implement the July 1986 resolution).
49. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Rech' Na Vstreche s PartiinymAktivom Krasnodarskogo
Kraia [Speech at a Meeting with the KrasnodarPartyAktiv], PRAVDA, Sept. 20, 1986,
at 1 [hereinafter 'Gorbachev, KrasnodarSpeech].
50. See, e.g., V Politbiuro TsK KPSS [At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo],
PRAVDA, Nov. 21, 1986, at 1 (noting that the Politburo formally criticized Perm Province Party Committee and its leaders for "serious failings"). See also 0. Gusev et al.,
Strozhe Sprashivat': S Plenuma TsK Kompartii Ukrainy [Make Stricter Demands:
From the Plenary Session of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee],
PRAVDA, Dec. 10, 1986, at 2; Editorial, Oblastnoi Komitet Partii[Oblast' Party Committee],

PRAVDA,

Dec. 5, 1986, at 1.

51. See, e.g., Vystuplenie Tovarishcha Gorbacheva M.S. [Speech by Comrade M.S.
Gorbachev], IZVESTIIA, July 1, 1988, at 7; May Theses, supra note 5, part 6. For a use
of the term "deformations," see Dmitrii Kazutin, A Guide to Inaction, Moscow NEWS,
Mar. 13, 1988, at 12 (quoting Gorbachev).
52. Political Reform Resolution, supra note 27, points 2 & 7.
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Gorbachev himself stressed on numerous occasions, however, this call to
liberate the soviets from local party dictate by no means signalled a corresponding reduction of central party influence on the political process,
let alone a renunciation of the CPSU's role and significance as the vanguard ruling party.5 3
B.

The ConstitutionalFramework

One month after the Nineteenth All-Union Party Conference the executive body of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium, created two working
groups to translate into constitutional and legislative form the directives
for political reform set forth in the Conference resolutions. 4 These
groups, composed of legal specialists and "responsible workers" from the
Presidium and the CPSU Central Committee, devoted two months to
formulating amendments to the USSR Constitution of 1977 and a new
Electoral Law to conform with Gorbachev's perestroika and democratization policies. According to first-hand reports, the drafters based their
texts primarily on the broad principles stated in the Conference resolutions and the more concrete instructions issued by CPSU Central Committee members and Gorbachev's closest advisors. 5 Apparently, there
was intense debate throughout the period regarding the appropriate contours and powers of legislative organs. 6 Nevertheless, the working
groups eventually hammered out a set of compromise statutory provisions, embodied in the draft Constitutional Amendments Law' and
Electoral Law58 of October 22, 1988. One month of "nationwide discus-

53. See, e.g., Gorbachev, Krasnodar Speech, supra note 49, at 1; Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, Report to the USSR Supreme Soviet, K PolnovlastiiuSovetov i Sozdaniiu
SotsialisticheskogoPravovogo Gosudarstva [Toward Full Power For Soviets and Creation of a Socialist Law-Governed State] part V, PRAVDA, Nov. 30, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Gorbachev, Report to the Supreme Soviet]. Accord TASS, Stroit' OtnosheniiaSovetov
s PredpriiatiiamiNa Novykh Nachalakh [To Build Relations Between Soviets and Enterprises on New Principles], PRAVDA, Feb. 3, 1988, at 2 (speech by A.A. Gromyko).
54. For a detailed description of the drafting of the Constitutional Amendments Law
and the Electoral Law, see MICHAEL E. URBAN, MORE POWER TO THE SOVIETS: THE
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN THE USSR 46-53 (1990). See also M. Kushtapin, Kto
Prinimaet Popravhi? [Who Adopts the Amendments?], IzvEsTnA, Nov. 25, 1988, at 2.
55. See URBAN, supra note 54, at 48.
56. Id. at 48-53.
57. Proekt Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Izmeneniakh i
Dopolneniakh Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) SSSR [Draft USSR Law On Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (FundamentalLaw)] (Oct. 22, 1988),
PRAVDA, Oct. 22, 1988, at 1.
58. Proekt Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Vyborakh
Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [Draft USSR Law On Elections of USSR People's Depu-
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sion" followed during which journalists, legal scholars, officials, legislators, and citizens subjected many of the key elements of the proposed
legislation to close scrutiny and sharp criticism. 9 These public comments
had minimal impact, however, on the final versions of the Constitutional
Amendments Law"0 and the Electoral Law, 1 which the Supreme Soviet
adopted on December 1, 1988.
1. Codification of Demokratizatsiia
The Constitutional Amendments Law expressly stated as its primary
aim the "development of socialist democracy, self-government by the
people." 62 Article 108, which introduced a new "supreme body of state
authority," the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, most directly reflected this emphasis on popular political rule. According to Gorbachev,
this supralegislature was designed to "represent all social strata and
shades of public opinion," "guarantee what Lenin called 'full democratism of the center'" and constitute "socialist pluralism of opinions in
action."63

The text of the Constitutional Amendments Law, as supplemented
and reinforced by the Electoral Law, appeared to support Gorbachev's
assertions. Article 109 promoted the goal of broad popular representation
in the political process by providing for a Congress composed of 2,250
deputies elected in equal numbers from three constituencies: territorial
okrugs, national-territorial okrugs, and all-union social organizations. In
so doing, it determined voting by density, geographical distribution, and
'
"specific interests, aspirations, and needs" 64
of the populace.
The new scheme offered' numerous guarantees for enhanced public involvement in the federal government. It expanded opportunities to choose
and to serve as people's deputies. The 1988 legislation stipulated that all
elections from territorial and national-territorial electoral okrugs were to
be conducted "on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by
ties] (Oct. 22, 1988), PRAVDA, Oct. 23, 1988, at 1.
59. See URBAN, supra note 54, at ch. 4. For an example of criticisms of the nationwide discussion and specific provisions of the drafts, see, e.g., A. Pol'shakov, Komu
Vydvigat' Kandidatov [Who Should Nominate Candidates],SOTS. INDUSTRIIA, Oct. 28,
1988, at 3.
60. Constitutional Amendments Law, supra note 28.
61. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Vyborakh Narodnykh
Deputatov SSSR [USSR Law On Elections of USSR People's Deputies] (Dec. 1, 1988),
PRAVDA, Dec. 4, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Electoral Law].
62. Constitutional Amendments Law, supra note 28, pmbl.
63.

Gorbachev, Report to USSR Supreme Soviet, supra note 53, part III.

64. Id. part VI.
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secret ballot." 5 Moreover, in sharp contrast to past practice, it expressly
prescribed multicandidate competitive races. 6
Other major changes encouraged increased public knowledge, interest,
and participation in the electoral process. Thus, Chapter VII of the
Electoral Law, entitled Glasnost' in the Preparation and Conduct of
Elections of USSR People's Deputies, required electoral authorities to
supply citizens with information about candidate registration and background, voting results, and election outcomes. It also asserted the extensive powers of the media to publicize election developments. To facilitate
campaign efforts, the Electoral Law established important guarantees for
both voters and candidates, including the rights to campaign freely
through meetings, rallies, and the mass media.6
The Constitutional Amendments Law also addressed the question of
popular input into and information about the decisions and activities of
the Congress of People's Deputies. Article 94 contained a blanket statement that all soviets (including the Congress) must "take into account
public opinion, submit the most important questions of nationwide...
significance for discussion by citizens, and systematically inform citizens
about their work and the decisions adopted." Articles 102 and 107 pro-

vided two other constitutional mechanisms by which voters and social
organizations could influence the Congress: the so-called "mandate" and
the right to recall "[d]eputies who fail to justify the trust of voters."
Article 107 promoted popular information about the performance of
their elected officials. It required deputies to report to voters, collectives,
and social organizations regarding their own work and the activities of
the Congress.
These promising indications of a formal constitutional commitment to
enhanced public political participation should not be overstated, however. Even without the advantage of hindsight, it was doubtful that the
Congress of People's Deputies could in fact fulfill its destiny as supreme
organ of power. With its unwieldy numbers of deputies and infrequent
sessions,6" the Congress most likely would become as much of a facade of

65. KONST. SSSR art. 95 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
66. Id. art. 100.
67. Electoral Law, supra note 61, arts. 44 & 47. Chapter 7 of the Electoral Law
also provided Soviet citizens, labor collectives, and social organizations the "opportunity
to discuss freely and comprehensively the political, professional, and personal qualities"
of candidates and to campaign both for and against candidates. In turn, it guaranteed
candidates the rights to obtain all "necessary" information, to operate their campaigns at
state expense, to employ up to ten campaign workers, and to be released from work for
campaign events without any reduction in salary.
68. Article 110 of the amended Constitution provided for the Congress to meet only
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popular self-government as its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet.
A closer look at the 1988 reforms revealed that it was the reconstituted
and restructured Supreme Soviet, not the Congress, that had the greater
potential to develop into an effective legislature. Under the new constitutional scheme, the Supreme Soviet was a virtually permanently functioning body, meeting twice yearly for three to four-month periods."9 While
still large, it was less than one-quarter of the Congress' size.7 0 Yet, despite these obvious advantages of the Supreme Soviet, there was no opportunity for direct election of its deputies by the Soviet citizenry.
Rather, pursuant to Article 111 of the amended Constitution, the Congress of People's Deputies had the sole authority to determine the membership of the Supreme Soviet by secret vote from among congressional
deputies.
Furthermore, the legislative reforms of 1988 contained internal "filters" 7' 1 to constrain popular influence and participation in government.
The most obvious filter provided for one-third of congressional deputies
to be elected by social organizations.7 2 Because, at the time, the CPSU

refused to acknowledge rival political parties, the few social organizations officially recognized for electoral (and other) purposes were the
communist party, its youth group (the Komsomol), and other organizations that were unlikely to deviate from CPSU directive.73 This resulted
in a constitutional guarantee of significant communist party presence in
both federal legislatures.

once a year unless the Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, its Chairman, one-fifth of the
people's deputies, or a republic legislature called for additional extraordinary sessions.
KONST. SSSR (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
69. Id. art. 112.
70. The Supreme Soviet consisted of 542 deputies, divided equally into two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Pursuant to Article 111 of
the amended Constitution, the Congress had the power each year to replace one-fifth of
the membership of the Supreme Soviet.
71. Both Western and Soviet commentators have used the term "filter" in their descriptions of USSR legislative reforms. See, e.g., URBAN, supra note 54, at 29; Bill Keller, Soviet People Go to Polls Today; For Many, a Real Choice Awaits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1989, at 1, 14; A. Nazimova & V. Sheinis, Vybor Sdelan [Choice Has Been
Made], IZVESTIIA, May 7, 1989, at 3.
72. KONST. SSSR art. 109 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
73. ROBERT SHARLET, SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: FROM DE-STALINIZATION TO DISINTEGRATION 93 (1992). A list of social organizations appeared in KONST.
SSSR art. 95 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988). See Editorial, Demokratiia i Initsiativa [Democracy and Initiative], PRAVDA, Dec. 27, 1987, at 1 (criticizing unofficial, grassroots
organizations and concluding, "There is only one criterion here: Everything that benefits
socialism and democracy should be supported 'from above.' ").
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The system of electoral commissions, bodies formed for each constituency by the corresponding soviets to supervise and direct the election of
deputies, constituted an additional filter in the 1988 scheme."" These organs had significant powers to control the electoral process. This was
particularly apparent at the stage of registration of candidate deputies.
Chapter VI of the Electoral Law gave electoral commissions broad discretion to determine whether to approve or reject candidates nominated
by voters' meetings or social organizations for inclusion on the final bal-

lot.75 In fact, in cases with more than two nominees, the Electoral Law

expressly allowed electoral commissions to hold preelection meetings,
question the candidates, and then eliminate even properly nominated
76
individuals.
Another filter had the greatest potential to ensure control of the Soviet

legislative process from above-the post of Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As discussed earlier, despite constitutional provisions for
election of the Chairman by congressional deputies,"8 in actuality the
office was reserved for the General Secretary of the CPSU (i.e. Mikhail
Gorbachev). Notwithstanding the clear dangers of concentrating chief
state and party authority in the hands of a single individual, the Constitutional Amendments Law provided virtually no limits on the Chairman's authority in the form either of carefully defined and circumscribed
legal powers or of institutional checks and balances.7 Thus, the 1988
reforms gave constitutional'legitimacy not only to Gorbachev's democratization program but also to his own status as architect and leader of the
Soviet state.

74. Electoral Law, supra note 61, arts. 22, 24 & 26.
75. Id. arts. 37-42.
76. Id. art. 38.
77. See supra text accompanying note 42.
78. KoNsT. SSSR arts. 108(7) & 120 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
79. See id. arts. 120 & 121. For criticisms of the constitutional provisions regarding
the Chairman, see, e.g., A. Alistratov et al., Vybory: Sostiazatel'nost' Kandidatov i Pozitsiia Izbiratelei [Elections: Candidates' Competition and Voters' Position], IZVESTIIA,
Nov. 23, 1988, at 2; 0. Losoto & G. Ovcharenko, Perestroika i Vlast'. Beseda v
"Pravde" [Perestroikaand Power. Discussion at Pravda], PRAVDA, Jan. 31, 1990, at
1; Passages From an Article, which the Government Newspaper Izvestiia Refused to
Publish, by Leonid Batkin, Member of the Moscow Tribune Informal Group: Diversion
to Democracy?, PROFIL, Dec. 5, 1988, at 5, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 6, 1988, at
103.
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Professionalization of the Lawmaking Process

The 1988 Constitutional Amendments Law introduced significant
changes into every stage of the legislative process.80 Originally only the
highest federal and republic legislative and executive organs, USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, the USSR Supreme Court, the USSR Procurator
General, and social organizations could initiate legislation."1 Article 114
of the 1988 amendments expanded this list to include the Chairman of
the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Oversight Committee, the
USSR Committee for People's Control, the USSR Chief State Arbiter,
and the USSR Academy of Sciences.
The Constitutional Amendments Law expressly covered preparation
of draft statutes, the critical stage unaddressed in the 1977 Constitution.
Articles 122 and 123 assigned the tasks of drafting laws and conducting
"preliminary discussion" of drafts to the standing commissions and committees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the two
chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The original and revised versions of the 1977 Constitution treated draft publication and amendment
nearly identically. Neither contained an automatic, guaranteed opportunity for public consideration and comment regarding draft laws. Committees could submit laws for nationwide discussion only with the specific permission of the Supreme Soviet. s2 As a general rule, they would
83
send drafts directly to the federal legislature for debate and approval.
The 1988 amendments made two interesting changes, however. First, the
Supreme Soviet now had the exclusive power to decide whether to allow
nationwide discussion.84 Previously it had shared that right with the
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the small executive organ of the Su-

80. For a detailed description of the five basic stages of the legislative process and the
early reforms instituted by Gorbachev, see Frances Foster-Simons, Towards a More Per-

fect Union? The "Restructuring" of Soviet Legislation, 25

STAN.

J.

INT'L

L. 331

(1989).
81. KONST. SSSR art. 113 (1977).
82. Id. art. 114; KONST. SSSR art. 115 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988). On June 30,
1987 the Supreme Soviet enacted a statute to define and govern the nationwide discussion

process. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Vsenarodnom Obsuzhdenii Vazhnykh Voprosov GosudarstvennoiZhizni [USSR Law On Nationwide Discussion of Important Questions of State Life] (June 30, 1987), 26 Vedomosti SSSR, item
387 (1987). The law and its initial implementation are analyzed in Foster-Simons,
supra note 80, at 345-51.
83. KONST. SSSR art. 114 (1977); KONST. SSSR art. 115 (as amended Dec. 1,
1988). See V.N. Kudriavtsev, Demokratizatsiiai Pravovaia Reforma [Democratization
and Legal Reform], IZVESTIA, June 1, 1988, at 4.
*84. KONST. SSSR art. 115 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
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preme Soviet.8 5 Second, the amendments authorized a new body elected

by the Congress,"6 the Constitutional Oversight Committee, to intervene
in the drafting process. One of its prescribed duties was to assure that all
draft statutes submitted to the federal legislature for official endorsement
were consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the USSR. 7
Legislative approval of draft laws closely tracked past practice regarding Supreme Soviet adoption of statutes. Under the amended text the two
chambers of the Supreme Soviet examined, discussed, and voted on draft
laws at separate or joint sessions.8 8 Any law was "deemed adopted" if
passed by a majority of each chamber's deputies.8 9 Where the Soviet of
the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities failed to agree on approval of a
draft, they would submit the law first to a so-called "conciliation commission" and then to both chambers for reconsideration at a joint sitting. 0 If there was still no resolution of the question, then the USSR
Congress of People's Deputies would determine the fate of the draft
law.9 1
This scheme, however, did represent some change from its 1977 predecessor. The amended version of the Constitution no longer expressly
stipulated that drafts debated by the Supreme Soviet chambers "[w]here
necessary,... may be referred to one or more commissions for preliminary or additional consideration.""2 Another dissimilarity appeared in

the last step for settling disagreements between the two legislative chambers. While the 1977 Constitution envisioned ultimate resolution either
by the Supreme Soviet or by nationwide referendum,9 3 the amended version assigned this duty to the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies.
Enactment and publication, the final stage of the legislative process,
also received revised treatment in the Constitutional Amendments Law.
Unlike the 1977 Constitution, the new text designated the Chairman of

the Supreme Soviet, not the Chairman and Secretary of the Presidium,
as the signatory of USSR laws and other acts adopted by the Congress,
Supreme Soviet, and Presidium."4 Moreover, it significantly expanded

85. KONST. SSSR art. 114 (1977).
86. KONST. SSSR art. 125 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
87. Id. art. 125(1).
88. Id. art. 115.
89. Id. Congress' laws and resolutions required adoption by a majority of votes of
the total number of people's deputies. Id. art. 108(13).
90. Id. art. 117.
91. Id.
92. KONST. SSSR art. 114 (1977).
93. Id. art. 115.
94. Compare KONST. SSSR art. 121(1) (as amended Dec. 1, 1988) with KONST.
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the category of laws requiring publication to include not only enactments
of the Supreme Soviet but also those of the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet chambers, the Presidium, and the Chairman of
the Supreme Soviet. 5
Despite the major modifications of the Soviet legislative structure and
process introduced in 1988, there remained serious questions as to their
practical value in creating an effective, professional legislature. Historically, the system contained five flaws, none of which was completely
eradicated by the new legislation.
First, the federal legislature traditionally had little meaningful impact
on the formulation of statutes. Rather, its prime function was to give
official imprimatur to CPSU-proposed and approved laws. 96 Structural
factors contributed to this impotence of the Supreme Soviet. The highest
federal legislative body met only twice a year, usually for a total of two
to three days per session, and, thus, was unable to play a major role in
the drafting and discussion of legislation.9 7 As discussed above,"' the
1988 scheme targeted this structural problem by transforming the Supreme Soviet into a permanent legislative body. At the same time, however, it undermined this reform by establishing two federal legislatures
whose respective jurisdictions and responsibilities in the formulation and
adoption of legislation were not clearly defined or demarcated.99
Second, the Soviet legislative process lacked opportunities for public
input and access. 1" 0 The Constitutional Amendments Law made some
positive changes in this area. Articles 122, 115, and 119(15) provided
greater specificity regarding the drafting, discussion, and publication of
laws, respectively. Nonetheless, even in its revised version, the Constitution failed to guarantee the Soviet citizenry real influence or direct information regarding the initiation, preparation, or amendment of legisla-

SSSR art. 116 (1977).

95. Compare KONST. SSSR art. 119(15) (as amended Dec. 1, 1988) with KONST.
SSSR art. 116 (1977).
96. See OLYMPIAD S. IOFFE & PETER B. MAGGS, SOVIET LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 98-101 (1983); Demokratiia,Zakonnost, Vlast', supra note 26; F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Legislation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 477, 480 (2d ed. 1985).
97. JEAN BLONDEL, COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES 56-60 (1973).

98.

See supra text accompanying notes 69 & 70.

99. See Fedor Burlatskii, Zakonodateli [Legislators], Soy. KULTURA, Apr. 6, 1989,
at 2.
100. See IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 96, at 107; A.S. Pigolkin, Sovershenstvovanie
Sovetskogo Zakonodatel'tvaNa Sovremennom Etape [Perfection of Soviet Legislation at
the Present Stage], Soy. Gos. I PRAVO, no. 1, 12, 17 (1988); V. Shipilov, Pisma " . .
Ne Dlia Pechati" [Letters "... . Not For Publication"],IZVESTIIA, Mar. 2, 1988, at 6.
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tion. For example, the much-vaunted "nationwide discussion" of laws
remained contingent upon Supreme Soviet approval."'
Third, the previous system gave the Presidium the dangerous constitutional authority to issue binding decrees and resolutions. 0 2 In the past,
the Presidium routinely had exploited this prerogative to amend, supplement, and repeal officially enacted laws on an ad hoc basis." 3 Despite
this serious problem, the Constitutional Amendments Law continued to
assign the Presidium broad legislative powers.10 4 It tried to limit abuses
by introducing potential checks in the form of mandatory publication of
Presidium acts 0 5 and Constitutional Oversight Committee monitoring of
Presidium decrees for conformity with the Constitution and laws of the
USSR. 06
Fourth, the bureaucracy historically was a major impediment to
achieving an independent, professional legislature. At the highest level,
administrative organs and personnel regularly dictated the specific language and content of federal laws, obstructed the passage of "unacceptable" statutes, and flouted constitutional prescriptions by unilaterally
amending Supreme Soviet enactments. 01
The revised version of the Constitution appeared to contain an impressive array of safeguards to ensure federal legislative primacy over the
highest administrative apparatus. While continuing to recognize the
Council of Ministers' rights to initiate federal legislation' and to issue
binding resolutions and orders, 0 9 it provided express limitations on exercise of these legislative powers. Thus, Article 131 restricted the Council
of Ministers to matters of USSR state administration not specifically assigned to the federal legislature (and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet).
Article 133 stipulated that all acts must be "[o]n the basis and in execution of USSR laws and other decisions of the USSR Congress of People's
101. KONST. SSSR art. 115 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
102. KONST. SSSR, arts. 122 & 123 (1977).
103. See Feldbrugge, supra note 96, at 479; ARYEH L. UNGER,

CONSTITUTIONAL

101-104, 210 (1981).
KONST. SSSR art. 119 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).

DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR

104.

105. Id. art. 119 (15).
106. Id. art. 125. The Presidium was not mentioned by name but it fell under the
rubric of "organs or officials accountable to them [the Congress and Supreme Soviet]" by
virtue of Article 118. Article 118 specifically described the Presidium as "an organ accountable to the USSR Supreme Soviet." Id. art. 118.
107. See Iurii Rytov, Pobedit' Biurokrata[Besting the Bureaucrat],IzvEsTIIA, Mar.
1, 1988, at 2; Zakon Dlia Vsekh Odin [The Law Is the Same for All], PRAVDA, July 7,
1988, at 1.
108.

KONST. SSSR art. 114 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).

109. Id. art. 133.
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Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet." Articles 108 and 113 mandated legislative ratification of the most important administrative documents, including the state plan and the state budget,"' 0 and provided for
Supreme Soviet repeal of unconstitutional acts issued by the Council of

Ministers."' Article 125 provided the most far-reaching check on administrative lawmaking. It empowered the Constitutional Oversight
Committee to monitor the constitutionality and legality of all laws and
union republic
resolutions issued by the USSR Council of Ministers,
12
councils of ministers, and other state organs.
Similarly, the 1988 text contained a number of articles specifically addressing the problem of administrative interference in the creation and
enforcement of legisltion. It attempted to limit intrusion by bureaucrats
into federal legislative decisionmaking by prohibiting members of the
Council of Ministers from serving simultaneously as people's deputies"' 4
and by generally forbidding any interference in the electoral process."1
Moreover, it sought to enhance legislative control over bureaucratic personnel by requiring the Congress and the Supreme Soviet to appoint and
to ratify the highest administrative officials"' and by guaranteeing people's deputies the right to question members of the Council of Ministers
during formal legislative sessions."' Finally, it assigned extensive powers
to monitor administrative enforcement of laws to three legislative bodies-the Supreme Soviet," 7 Supreme Soviet commissions and committees," and the Committee for People's Control, an organ established by
110. Id. arts. 108(5) & 113(10). Article 108(5) contained a particularly comprehensive grant of authority. It gave the Congress the power to ratify "highly important allUnion programs for the economic and social development of the USSR." Article 113(10)
also empowered the legislature to amend the state plan and the state budget "whenever
necessary."
111. Id. art. 113(18). Article 113(19) assigned the Supreme Soviet, in addition, the
right to repeal union republic council of ministers' acts that were not in conformity with
the USSR Constitution and USSR laws.
112. Id. art. 125(3).
113. Id. art. 96.

114. Id. art. 99. See also Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 13 (providing for liability of officials of state bodies and social organizations for violations of Electoral Law).
115. KONST. SSSR arts. 108(9) & 113(2) (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).
116. Id. art. 124.
117. Under Article 113, the Supreme Soviet had the express authority to "monitor
progress in the implementation of the plan and the budget" and to hear regular reports
by the Council of Ministers and any other organs or officials appointed by it. Id. art.
113(5), (10).
118. The Constitution empowered Supreme Soviet committees and commissions,
among others, to investigate appointees to the Council of Ministers, to promote the implementation of laws and decisions adopted by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, and
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and accountable to the Supreme Soviet."'
On paper, then, the revised version of the Constitution appeared to
institute numerous devices to protect 'the federal legislature from administrative interference. In fact, however, nearly every mechanism had an
analogue in the original version of the 1977 Constitution. The powers to
appoint the Council of Ministers, repeal its decisions, ratify and supervise the state plan and state budget, and monitor by direct and indirect
means the execution of laws and administrative activities of the Soviet
bureaucracy all predated the 1988 legislative reforms.12 ° In the past,
these provisions had amounted to mere illusions of federal legislative
supremacy rather than effective restraints on administrative organs and
officials.
Fifth, the communist party constituted by far the greatest threat to
establishment of a competent, sovereign federal legislature. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, the CPSU, not the Supreme Soviet
or its Presidium, traditionally exercised chief legislative authority. 21
Party policy operated as the major impetus for new or amended legislation. Party officials either drafted statutes or participated as advisors in
the process. The highest party body, the Politburo, determined when or
even if a specific draft was suitable for submission to the public and the
legislature. Once the Politburo approved a draft for formal enactment,
the Supreme Soviet swiftly and unanimously endorsed it.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Soviet reformers dismissed the formulation and adoption of USSR legislation as a "stage-managed process."1 22 What is remarkable is that the 1988 amendments did not directly mention party involvement in lawmaking or, for that matter, the
CPSU itself. The communist party appeared only indirectly under the
general rubric of "social organization." As described above, 23 the 1988
Constitutional Amendments Law gave the CPSU as a social organization significant constitutional power to shape the composition and decisions of both federal legislatures. Moreover, it permitted the party to

to monitor the activities of state organs and organizations. Id. arts. 122 & 123.
119. The Committee for People's Control had the responsibilities to "verify the fulfillment of the requirements of legislation and state programs and targets; combat violations of state discipline, manifestations of parochialism and a departmental approach to
the task, thriftlessness and extravagance, red tape, and bureaucracy." Id. art. 92.
120. See KONST. SSSR arts. 108, 121(7), 122(34), 129 & 130 (1977).
121. See Foster-Simons, supra note 80, at 335-38, 343-44, 372-73.
122. Iurii Shpakov, Pervyi Etazh Vlasti [The First Level of Power], PRAVDA, Apr.
28, 1988, at 1.
123.

See supra text accompanying note 73.
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retain its official right to initiate legislation."" Similar to the treatment
of the bureaucracy, the new scheme introduced one possible but weak
check on party lawmaking-Constitutional Oversight Committee supervision of the "normative acts" of social organizations.' 2 5
Thus, the Constitutional Amendments Law did not adequately address any of the fundamental defects in the Soviet legislative structure or
process. In fact, its end result was the creation of a new, even more
formidable rival to the federal legislature in the person of the Chairman
of the Supreme Soviet. Article 121 of the amended Constitution guaranteed the Chairman the rights to initiate legislation; to "exercise overall
leadership over the preparation of questions subject to examination by
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet"; to sign laws; to nominate the first deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, members of the Constitutional Oversight Committee, and
highest administrative and legal officials; and to issue "orders."' 26 These
broad powers amounted to a constitutional license for the Chairman to
supplant the federal legislature in every lawmaking stage.
C. Legislative Reform in Theory and Practice
Gorbachev's interpretation of demokratizatsiia and pravovoe
gosudarstvo clearly was neither "government by the people" nor "rule
of law." His reform program featured a legislature more reflective of
popular interests yet still fundamentally responsive to central party directive and guidance. Both theoretical underpinnings and structural design promoted outside domination.
In initial proclamations and justifications for legislative change, the
adjective "socialist" invariably preceded the noun "democracy. 1127

124.

KONST. SSSR art. 114 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988).

125. Id. art. 125(4).
126. Id. art. 121.
127. See, e.g., A. Eberlin, Democracy and Public Order, BAKINsII RABOCHII,
Mar. 12, 1988, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 28, 1988, at 64; Gorbachev,
supra note 29; Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Address to Fourth All-Union Congress of
Kolkhoz Members (Mar. 23, 1988), PRAVDA, Mar. 24, 1988, at 1, 1; TASS, Vysokoe
Napriazhenie-Kazhdomu Dniu Perestroiki [Great Effort-For Every Day of Perestroika], PRAVDA, Feb. 2, 1988, at 2. For an explanation of a similar use of "socialist"
to modify "pluralism," see Andrei Vinogradov, The CPSU Expresses the Interests of All
Working People, RUDE PRAVO, Mar. 23, 1988, at 6, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar.
31, 1988, at 49-50:
One still comes across the view that expressions of pluralism (in all kinds of issues) are something harmful and alien to socialism . . . I think that here it is
appropriate to recall the principled clarification made during M. Gorbachev's
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Gorbachev's democracy was not an independent public good but an instrument of ideology. Its purpose was to advance Soviet socialism along
the new path marked out by the current CPSU leadership. 2 8 This approach made the definition of democracy and its translation into action
the exclusive preserve of Gorbachev and the party elite. It also set the
stage for continuous CPSU supervision and intervention in the day-today operations of the new Soviet legislature to ensure conformity with
changing policies and objectives of the party leadership. Gorbachev's "socialist democracy," like Stalin's "socialist law,"'129 was nothing short of a

meeting with the representatives of the French people last September. I am thinking of the importance of the adjective "socialist," which-as the CPSU Central
Committee general secretary stressed-it is essential to add to the term "pluralism." Socialist pluralism, the absence of which under the one-party system is so
often deplored, is based on socialist values. A frank exchange of views does not
multiply problems-it crystallizes them, and helps alternative solutions to be found
and the very best to be selected. After all, the exclusive nature of the Communist
Party in our society has never been a purpose in itself. The system of several
parties was maintained during the post-revolutionary years, and the members of
the first All-Russian Central Executive Committee were not only Bolsheviks, but
also left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), Maximalist SRs, Mensheviks-Internationalists, and Ukrainian Socialists. It was not the Bolsheviks who removed
them from the political arena-they themselves failed to pass the test of devotion to
the ideas of the socialist revolution.

See generally Archie Brown, The Soviet Leadership and the Struggle for Political Reform, 1 HARRIMAN INST. F. 1, 3 (Apr. 1988); Thomas F. Remington, A Socialist Pluralism of Opinions: Glasnost' and Policy-Making Under Gorbachev, 48 RUSSIAN REv.
271 (1989).
128. See supra part II.A.
129. In the 1930s, Joseph Stalin dramatically departed from Marxist-Leninist ortho-

doxy when he proclaimed the need for a strong socialist state and stable legal system
during the Soviet Union's transition to communism. See, e.g., Joseph Stalin, Political
Report of the Central (Party)Committee to the XVI Congress, 1930, translatedin SoVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 235 (Hugh W. Babb trans. & ed., 1951); Joseph Stalin, On
the Draft Constitution of the USSR (Nov. 25, 1938), translated in LENINiSM 564-65
(1940). E.B. Pashukansis provided the most succinct definition of the Stalinist notion of
socialist law in a 1936 recantation of his earlier views: "the law of the proletarian state
[that] serves as an instrument for the construction of socialism." E.B. Pashukanis,
Gosudarstvo i Pravo Pri Sotsializme [State and Law Under Socialism], Soy.
GOSUDARSTVO, no. 3, 3 (1936), translated in SOVIET POLIrIcAL THoUGHT: AN ANTHOLOGY 315, 321 (Michael Jaworskyj trans. & ed., 1967). Andrei Ia. Vyshinskii, the
leading exponent of the new "permanent socialist law," see W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW
35 (2d ed. 1988), went even further to exalt socialist law precisely because it emphasized
"the interests and needs of the proletarian revolution ... rather than the formal element,
the wording, or legal formula." ANDREI IA. VYSHINSKII, REVOLUTIONARY LEGALITY
ON THE PRESENT STAGE 16 (1933). See generally ANDREI IA. VYSHINSKII, THE LAW
OF THE SOVIET STATE (Hugh W. Babb trans., 1948). This interpretation rationalized
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formula for control.
The reform program buttressed theory with practical mechanisms to
ensure subordination of the restructured legislature to central party command. Key examples appeared in the process for selection of deputies. As
has been shown above,' 30 the 1988 legislation reserved one-third of the
seats in Congress for representatives of CPSU-sanctioned social organizations, introduced various electoral "filters" to screen out politically
"unsuitable" candidates, and denied direct popular selection of the most
significant legislators, Supreme Soviet deputies. Similarly, the new
scheme provided two internal institutional constraints on legislative action in the form of the Presidium and the omnipotent Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet. 131 Finally, it carefully insulated the lawmaking process
from outside influence by the popular electorate. Even in its revised version, the Soviet Constitution continued to offer virtually no avenues for
meaningful public participation or impact on the initiation, formulation,
and enactment of legislation." 2 This isolation of power blunted any pos-

sible danger of competition between popular and party interests and
demands.
The reform program did not promise institution of "rule of law" any
more than it did "people's power."' While it created a more effective,
professional lawmaking body, the basic function of this restructured legislature remained largely unchanged-to codify the policy directives of
highest party authorities. Gorbachev recognized that the economic and
political exigencies of the time required greater attention to the content
and enforcement of statutes. Accordingly, to promote economic modernization, he called for rapid creation of comprehensive, predictable legal
norms and rules.' 4 At the same time, to counter the most likely threats
to the future of perestroika and of Gorbachev himself, he insisted on
strict observance and subordination of administrative and party personnel and organs to the law.'3 5 Unfortunately, his new scheme provided no

and licensed Stalin's extensive resort to both legal and extralegal means to crush popular
resistance and political opposition. For accounts of Stalinist terror, see generally ROBERT
CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES
JuVILER, REVOLUTIONARY LAW AND ORDER:

POLITICS

(1968);

PETER

AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE

USSR (1976); NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, CIMES OF THE STALIN ERA (1962); Roy
MEDVEDEV, LET HISTORY JUDGE (G. Shriver trans., 1989) (1972).

130. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 77-79, 102-106, 126 and accompanying text.
132.
133.

See supra notes 80-95, 100-01 and accompanying text.
Editorial, Doverie Naroda [The People's Trust], PRAVDA, May 24, 1989, at 1.

134. See supra notes 29, 43-45 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
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detailed blueprint regarding the nuts and bolts of the lawmaking process.
Nor did it establish concrete devices to ensure administrative and party
compliance.
In short, Gorbachev prescribed a system of "rule by law" rather than
"rule of law." 3 ' His ideal "[p]arliament was not the representative organ of the people but an organ supporting [his] legislative power . .. ""'
The practical potential and limits of this legislative model readily became apparent in the early 1989 elections for the USSR Congress of
People's Deputies.
In 1989 the Soviet leadership for the first time in history allowed its
citizens genuine involvement in the selection of their legislative representatives. 13 s The Soviet populace accepted this invitation with an enthusiasm that captured national and international attention. For four
months, voters attended meetings and rallies by the thousands,1" 9

launched a veritable war of political posters, leaflets, and flyers, 4" and
sported colorful campaign buttons."4 ' During this period, the USSR entered the age of electronic campaigning. Vans with loudspeakers patrolled city streets proclaiming the virtues and latest platforms of candidates. 142 Radio and television provided extensive coverage of campaign
events and fora for candidates to debate their views and answer voters'

136.

This distinction between "rule by law" and "rule of law" is drawn from

Noriho Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States
and Japan, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 63 (1990).
137. Id. at 63 (describing the nature of Japanese legislature under the Meiji Constitution but equally applicable to the "perestroika parliament" proposed by Gorbachev).

138. Editorial, Nash Grazhdanskii Dolg: Ispolnim Ego, Priniav Uchastie v
Vyborakh [Our Civic Duty: Let's Fulfill it by Participatingin the Elections], PRAVDA,
Mar. 26, 1989, at 1. For in-depth analyses of the 1989 elections, see Peter Lentini,

Reforming the Electoral System: The 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies, 7 J. COMMUNIST STUD. 69 (1991); Max E. Mote, Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, 38 PROBS. COMMUNISM 51 (Nov.-Dec. 1989); Stephen
White, The Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, March 1989, 9 ELECTORAL STUD. 59 (1990).

139. See, e.g., AFP, Mar. 19, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62; A.
Davydov, Moskva, IZVESTIIA, Mar. 27, 1989, at 1.

140. See V. Drobotov, Komu Doverit' Vlast': Debaty vo Dvore Vokrug Kandidatov i
Ikh Programm [Those To Whom Power Should Be Entrusted. Debates in the Main
Square on Candidates and Their Programs], Soy. RossnA, Mar. 12, 1989, at 1; A.
Murtazaev, Izbrany Narodnom [Elected by the People], PRAVDA, Apr. 5, 1989, at 2;
TASS, Mar. 17, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62.
141. Walter Isaacson, A Long Mighty Struggle, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 52.
142. See N. Kishkin, Vybory i Vybor [Elections and the Choice], TRUD, Apr. 7, 1989,
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questions.' 4 The Soviet electorate also experienced the most negative aspects of political campaigns all-too-familiar to Western counter45
4
parts-outrageous campaign promises' and slander of opponents.'
When Soviet voters went to the polls in late March, they demonstrated
that they took their expanded, constitutional right of franchise as seriously as their new campaign guarantees. Nearly ninety percent of the
electorate cast ballots.: 4 They dealt a series of defeats to party loyalists

143. For example, the popular television program Dobryi Vecher, Moskva [Good
Evening, Moscow] featured debates among candidates for Moscow's twenty-six okrugs.

See also, Bill Keller, In Moscow's TV PoliticalDebates, the Unspeakable Is Now Routine, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1989, at 1, 8; Katrina Vanden Heuval, Counting the Votes
and the Dead, THE NATION, Apr. 17, 1989, at 523. See V. Dolganov, Komplimentarnye
Pomekhi v Debatakh [Complimentary Obstacles in Debates], IzvESTIIA, Mar. 10, 1989,
at 7.
There were problems with televised broadcasts, however, which included too limited
time for candidates to describe their programs and to answer questions, biased questions
from reporters, and frequent intervention by moderators to prevent real dialogue among
candidates. See id.; Sergei Lomakin & Artem Borovik, Moscow Television Service, Mar.
17, 1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 20, 1989, at 63. Moreover, there was occasional censorship of broadcasts even to the point of refusing to air some candidates' debates. See Vladimir Tikhonov et al., Ban on Criticism: One Incident in the Lives of
Candidatesfor Election to People'sDeputies in the Epoch of Glasnost, Moscow NEws,
Mar. 12-19, 1989, at 14.
144. See Editorial, Otvetstvennost' PeredIzbirateliami [Responsibility to the Voters],
PRAVDA, Feb. 15, 1989, at 1, translated in 41 CDSP, Mar. 15, 1989, at 20, 20:
However, it sometimes happens that voters are promised everything but the moon.
They suddenly find out that one candidate is promising that enterprises in his
district will be environmentally clean in three years (!), while another intends to
"increase purchases of imported manufactured goods until Soviet-made goods of
equal quality are available." (Though he has nothing to say about when and how
they will appear.) Some argue for immediate introduction of a convertible ruble,
evidently ignoring our multibillion-ruble budget deficit. Some are demanding that
all state apartments be sold to their occupants, forgetting to ask, however, whether
the Jatter want and have the means to buy them.
Id. Accord A. Belousov, Ia-Za Dostatochnost' Khleba i Oborony [I-For Enough

Bread and Defense],
145.

KRASNAIA ZVEZDA,

Apr. 29, 1989, at 1.

See N. Volynskii & V. Loginov, ZatianuvshaiasiaPauza. Razmyshleniia 0

Nekotorykh Uroakh Vyborov v Leningrade [A Prolonged Pause: Reflections on Some
Lessons of the Elections in Leningrad], PRAVDA, Apr. 20, 1989, at 2. A well-publicized
example of such negative tactics was the so-called "smear campaign" against Boris
El'tsin. See AFP, Mar. 24, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 27, 1989, at 47; Boris El'tsin,
A Crisis ProgramIs Needed, Gorbachev!, DAGENs NYHETER, Aug. 8, 1989, at 5, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 10, 1989, at 52, 53.
146. See A. Plutnik & V. Shchepotkin, Moskva, 25 Maia. Kremlevskii Dvorets
S'ezdov [Moscow, 25 May. Kremlin Palace of Congresses],IZVESTIIA, May 26, 1989, at

1; Soobshchenie Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii Ob Itogakh Vyborov Narodnykh
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and conservative officials so stunning as to surprise even the Gorbachev
leadership.14 In competitive races, they consistently favored the candidates espousing progressive political views and policies.1 4 Where entrenched CPSU functionaries ran unopposed, Soviet voters protested
these "elections without choice"' 49 by crossing out the sole names on the
ballot.' 50 In so doing, they prevented unacceptable candidates from receiving the legal requisite for election of over fifty percent of votes
cast.'' In the end, USSR citizens rejected thirty-four regional CPSU
secretaries, the mayors of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and the former
commander of Soviet forces in East Germany.' 52 They elected prominent
political, religious, and nationalist reformers committed to radical
changes far beyond those proposed by Gorbachev.' 53
Deputatov SSSR v 1989 Godu [Report of the Central Electoral Commission on the
Results of the 1989 Elections of USSR People's Deputies], IZVESTIIA, Apr. 5, 1989, at 1
[hereinafter CentralElectoral Commission Report].
147. See B. Buchialis & G. Savitskas, Discoveries and Lessons of Elections, Soy.
LITVA,

Mar. 30, 1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 13, 1989, at 54; Editorial,

Narod Sdelal Vybor [The People Have Made Their Choice], PRAVDA, Apr. 1, 1989, at
1; Viktor Khatuntsev, Vybory Prodolzhaiutsia[Elections Continue], PRAVDA, Apr. 9,
1989, at 3.
148. See, e.g., discussion of Moscow elections in URBAN, supra note 54, at 112.
149. N. Baklanov, Kiev, IzvEs'IIA, Mar. 28, 1989, at 1, 1.
150. Such voting tactics had an enormous impact. In 195 districts, candidates failed
to obtain the required majority of votes. In three other districts (all in Armenia), less

than the requisite half of voters (Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 55) participated in
an expression of their displeasure with "elections without a choice." See S. Bablumian,

Erevan, IZVESTIIA, Mar. 28, 1989, at 1. This necessitated repeat elections on May 14,
1989 in these 198 districts (and in one additional district where the elected deputy died).
See TASS, May 13, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 15, 1989, at 62.
In some areas, unofficial organizations posted signs encouraging voters to cross out
names of single candidates. For example, in Kalingrad, the Solidarity Society's posters
read: "When you are deprived of a vote, vote against." A. Pilipchuk, Shumikha Na

Perekrestke, Ili Kakimi Metodami Deistvuiut "Neformaly" iz Kalingradskogo
Obshchestva "Solidarnost'" [Ballyhoo at the Crossroads, or the Methods Used by "Informals"from the Kalingrad"Solidarity" Society], KRASNAIA ZVEZDA, Mar. 11, 1989,
at 1.
151. Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 55.
152. Harry Anderson, A Message to Moscow, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1989, at 34. See
also URBAN, supra note 54, at 112-14; Viktor Danilenko, Electoral Reform, in PERESTROIKA-ERA POLITICS, supra note 12, at 33, 48.
For a discussion of party losses, see Editorial, Komu Liudi Doveriaiut.Avtoritet Par-

tiinykh Rabotnikov Utverzhdaetsia Delom [Whom the People Trust: Party Workers' Authority Is Affirmed by Deeds], PRAVDA, Apr. 13, 1989, at 1.
153. See Bill Keller, Soviet Voters Deal Humiliating Blow to Party Officials, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1989, at Al. For a complete list of elected candidates, see IzvESTIIA,
Apr. 5, 1989, at 2-12.
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Despite Gorbachev's claims to the contrary,' the dramatic, unexpected votes in the 1989 elections by no means reflected demokratizatsiia
in action. Rather, they represented the well-publicized exceptions to an
otherwise successful "road test" 155 of the prescribed model of "apparatus
democratization" 1 5 6-democratic reform within the strict definition and
control of Gorbachev and the party elite. The reality of demokratizatsiia
57
was an electoral process that generally offered few contested races,
limited candidate information and access to voters,' 58 licensed extensive
outside interference with popular efforts to participate as candidates and
voters,' 5 9 and, ultimately, produced a legislature with substantially increased CPSU representation.' 0

154. See, e.g., Mikhail Gorbachev, Zakliuchitel'noe Slovo M.S. Gorbacheva na
Plenume TsK KPSS 25 Aprelia 1989 [Concluding Speech of M.S. Gorbachev to the
CPSU Central Committee Plenum on April 25, 1989], IzvSTI1A, Apr. 27, 1989, at 1.
155. Editorial, Golosuem za Perestroiku: Segodnia-Vybory Narodnykh Deputatov
SSSR [We Vote for Restructuring: Elections of USSR People's Deputies Are Today],
KRASNAIA ZVEZDA, Mar.

26, 1989, at 1.

156. Viktor Danilenko, Kakim Vizhu Sovetskii Parlament [How I Envision the Soviet Parliament],LITERATURNAIA GAZETA, May 17, 1989, at 10.
157. Of the 1500 district races, a total of 384 were uncontested. The record of social
organizations was even more dismal, with only 871 candidates for the 750 seats. The
CPSU showed its support for democratic competition by nominating exactly 100 candidates for its 100 seats. See I. Karpenko, Dorogi, Kotorymi My Vybiraem: Nakanune

Poslednego Etapa Izbiratel'nomoiKampanii [The Ways We Choose: On the Eve of the
FinalStage of the Election Campaign], IZVESTIIA,Mar. 8, 1989, at 2; CentralElectoral
Commission Report, supra note 146. For justifications of the CPSU approach, see Viktor

Belousov, Nazvany Partiei [Nominated by the Party], PRAVDA, Feb. 25, 1989, at 2;
TASS, M.S. Gorbachev: Vybory 1989-90 Prodvigaiut Nas Daleko Vpered [M.S.
Gorbachev: The 1989 Elections Are Taking Us a Long Way Forward],PRAVDA, Mar.
27, 1989, at 1.
158. A public opinion questionnaire conducted by the All-Union Center for Study of
Public Opinion revealed the most dramatic evidence of this. This poll indicated that three
weeks before the elections, more than half the voting population still did not know who

the candidates were. See N. Popov, Obshchestvennoe Mnenie i Vybory [Public Opinion
and Choices], IZVESTIIA, Apr. 22, 1989, at 6. See also I. Karpenko, Dorogi, Kotorymi
My Vybiraem [The Ways We Elect], IZVSTIA, Mar. 21, 1989, at 1; Viacheslav Shchepotkin, Volna i Krugi [The Wave and the Ripples], IzvEs'mA, Feb. 9, 1989, at 2.
159. See infra notes 161-180, 188 and accompanying text.
160. CPSU representation rose from 71.4% in 1984 to 87.6% in 1989. However,
only 31% of the full members of the CPSU Central Committee and 26% of its candidate
members were elected to the Congress. Nazimova & Sheinis, supra note 71. In contrast
to the CPSU, other groups, including workers and peasants, experienced reduced legislative representation as a result of the 1989 elections. See Iurii Kurbatov, Gde Zhe

Rabochie Kandidaty? [But Where Are The Worker Candidates?], SOTS.

INDUSTRIIA,

Mar. 4, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Kurbatov, Worker Candidates]; Iurii Kurbatov, Proba

Golosa [A Sample of the Vote], SoTs. INDUSTRIIA, Apr. 4, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter
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Indeed, in every phase of the electoral process the extralegal and legal
filters "operated rigidly and impeccably." ' In nomination of candidates
the longstanding practice of prior CPSU clearance and approval remained prevalent. Reports abounded of open "instructions" from party
authorities regarding appropriate slates of candidates,' 62 "comrade to
comrade" talks with "unsuitable" potential nominees to persuade them
to withdraw their names from consideration, 6 3 and direct summons of
nominating organizations to local CPSU headquarters for criticism and
64
correction of their "unplanned" nominations.1

Official electoral organs reinforced and supplemented this unofficial
manipulation of the nomination process. Thus, social organizations used
their legal authority to disqualify prominent reformists from their lists of
candidates.'6 5 Electoral commissions directly 6 and indirectly 6 7 pre-

Kurbatov, A Sample of the Vote].
The number of female deputies decreased by more than half, a disturbing development. Commentators have generally attributed this drop to negative societal attitudes
toward women and to lack of electoral experience and "boldness" of women's councils
and female candidates. See T. Khudiakova, PrekrasniiPol: Shansy Stat' Deputatom
[The FairSex: Chances to Become a Deputy], IZVESTIA, Dec. 30, 1989, at 2; Latinform
Report, Democracyfor All is the Foundationof Restructuring, Soy. LATVIIA, Mar. 19,
1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 7, 1989, at 59, 60. Mikhail Poltaranin
suggested, however, that the low representation of women might not be entirely negative:
"[W]e should not push them [women] into politics by force; after all, in our country they
are still doing most of the housework and, therefore, have less free time." Kerstin Witt,
The Dictatorshipof the Apparatus Is Over, PROFIL, Apr. 3, 1989, at 54, translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 4, 1989, at 44, 45 (comment by Mikhail N. Poltaranin).
161. Nazimova & Sheinis, supra note 71, at 3.
162. See, e.g., Viacheslav Liubitskii, Vydvizhenie Kandidatov: Uroki i Vyvody [Nomination of Candidates:Lessons and Conclusions], PRAVDA,Jan. 28, 1989, at 3.

163. See, e.g., A. Davydov et al., Kandidaty Nazvany-Bor'ba Vpered [The Candidates Are Nominated-the Struggle Lies Ahead], IZVESTIIA, Jan. 25, 1989, at 2; G.
Dildiaiev, Pervye i... Edinstvennye? [The First and... Only Ones?], PRAVDA, Mar.
21, 1989, at 2; Editorial, supra note 144; Kurbatov, Worker Candidates, supra note
160.
164. See, e.g., Kishkin, supra note 142 (noting that ChernomorskaiaZdravnitsa reporters summoned to city party committee and criticized for their "immaturity" in nominating a candidate without party approval).
165. For example, the USSR Academy of Sciences' Presidium refused to include Andrei Sakharov (and other reformists) on its slate of nominees on January 18, 1989. More
than fifty-five scientific institutes had supported Sakharov's candidacy. See A. Davydov,

ZavershaetsiaPervyi Etap. Mandatov Bol'she Chem Pretendentov [FirstStage Coming

to a Close: More Mandates Than Contenders], IZVESTIIA, Jan. 20, 1989, at 2. Academy
research associates responded by organizing a protest rally, by establishing the Interinstitute Committee for Democratic Elections in the USSR Academy of Sciences, and by
approving only eight of the twenty-three candidates in the March 21 Academy elections.
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vented independent citizens groups from meeting to nominate candidates,
disqualified nominees on specious procedural grounds,""8 and, in some
cases, even forced withdrawal of would-be candidates to guarantee victory for party members.'
In the postnomination phase, electoral commissions exercised even
more substantial control. They demonstrated the practical application of
the preregistration meetings stipulated in Article 38 of the 1988 Electoral Law. 170 If more than two nominees sought a legislative seat, electoral
commissions routinely called preelection meetings to screen out undesirable candidates. These sessions often consisted of only limited questioning of candidates and consideration of their respective qualifications and
platforms.17 ' In some instances, organizers even went so far as to estabThis forced the Presidium to nominate on April 10 new candidates for the twelve vacant
seats. The Presidum named Sakharov, who was ultimately elected as a deputy on April
20. See V. Dolganov & M. Kushtapin, Deputaty ot Akademii Nauk SSSR [Deputies
from the USSR Academy of Sciences], IZVFSTI1A, Apr. 21, 1989, at 3; Valerii Kadzbaia,
Those Who Decided to Enter the Political Struggle in.EarnestShould Earnestly Learn
the Art of the Struggle: The Science of Choosing, Some Lessons From the Election Struggle of A. Sakharov, B. Yeltsin and V. Korotich, NEDELIA, Apr. 10-16, 1989, at 7, translated in 41 CDSP, May 10, 1989, at 14; Gennady Zhavoronkov, For Peace and Progress, Moscow NEws, Feb. 12-19, 1989, at 8 (interview of Andrei Sakharov).
166. For examples of outright bans on nomination meetings see, e.g., Krainiaia
Mera [Extreme Measure], KOMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA, Jan. 24, 1989, at 2; Viacheslav

Liubitskii, Schet v Pol'zu Demokratii [Balance in Favor of Democracy], PRAVDA, Feb.
3, 1989, at 1. See generally M. Kushtapin, Chto v Tsentral'noiIzbiratel'noi Komissii
[What They Discussed at the Central Electoral Commission], IzvEsTIA, Jan. 14, 1989,
at 2.
167. Indirect means included refusal to provide premises, belated announcement of
meetings, deliberate selection of inconvenient times for sessions, and last-minute relocation of meetings without adequate notice to the public. See, e.g., Drobotov, supra note
140, at 1; Editorial, supra note 144; Kurbatov, Worker Candidates, supra note 160.
168. See, e.g., Kishkin, supra note 142; I. Korol'kov, My Tak Schitaem ...Zaiavili

Izbirateliam v Raiispolkome i Sobranie Zakryli [Because We Think So ...That Was
What the Raiispolkom Told Voters, and the Meeting Was Closed], IZVESTIIA, Jan. 17,
1989, at 2.
169. See, e.g., AFP, Feb. 10, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 10, 1989, at 49 (noting
that Voronezh electoral commission withdrew Gavril Popov's name to ensure victory for
Vitalii Vorotnikov, a Politburo member and President of the RSFSR).
170. ElectoralLaw, supra note 61, art. 38. The Electoral Law did not mandate such
meetings. It only stipulated that they "may be held." The statute barred election meetings "if no more than two candidates have been nominated for the okrugs . . . ." Id. For
a discussion of the ambiguous and incomplete legal provisions on preelection meetings
that could be manipulated by electoral commissions, see Viacheslav Shchepotkin, Pod
Strogii Kontrol' Izbiratelei [Under Voters' Strict Control], IzvEsTnIA, Jan. 23, 1989, at

1.
171.

See Kishkin, supra note 142 ("Thus, the discussion is not the important thing,
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lish "checkpoints" to restrict access to approved nominees. 7 2 Not surprisingly, this resulted in a significant reduction in the number and diversity of candidates on the final slates.1 7 3 For example, in one electoral
okrug, the commission ultimately permitted registration for only one out
of eleven original nominees-the first secretary of the oblast' party
17 4
committee.
In preelectoral campaigns as well, there were major obstacles to full,
independent participation by the citizenry. Party, administrative, and
electoral authorities exploited their legal and practical controls over
printing houses, 75 duplicating technology, 76 scheduling, location, and

procedures of candidate meetings with voters, 177 access to the mass media,17 and the like to favor some candidates at the expense of others.
Similarly, national and local government officials used their regulatory

only the desire to reduce the number of candidates."). Accord Interview with Vitalii
Korotich, BBC, Feb. 27, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 10, 1985, at 30.
The composition of meeting participants contributed to the pro forma nature of many
preelection meetings. Although the Electoral Law provided for nominating organizations
to select appropriate delegates. Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 38, electoral commissions often handpicked delegates deemed most likely to vote for the nominees favored by
local party authorities. See G. Barabashev & V. Vasil'ev, Etapy Reformy [Stages of Reform], PRAVDA, May 7, 1989, at 3; Karpenko, supra note 157; Iurii Nikolaev, Izbirateli
iKandidaty [Voters and Candidates], Soy. RossIIA, Feb. 28, 1989, at 1.
172. See, e.g., V. Liubitskii & A. Cherniak, Voskhozhdenie K Demohratii: Po
Stupeniam PredvybornoiKampanii [Ascent Toward Democracy: On the Rungs of the
Election Campaign], PRAVDA, Apr. 4, 1989, at 3 (describing experience in Kiev City
National-Territorial Okrug No. 33). Accord T. Boikova, Difficult Lessons of Democracy,
SELSKAIA ZHIZN', Feb. 23, 1989, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 28, 1989, at 44.
173. Electoral commissions used other techniques to refuse registration to properly
nominated individuals. The most popular was invocation of an absolute residency requirement, which in fact did not appear in the Electoral Law. See, e.g., Liubitskii &
Cherniak, supra note 172, at 3; G. Ovcharenko, Povtornye Vybory [Repeat Elections],
PRAVDA, May 14, 1989, at 1; TASS, May 13, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 15, 1989, at
62.
174. See Shchepotkin, supra note 158. For a similar experience in the social organization context, see V. Dolganov, Izbrany Pervye Narodnye Deputaty SSSR [Selecting the
First USSR People's Deputies], IZVESTIIA, Mar. 12, 1989, at 1.
175. See Kishkin, supra note 142; Shchepotkin, supra note 158.
176. See Kurbatov, Worker Candidates,supra note 160.
177. See Kishkin, supra note 142.
178. See Kurbatov, A Sample of the Vote, supra note 160. In some cases, local authorities used their control over information to discredit "unsuitable" opponents. See Lidia Grafova, Effekt Bumeranga, Ili Nochnye Razgovory s Neugodnym Kandidatom [The
Boomerang Effect, or Nighttime Conversationswith an Undesirable Candidate],LrrER-

ATURNAIA GAZETA, Apr. 12, 1989, at 10; Lomakin & Borovik, supra note 143; Shchepotkin, supra note 158; Liubitskii & Cherniak, supra note 172, at 3.
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power over "meetings, rallies, street processions, and demonstrations" '7 9
to limit or even ban rallies in support of opposition candidates."' 0 This
overall lack of "equal opportunities"' 8' seriously compromised opportunities for genuine competition among candidates.
Finally, in the election of deputies, the prearranged filters also revealed their value in practice. The scheme for selection of representatives
from social organizations dearly inhibited the emergence of legislative
interest groups or parties that might rival CPSU domination. Two

179. See Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: 0 Poriadke Organizatsii i
Provedenia Sobranii, Mitingov, Ulichnykh Shestvii i Demonstratsiiv SSSR [Decree of
the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: On the Procedurefor Organizing and Holding
Meetings, Rallies, Street Processionsand Demonstrations] (July 28, 1988), IZvESTIIA,
July 29, 1988, at 2. For reports on other demonstration regulations, see, e.g., I. Pudalov,
In the Interests of Muscovites, VECHERNIATA MOSKVA, Sept. 1, 1987, at 2, translatedin
39 CDSP, Oct. 7, 1987, at 8 (reporting on Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee's
Decision On Gatherings, Rallies, Processions, Demonstrations and Other Events on
Streets, Squares and Prospects and in Parks, Gardens and Other Public Places in the
City of Moscow); TASS, July 29, 1988, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 1, 1988, at 55 (reporting
on RSFSR Law on Demonstrations). See generally Ralph Ruebner, Public Demonstrations and the Rule of Law in the Age of Glasnost and Perestroika,5 AM. U. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 13 (1989).
180. See, e.g., A. Davydov, Manifestatsiiai Informatsiia [Demonstrationand Information], IZVESTA, Mar. 20, 1989, at 2. But see V. Dolganov, Agitatsiia Bez
Agitpunktov. Kakie PravaPredostavleny Kandidaty i Ego Izbirateliamv Predvybornoi
Bor'be [Agitation Without Agitation Stations. What Rights Are Given to Candidates
and Their Constituents in the Election Campaign], IzvEsTIlA, Feb. 4, 1989, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 9, 1989, at 48, 50:
I want to emphasize in particular that the decree which you mentioned [demonstration decree] should not be applied in any circumstances in the election campaign, when it really is a question of preparation for elections. I am certain that
no special permission is required. The law states bluntly: A candidate people's
deputy can conduct meetings at rallies and in any other form convenient for the
voters. In other words, a spontaneous rally can be held in a microrayon, near an
apartment block, in a park or a small public garden .... You can argue, discuss,
and campaign for your candidate in the way this is done in a civilized society. Just
bear in mind the conditions we mentioned earlier: legality and safety.
Id. (comments of Evgenii M. Koveshnikov, Chief of the Central Electoral Commission
Juridical Group).
181. Kishkin, supra note 142; Liubitskii & Cherniak, supra note 172, at 3. On
December 20, 1989, the government amended the Constitution to provide explicitly for
"equal conditions" for all candidates. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh
Respublik Ob Izmeneniakh i Dopolneniakh Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) SSSR Po
Voprosam Izbiratel'noi Sistemy [USSR Law On Amendments and Additions to the
USSR Constitution(Basic Law) On Questions of the Electoral System] art. 100 (Dec. 20,
1989), IzvESIIA, Dec. 23, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter 1989 ConstitutionalAmendments on
the Electoral System].
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mechanisms accomplished this goal: limitation of electing bodies to legally established entities with "all-union organs;"" 2 and imposition of
quotas for representation."' 3 The first requirement successfully prevented
organized representation of informal, independent groups potentially
critical of leadership policies. Thus, in the 1989 elections voters chose
official spokespeople for the All-Union Society of Philatelists, the AllUnion Volunteer Society of Bibliophiles, and the All-Union Society
Fighting for Sobriety, but had no opportunity to select deputies from
religious communities, ecological organizations, nationalist fronts, or
bodies championing the rights of the disabled or of Afghan War
veterans."8 '
The second element, the quota system, was equally effective in promoting party primacy. Norms of representation varied according to the
political reliability of each social organization. For example, the communist party, USSR trade unions, and cooperative societies each elected one
hundred deputies, and the Komsomol chose seventy-five legislators." s In
contrast, journalists were permitted a mere ten congressional seats?8 8
Philatelists received a greater voice in the new legislature than public
educators.18 7 This latter example provided particularly telling evidence
of the major aim of social organization elections-representation of party
rather than popular interests and needs.

The general elections further solidified CPSU influence over the new
legislature. There were isolated reports of informal, illegal intervention
in the voting process by party, administrative, and electoral commission
personnel to guarantee the victory for preferred candidates.1 , In fact,

182. Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 4.
183. Id. art. 17.
184. See Kurbatov, A Sample of the Vote, supra note 160, at 1.
185.

Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 18.

186. See V. Krichko, Kontrol' Nad Vlast'iu [Control Over Authorities], SoTs.

IN-

May 17, 1989, at 1. The Electoral Law provided only general guidelines for
social organization representation. It left determination of the specific quotas to "joint
sitting[s] of the leading elected organs of these organizations or their agents, convened by
the Central Electoral Commission, or, in the event of disagreement, [to] the Central Electoral Commission." Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 18. This imprecise provision
prompted numerous calls for reform. See, e.g., G. Popov, cited in Krichko, supra, at 1.
187. Krichko, supra note 186, at 1.
188. These tactics included direct pressure on voters (see, e.g., TASS, Interview with
E.M. Koveshnikov, IZVESTIA, Feb. 17, 1989, at 1), posting of "authorized agents" at
polling stations to supervise and intimidate voters (see, e.g., Liubitskii & Cherniak,
supra note 172), creation of fictitious requirements to void ballots (see, e.g., V.P. Zhdanov, Kak My Budem Golosovat' [How We Will Vote], TRUD, Mar. 18, 1989, at 4), and
votes on behalf of citizens without their prior approval or knowledge (see, e.g., Arturas
DUSTRIIA,
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however, there was no need for such individualized manipulation because the overall electoral scheme was heavily stacked in favor of CPSU
control. For example, the provision for elections on a national territorial
basis followed the social organization approach by allocating legislative
seats according to officially determined geographical boundaries rather
than actual nationality of voters.189 This created effective barriers to representation of potentially troublesome minority ethnic groups, such as
Crimean Tatars19 and Germans.1 9 Even more importantly, the combination of the social organization and territorial election systems afforded
CPSU members multiple opportunities to select deputies. 92 The ultimate outcome of the 1989 elections was predictable. Eighty-seven percent of the new legislators were members of the communist party. 9
The real significance of the 1989 elections was not the successful formation of a party-dominated Congress of People's Deputies, however.
More far-reaching was the fundamental gap revealed between leadership
and popular notions of democracy and legislative reform. Gorbachev
designed and instituted a malleable legislative body that would identify,
transmit, and reflect a wide spectrum of public views through the con-

stricted channels of CPSU-designated and controlled representative
groups and personnel. Yet, the actual experience of selecting legislative
deputies sent a decidedly contradictory message about the future of the
new Soviet legislature. Through its active grassroots participation and
unexpectedly independent voting, the Soviet populace expressed an unGrigaliunas, Was Every Voter's Voice Truly Counted?, TIESA, Apr. 7, 1989, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 14, 1989, at 49, 50).
189. See Electoral Law, supra note 61, art. 17; Popov, cited in Krichko, supra note
186, at 1.
190. Stalin forcibly exiled the Crimean Tatars to Soviet Central Asia during World
War II. They engaged in open defiance of the Gorbachev regime. For example, they held
a large demonstration in Moscow in July 1987. See Archie Brown, Ideology and Politi-

cal Culture, in

POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND NATIONALITY INSIDE GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA

1, 20 (Seweryn Bialer ed., 1989).
191. Soviet Germans originally lived in a separate Volga German Autonomous Republic within the Russian Republic. Stalin, however, ordered Soviet Germans to be
transported to eastern parts of the USSR and their autonomous republic formally abolished. A 1948 decree prohibited Germans from returning to their original homeland and
even established prison sentences for leaving resettlement areas without official approval.
See V. Auman & V. Chernyshev, Sovetskie Nemtsy Pered Voinoi i Segodnia [Soviet
Germans Before the War and Today], PRAVDA, Nov. 4, 1988, at 8.
192. See Valentin G. Rasputin, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(June 6, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 7, 1989, at 20; Uchit'sia
Parlamentarizmu![To Learn Parliamentarianism],LITERATURNAIA GAZETA, June 7,
1989, at 1 (interview with Anatolii I. Luk'ianov)
193. See Nazimova & Sheinis, supra note 71.
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mistakable desire to have a greater voice in governance of their country.
With the convocation of the first Congress of People's Deputies in May
1989, it soon became obvious that "apparatus democratization" was intrinsically incompatible with the aspirations of Soviet citizens and their
legislators for nothing short of political self-determination. Over the next
year, the prescribed leadership models of demokratizatsiiaand pravovoe
gosudarstvo increasingly clashed with emerging popular ideals of "democracy" and "rule of law."
III.

THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGISLATIVE AUTONOMY

On the eve of the first elections for the Congress of People's Deputies,
a Pravda editorial appealed for "precise observance of so-called procedural 'technicalities.' ",194 What was "at stake" was not merely election
results, it explained, but "the establishment of trust in the future organs
of power and in their ability to build a life for society based on the
'195
principles of social justice.
The 1989 election experience, especially the machinations of electoral

commissions,' revealed that outside control over procedure was tantamount to control over the democratic process itself. At the same time, it
showed that popular mastery and manipulation of procedural niceties,
such as voter participation requirements,197 could serve as an effective, if
limited, counterweight to official dominance. These lessons and their implications for legislative reform were not lost on Soviet reformers.' 9 8

194. See Editorial, Golosuem Za Perestroiku. Zavtra Nachinaiutsia Vybory
Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR Ot Obshchestvennykh Organizatsii [We Vote in Favor of
Restructuring.Elections of USSR People's Deputies From Public OrganizationsBegin
Tomorrow], PRAVDA, Mar. 10, 1989, at 1.
195. Id.
196. The activities of electoral commissions, pariicularly the use of preelection meetings to limit nominees, were frequently criticized. See, e.g., sources cited in notes 166-74,
177, 188, supra. Commentators, voters, and deputies were concerned about the possible
parallels between preelection meetings and legislative sessions. See, e.g., Danilenko,
supra note 156, at 10; 1.0. Bisher, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 26, 1992), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 25; A.I. Konovalov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 26, 1992), in id. at
19.
197. See supra notes 150 & 151 and accompanying text.
198. For an outstanding summary of needed legislative reforms, see Danilenko,
supra note 156. The author warned that conservative deputies would attempt "to subject
the rules of parliamentary procedure to their own interests." He advocated the creation
of "democratic procedure," which he defined as "rules and norms formulated and approved by the deputies themselves." He argued that this was the only possible way to
ensure "real democratization" and "real leadership by deputies." Id.
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From May 25, 1989, deputies joined battle over the previously "undivided domain of the apparatus"a 99-parliamentary procedure.
A.

"Consolidation Within the Framework of Pluralism":20 The
First Congress of People's Deputies

For two weeks in late May and early June 1989, the Soviet populace
and the world sat riveted to their television sets enthralled by the extraordinary spectacle unfolding on the very floor of the Kremlin Palace
of Congresses. Before an audience of millions, Soviet legislators unabashedly criticized their colleagues, 201 system,2 0 2 Constitution, 20 3 "vanguard party, ' 2 04 and highest leaders.2 0 5 One deputy stood on the rostrum
and openly denounced the fearsome KGB.206 Congressional voting was
just as unrestrained and unpredictable. In a far cry from the "sham unanimity and fake concord" 20 of the past, deputies abstained and dissented
from officially sponsored measures, 2 8 protested balloting irregulariV. Nadein, Den' Pervyi [Day One], IZVEsTIA, May 26, 1989, at 1.
V. Shchepotkin, Ogliadyvaias' Nazad i Zagliadyvaia Vpered [Looking Back
and Looking Ahead], IZVESTIIA, May 20, 1989, at 3 (comment by K. Lubenchenko).
201. See, e.g., Iurii N. Afanas'ev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 27, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 54; Muslin R.
Mamedov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25, 1989), translated in id. at 4.
202. See, e.g., Iurii D. Chernichenko, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 1, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 5, 1989, at 2-5.
203. See, e.g., Anatolii V. Gorbunov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 31, 1989), translated in F.BI.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 1, 1989, at 19-21; Aleksandr
M. Obolenskii, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 9-11.
204. See, e.g., Boris N. El'tsin, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 31, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 1, 1989, at 24-26; Aleksei
M. Emel'ianov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 8, 1989), in
199.
200.

PRAVDA,

June 9, 1989, at 3.

205. See A. Cherniak & A. Chernenko, Ekzamen Na Vlast'. Ego Glasno Derzhali
Kandidaty Na Vysshie Posty v Nashem Gosudarstve [Examination To Exercise Power:

Candidatesfor Highest Posts in Our State Took It in Public], PRAVDA, June 12, 1989,
at 2. Even Mikhail Gorbachev was not immune from public criticism. See TASS, May
25, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 31. In fact, at the first session,
Gorbachev had to defend himself from direct attacks on both his policies and personal
life. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Vystuplenie Tovarishcha Gorbacheva M.S. [Speech of
Comrade M.S. Gorbachev] (May 25, 1989), in PRAVDA, May 26, 1989, at 4.
206. Iurii P. Vlasov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 31,
1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 1, 1989, at 33-34.
207. Editorial, Razmyshliaia o S'ezde [Reflecting on the Congress], PRAVDA, June
12, 1989, at 1.
208. For example, on May 26, deputies voted on a proposal to suspend demonstra-
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ties,209 and even boycotted voting sessions.2 10
For all its drama and novelty, however, the first meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies, like the elections, was a mere mirage of democracy. An Izvestiia commentator aptly likened it to a symphonic performance with Gorbachev as "the conductor ... managing to extract a
common tune from an orchestra even when soloists might be out of
tune."' 2 1 1 Indeed, central party authorities carefully orchestrated the
Congress. Following traditional patterns, the CPSU formulated the
agenda, procedures, and goals without consultation or endorsement of

newly elected legislators.2 12 In fact, deputies did not have an opportunity

to review in advance preliminary materials or documents, including basic
rules for election of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the major assignment of
the first Congress.2 13
On May 22 the CPSU Central Committee Plenum finalized arrangements for the Congress. It approved draft standing orders and a slate of
nominees for the new Supreme Soviet, recommended selection of
Gorbachev as Chairman of the reformed Supreme Soviet, and explained
"the responsibility that communist deputies bear for the businesslike and
constructive nature of the upcoming debate. 2' "14 Attendees learned an
early lesson in party-legislative relations. At the Plenum, Boris El'tsin

tion decrees for the duration of the Congress. The final vote was 831 in favor, 1,261
opposed, and 30 abstentions. See F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 15.
209. See Vladimir A. Zubanov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 27, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 2.
210. The Lithuanian delegation, which boycotted votes on election of Supreme Soviet
deputies and formation of a Constitutional Oversight Commission, provides two illustrations. See Vitautas V. Landsbergis, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 35-36; Romas
V. Gudaitis, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 8, 1989), translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 34-35.
211. E. Gonzal'ez, Den' Tretii [Day Three], IZVESTIIA, May 28, 1989, at 1.
212. See AFP, May 21, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 22, 1989, at 68; Oleg V.
Chernyshev, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 29, 1989), translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 38, 39.
213. See Gennadii I. Fil'shin, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 27, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 19; Gavril K.
Popov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 27, 1989), translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 54-55.
214. Editorial, supra note 133, at 1. See Informatsionnoe Soobshchenie o Plenume
Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi PartiiSovetskogo Soiuza [Information Report on the CPSU Central Committee Plenum], PRAVDA, May 23, 1989, at 1; V.
Chichin, Five Days to Go. How the Leningrad Delegation of USSR People's Deputies Is
Preparingforthe Congress, LENINGRADSKAIA PRAVDA, May 20, 1989, at 1, translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 19, 1989, at 68.
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questioned the appropriateness of considering a single candidate, the
General Secretary of the CPSU, for the highest position in the new legislature. The party leadership roundly criticized him and reminded him
of his duty as a party member to uphold the resolutions of the Nineteenth Party Conference.2 15
Up to the last moment, the communist party in general and
Gorbachev in particular exercised firm control over Congress preparation. On May 23 Gorbachev chaired a session of the Supreme Soviet
Presidium, which gave legal imprimatur to the Plenum decisions. 210
That same day, in his capacity as CPSU General Secretary, he convened
a special meeting of the communist party "group" of deputies to communicate and to reinforce central CPSU directives and policies. 2V Not until
the day before the opening of Congress were legislators formally invited
to participate in organizational matters, and even then only in a
subordinate role under Gorbachev's watchful eye.2"'

215. See Boris N. El'tsin, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May
25, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 11; Bill Keller, New
Soviet Congress Set For Opening Debates, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1989, at A5. Accord
Boris V. Kryzhkov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25, 1989),
translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 6 (discussing pressure on communist members of Gorkii delegation to follow 19th Party Congress line regarding combination of posts).

216. See TASS, Zasedanie Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium Session], PRAVDA, May 24, 1989, at 1.
217. See TASS, Sobranie Partiinoi Gruppy S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR
[Meeting of the Party Group of the USSR Congress ofPeople's Deputies], PRAVDA, May
24, 1989, at 1; Interview with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Moscow Domestic Service, May
23, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 24, 1989, at 34; TASS, May 23, 1989, in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 23, 1989, at 43.
218. On May 24, 446 representatives of regional groups of deputies assembled in the
Kremlin for a 9-hour preliminary examination and discussion of issues to be considered
by the Congress. Gorbachev presided over the meeting. See TASS, Sobranie Pred-

stavitelei Grupp Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [Meeting of the Representive Group of
USSR People's Deputies], PRAVDA, May 25, 1989, at 1. Nursultan A. Nazarbaiev formally presented the proposals of the conference of representatives at the opening session
of Congress. For text, see F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 3. The fundamental
irrelevance of this session became painfully obvious the next day when members of the
Congress of People's Deputies were presented with the original party-drafted and ap-

proved standing orders rather than the amended version prepared by their official representatives. Vremennyi Reglament Zasedanii S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [Provisional Standing Orders of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies] (May 25, 1989),
PRAVDA, May 26, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Provisional Standing Orders]. See Gavril K.
Popov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25, 1989), translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 4-5; Antanas Y. Burachas, Comments at USSR
Congress of People's Deputies (May 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.),
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Mikhail Gorbachev remained the commanding figure throughout the
official meetings of the Congress of People's Deputies. He asserted his
claim to leadership from the very start in unmistakable fashion. He insisted on chairing the opening session in direct violation of the recently
amended Constitution21 9 and over the strong objections of elected deputies. 220 This blatant disregard of established norms and rules characterized the entire two weeks that followed.
Gorbachev routinely ignored or unilaterally changed rules regarding
such crucial matters as voting,2 2 ' working hours, 222 recognition of speakers, 22 presentation of written questions from deputies, 224 time limits on
congressional debates and speeches,225 and order of proceedings.226
Moreover, he manipulated procedural language to solidify further his
personal control over the legislature. As a result, deputies found them-

selves compelled to vote "according to a mechanical majority

'22 7

for a

Supreme Soviet, Constitutional Oversight Commission, and the highest
legislative officials that had all been handpicked by Gorbachev and the
22
party elite. 1
May 30, 1989, at 37.
219. See KONST. SSSR art. 110 (as amended Dec. 1, 1988) ("The first sitting of the
USSR Congress of People's Deputies following the elections is chaired by the Chairman
of the Central Electoral Commission for the Elections of USSR People's Deputies and
subsequently by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet or his deputy."). Despite
this provision, Gorbachev presided over sessions prior to his formal election as Supreme
Soviet Chairman.
220. See, e.g., A.V. Levashev, Comments at USSR. Congress of People's Deputies
(May 25, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 10.
221. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (June 8, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 41. See,
e.g., Iurii E. Burykh, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 29, 1989),
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 37.
222. See, e.g., Karasev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 27,
1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 59.
223. See, e.g., Fil'shin, supra note 213, at 19.
224. Comment from unidentified deputy at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 27, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 61.
225. See, e.g., Interchange Between Gorbachev and Popov at USSR Congress of
People's Deputies (May 27, 1989), translated in id. at 54.
226. See, e.g., Nikolai A. Strukov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 29, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 40 (noting that

Gorbachev departed from fixed agenda in calling for establishment of a commission to
investigate actions of Telman K. Gdlian).
227. Popov, supra note 213, at 55. Accord A. Iablokov, cited in Uchityvaia Golos
Izbiratelei [Taking the Voice of the Voters Into Account], PRAVDA, June 2, 1989, at 1.
228. See Afanas'ev, supra note 201, at 54; Andrei D. Sakharov, Speech to USSR
Congress of People's Deputies (June 9, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June
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In the course of the two weeks, Gorbachev also developed a set of
masterful techniques to constrain and influence deputy discussion and

votes. At times he resorted to direct curtailment of "unsuitable" speech
and speakers. He interrupted deputies at will 229 and, in extreme cases,
turned off their microphones. 3 0 On other occasions, however, he preferred more indirect methods of control. These included unsolicited per231
sonal summary, commentary, and clarification of deputies' remarks,
recommendations regarding appropriate resolution and voting on issues, 23 2 and denigration of progressive legislators' procedural questions
and criticisms. 233 At his most subtle, Gorbachev communicated his views

12, 1989, at 65-67.
229. See, e.g., Interchange Between Gorbachev and Stankevich at USSR Congress of
People's Deputies (May 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989,
at 36-37. See Tolpeshnikov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May
26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 56.
230. See, e.g., Interchange Between Gorbachev and Sakharov, USSR Congress of
People's Deputies (June 9, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989,

at 67. See Iurii Rost, Akademik A.D. Sakharov: S'ezd Ne Mozhet Sdelat' Vse Srazu
•

[Academician A.D. Sakharov: "The Congress Cannot Do Everything Right Away
LITERATURNAIA GAZETA, June 21, 1989, at 11 (interview with Andrei
Sakharov).
231. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (June 1, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 6, 1989, at 8-9;
Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 8,
1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 39-41. See Vladimir D.
Iudin, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 29, 1989), translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 44.
232. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (May 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 14-15
(speaking on proposal to suspend demonstration decree during Congress). See A. Plutnik,
Den' Deciatii [Day Ten], IZVESTIIA, June 8, 1989, at 1 (reporting that Gorbachev "gently" persuaded deputies not to abstain).
233. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (May 29, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 25
(characterizing questions regarding procedure as "putting a spoke in the wheels of the
Congress"). See also Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (May 26, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 53 ("I
think gradually you are beginning to see that we work better when there are no interruptions, and so on."). Several deputies criticized Gorbachev for such behavior. See, e.g.,
Sergei V. Belozertsev, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 29, 1989),
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 41:
To go on, Mikhail Sergeyevich, I call on you to give up the formula-Let's talk
about it-after which come references to the time, working on the people in the
. ."

...

"],

hall by saying that resolving questions is being delayed by discussing procedural
matters of the congress, and references to the need to postpone discussion, by saying that now there are objections. Why should all the pros and cons not be clearly
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by reading from the podium notes, requests, and letters from deputies.
For example, on May 26 he presented a note attributed to Deputies
Kislitsyn, Karpochev, and Gorinov that stated, "Mikhail Sergeievich,
when will the Moscow group of deputies stop causing disorganization
and confusion in the congress' work? The standing orders should be applied to them too. They are dragging out the work of the congress. Is this
not deliberate?"'2 34 Gorbachev responded: "That is for the deputies from
Moscow to think about. I do not think this is some kind of reprimand or
anything of that nature. It is information, for consideration." 2 5
Gorbachev's individual domination of Congress' proceedings was only
one impediment to legislative independence. In addition, a number of
institutions worked behind the scenes to shape and suppress legislative
action. The Congress itself contained two of the key organs-the Presidium and the Secretariat. These bodies, created during the first two days
of the Congress," 8 had extensive but completely undefined and unchecked powers to expedite and supervise internal organizational matters. During congressional proceedings, they consistently played a role
similar to that of electoral commissions in the spring elections. They operated as screens to limit participation by deputies disfavored by central
party authorities. They often misplaced or failed to register progressive
deputies' formal written requests to address Congress or to present alternative proposals for legislative consideration.23 7 They also effectively

formulated and the congress then decide itself by a vote what to adopt and what to
reject?
234. F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 18.
235. Id. Accord Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (May 25, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 12
(reading and commenting on deputies' letter describing efforts by some legislators to "di-

vert" Congress with procedural matters as "very pernicious").
236. The Congress officially approved a Presidium and Secretariat on May 25 and
May 26 respectively. For reports on voting and lists of members, see F.B.I.S.-SOV
(Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 2 and F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 49. Legislators
did not formally discuss candidates or their powers. Gorbachev provided a brief description of these two bodies at the May 27 and May 29 sessions. The Secretariat's major
function was to "assist" the Presidium in the organization and registration of deputies'
documents, notes, proposals, procedural criticisms, and requests to address the Congress.
See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 27
and 29, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 7, 22, 25; V.
Liubitskii et al., Dela u Nas Neotlozhnye ... [Our Business Is Urgent.. .], PRAVDA,
June 11, 1989, at 4.
237. See Belozertsev, supra note 233, at 41; V. Mikhailov, All Power-To Whom?,
Soy. LITvA, June 1, 1989, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 20, 1989, at 75, 76
(interview with Vitautas V. Landsbergis); Popov, supra note 213, at 55; V. Smetannikov, Ship Is FollowingRight Course, Soy. LATVrHA, June 3, 1989, at 2, translatedin
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prevented dissemination of minority views by refusing to duplicate or
circulate materials that did not conform with the official line.23 8
As the Congress progressed, its executive bodies increasingly pre-

empted legislative discussion and determination of procedural questions.
Presidium "reports" on issues soon became conclusive resolutions unchallengeable by elected legislators. 23" Deputy Sergei A. Tsypliaiev was
justified in being "very concerned about apparatus-style organs maturing
here and there. 2 40
The Presidium and the Secretariat, in conjunction with the mass media, also had a significant impact on legislative deliberations through
their control over information. Official documents submitted for final endorsement by the Congress often did not reflecf the actual language or
policies approved by deputies. For example, the slate of nominees for the
Supreme Soviet included the names of two candidates that had not in
fact been selected by the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast' 24 and
24 2
deleted altogether the chosen representative from the Mari Republic.

Moreover, the formal stenographic accounts and media reports of ConF.B.I.S.-SOV, June 20, 1989, at 56 (comments by Viktor Alksnis). Note that similar
problems occurred with proposals submitted to the Supreme Soviet Presidium prior to

the convocation of the Congress. See Glasnost' Vo Imia Perestroiki [Glasnost in the
Name of Restructuring], PRAVDA, May 30, 1989, at 1, 1-2.
238. See, e.g., Konovalov, supra note 196. In these actions, Congress administrative
bodies followed the lead of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. For example, during the preCongress period, the Supreme Soviet Presidium refused to provide "deputies of democratic orientation" with paper, meeting facilities, or duplicating services. See Popov,
supra note 213, at 54.
239. See, e.g., Anatolii S. Luk'ianov, Report to USSR Congress of People's Deputies

(May 26, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 33-34 (reporting
on Presidium "conclusions" regarding procedures for forming Supreme Soviet and legislative committees) [hereinafter Luk'ianov, May 26 Report]; Anatolii S. Luk'ianov, Report to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 9, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV
(Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 57-59 (providing an example of Presidium changing Congress
agenda).
240. Sergei A. Tsyplaev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May
26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 33. Deputies also
criticized two other administrative bodies, the Credentials Commission and the Tellers'
Commission, for procedural irregularities and control by the party apparatus. See, e.g.,
Strukov, supra note 226, at 41.
241. See Genrikh A. Pogosian, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 27, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May, 30, 1989, at 61.
242. See Sergei V. Iastrebtsov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 29, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 31, 1989, at 40. Similarly, names of
deputies chosen to serve on legislative commissions "accidentally" disappeared. See Andrei L. Plotnikov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 6, 1989),
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 7, 1989, at 27-28.
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gress sessions regularly censored or misrepresented the proceedings. In
one instance, the official transcript omitted a full paragraph of a speech
by Aleksandr Obolenskii that contained criticisms of Gorbachev.2 4 To

make matters worse, Izvestiia's daily summary designated Obolenskii as
"heckling from the hall," a claim he vehemently denied later on the floor
of the Congress.24 4
The communist party constituted the most significant institutional
barrier to legislative autonomy. The CPSU effectively controlled and influenced Congress decisions on both the micro and macro levels. Party
first secretaries, who dominated regional and organizational delegations,
inhibited free choice and discussion by legislators by issuing guiding directives and keeping a close eye on individual votes. 2 45 The party center
made its presence known throughout the sessions with frequent references to the pivotal, binding resolutions of the Nineteenth Party Conference. 246 It even convened a special plenum of the Central Committee on
June 2 to evaluate the first week's developments and to recommend appropriate actions for upcoming Congress and Supreme Soviet
meetings.2 47

243. See Aleksandr M. Obolenskii, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 29, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 42.
244. Id.
245. See Aleksandr V. Minzhurenko, Comments at USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (May 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 23.
246. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Report to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 30, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 47;
Otvetstvennost' Za Perestroiku [Responsibility for Restructuring], PRAVDA, June 7,
1989, at 1 (reference by Anatolii I. Luk'ianov to 19th Party Conference decision). In
fact, in its concluding resolution, the Congress formally asserted its support for 19th
Party Conference decisions. See Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR Ob
Osnovnykh Napravleniakh Vnutrennei i Vneshnei Politiki SSSR [Resolution of the

USSR Congress of People's Deputies On the Basic Guidelines for the Domestic and
ForeignPolicy of the USSR] (June 9, 1989), PRAVDA, June 25, 1989, at 1-2 [hereinafter

Basic Guidelines].
On June 9, Aleksandr N. Kraiko proposed the following provision: "At the Congress
of People's Deputies and in the Supreme Soviet, people's deputies are guided only by the
law, the will of the electorate, and by their convictions, and are autonomous with regard
to other state, political and public bodies." Aleksandr N. Kraiko, Speech at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 9, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12,
1989, at 62. He cited Lenin's statement that "all members of the party faction have the
right and obligation to vote according to conscience, and not on instructions from the
Central Committee." Id. Kraiko's proposal was rejected by the Congress. See F.B.I.S.SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 63. For an outstanding criticism of party control over
communist deputies, see Emel'ianov, supra note 204.
247. See TASS, June 2, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 5, 1989, at 28, 28-29.
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The CPSU ensured continued dominance of the legislature in the future by securing the selection of party loyalists to staff the reconstituted
Supreme Soviet24 and parliamentary commissions and committees. 2 49 It
guaranteed that even the one constitutional check on legislative authority,
the Constitutional Oversight Commission, would likely serve CPSU interests. Deputies received a slate of nominees composed entirely of party
members one hour before voting. 25° This moved one deputy to ask, "Are
there any specialists in the sphere of state and law who are not members
of the party?"2 1
During the two-week convocation of the Congress of People's Deputies, legislators came to realize that they themselves were significant contributents to their "control from above."2 52 They discovered that their
disorganization and unprofessionalism, indeed their very pluralism, severely impeded their development into an effective, independent political
force.253 Some suspected that congressional authorities directly encouraged and manipulated deputies' inexperience and emotionalism 254 to
255
strengthen the hand of Gorbachev and the party leadership.

Legislators' unfamiliarity with parliamentary practice and rhetoric
dearly redounded to their Chairman's benefit. As one observer of Congress proceedings reported, "It is curious that Gorbachev is the only person here who can formulate a genuine argument .... At this congress he

248. See Bill Keller, Soviet Dissenters Denied Major Role in New Parliament,N.Y.
TmEs,May 28, 1989, at 1; Andrei D. Sakharov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (June 9, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 65.
249. See, e.g., Chernichenko, supra note 202, at 3 (noting that CPSU Central Committee compiled lists of commission members).
250. See Iurii Iu. Boldyrev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(June 8, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 36 (describing
Constitutional Oversight Committee as a "political tool" of the party and calling for
postponement of election of its members). On June 9 the Congress elected a twenty-three
member commission to prepare the USSR Draft Law on Constitutional Oversight in the

USSR. See

PRAVDA,

June 11, 1989, at 1.

251. Nikolai N. Vorontsov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(June 8, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 34.
252. See Burykh, supra note 221, at 37; Konovalov, supra note 196, at 19.
253. See A. Kozlov, Ves' Spektr Problem i Nastroenii [The Whole Spectrum of
Problems and Feelings], SoTs. INDUSTRIIA, June 3, 1989, at 1; Rost, supra note 230;
Vladislav A. Shapovalenko, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (June 9,
1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 64. See also N. Betaneli et
al., Mnenie Deputatov ... [Deputies' Opinions ...],IzvEsmIA, May 31, 1989, at 7
(listing organizational reforms deputies viewed as essential to fulfill their duties).
254. Editorial, Razmyshliaia o S'ezde [Reflecting on the Congress], PRAVDA, June
12, 1989, at 1; Anatolii Sobchak, cited in Kozlov, supra note 253.
255. See El'tsin, supra note 145; Strukov, supra note 226.
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has brilliantly created the impression of someone standing above the
'256
skirmish listening to and guiding the debate.
Similarly, deputies' inexperience and inability to reach consensus on
basic issues of legislative and state policy and structure served the interests of their "puppeteer," 2 57 the central party apparatus. In fact, by its
conclusion on June 9, the Congress had failed to adopt a single constructive proposal drafted and presented independently by legislators.2 5 Despite its open, unprecedented criticism of the CPSU, the Congress ultimately approved virtually unchanged every resolution and personnel
decision predetermined by party authorities.2 59 In so doing, it fulfilled its
assigned role to perfection. After all, from the very start, party and legislative leaders called for an "orientation toward consolidation," 26 0 insisting that "pluralism of views" must eventually yield to "unity of action."2 ' According to plan, the Congress articulated the diverse interests,
needs, and concerns of the Soviet populace. As prescribed, however, the
CPSU, not the legislature, harmonized, coordinated, and translated these

256.
ion],

X. Smiley, reprinted in Mnenie "Deili Telegraf' [The Daily Telegram's Opin-

PRAVDA, June

2, 1989, at 6.

257. Chernichenko, supra note 202, at 4.
258. Boris N. El'tsin, Comments at USSR Supreme Soviet (June 10, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 81-82 (citing Congress' failure to
adopt proposals regarding amendment of Constitution, alternative candidates, and annual
national referendum on confidence in Supreme Soviet Chairman); E. Gonzal'ez, Den'
Odinnadtsatyi[Day Eleven], IZVESTIIA, June 9, 1989, at 1. For criticisms of Congress'
failure to adopt constructive proposals see P. Bunich, cited in Kozlov, supra note 253, at
1; E. Sorokin, Eto Tol'ko Nachalo Korennykh Peremen v Zhizni Strany [This Is Only
the Beginning of Fundamental Changes in the Country's Life], PRAVDA,June 20, 1989,
at 2.
259. For example, despite numerous criticisms and suggested changes, deputies
adopted the Provisional Standing Orders, supra note 218, in the original form presented
by the CPSU. See F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 16. See generally Sakharov,
supra note 228. But see Editorial, PorucheniiaS'ezda [Congress Instructions], IzvESTIA, June 27, 1989, at 1 (reporting delay in publication of Basic Guidelines due to
numerous comments and suggested amendments of its draft version, which represented a
"deviation from recent traditions").
260. Vadim A. Medvedev, cited in Moscow Television Service, May 23, 1989,
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 24, 1989, at 36, 36. For other uses of the term "consolidation," see, e.g., N. Bodnaruk, Den' Vtoroi [Day Two], IZVESTIrA, May 27, 1989, at
1; Shchepotkin, supra note 200; N. Zhelnorova & L. Novikova, Ot Imeni Naroda [In
the Name of the People], ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, June 10-16, 1989, at 1 (comments by
Aleksandr S. Kapto). In fact, even the Basic Guidelines issued by the Congress formally
recognized the "full importance of the consolidating role of the CPSU." Basic Guidelines, supra note 246, part VI.
261. Evgenii N. Meshalkin, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(May 27, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 58.
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goals into "sensible" decisions. 62
Progressive
legislators soon recognized that the "way out" of this
' 26
"mess

3

was a set of regularized rules and structures formulated by the

deputies themselves. During official sessions, legislators repeatedly invoked procedure as a democratic talisman to criticize and, to a limited
degree, restrain their Chairman from dictating congressional policy and
action. 264 They achieved some successes with this technique, including
limited consideration of alternative candidates,26 5 preelection discussion
of nominees for legislative and administrative position, 26 6 and postponed
267
formation of the party-selected Constitutional Oversight Commission.

262. See Gorbachev, supra note 246, at 56, 61.
263. Anatolii Sobchak, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 27,
1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 1, 2.
264. See, e.g., Burykh, supra note 221, at 37; Chernyshev, supra note 212, at 38;
Mikhail I. Chimpoi, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 29, 1989),
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 39-40.
265. See G. Alimov & A. Stepovoi, Moskva, 26 Maia. Kremlevskii Dvorets S'ezdov
[Moscow, May 26. Kremlin Palace of Congresses], IZVESTA, May 27, 1989, at 1, 3
(describing efforts to introduce multiple candidates for Supreme Soviet seats). This strategy backfired in the case of Supreme Soviet elections. To demonstrate their support for
the principle of alternatives (printsipalternativnosti), Moscow deputies nominated fiftyfive candidates for their quota of twenty-nine positions. Because the entire Congress,

rather than individual delegations, voted for Supreme Soviet deputies, this gave conservatives an unanticipated opportunity to eliminate troublesome Moscow reformists from the
final list of Supreme Soviet members. As a result, Boris El'tsin failed to obtain sufficient
votes to be included in the Moscow quota of deputies. See Report of the Tellers Commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 27, 1989), translatedin F.B.I.S.SOV (Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 53. This decision provoked a major outcry by progressive deputies and Moscow residents. See Burykh, supra note 221, at 37; Aleksandr N.
Kraiko, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 27, 1989), translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 14. Ultimately, the problem was resolved
when Aleksei I. Kazannik, one of the victorious Moscow nominees, voluntarily resigned
in favor of Boris EI'tsin. Aleksei I. Kazannik, Speech to USSR Congress of People's
Deputies (May 29, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 44-45.
See L. Novikova, Kak Slovo Nashe Otozvet'sia? [What Will the Response Be to Our
Word?], ARGUMENTY i FAKTY, June 17-23, 1989, at 1 (interview of Kazannik).
266. For example, late in the May 27 evening session, Gorbachev proposed Anatolii
I. Luk'ianov as first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the second highest USSR
legislative post, and called for immediate election. Legislators successfully postponed the
vote until May 29 to permit extensive interrogation of Luk'ianov prior to his election.
See Relay of USSR Congress of People's Deputies, Moscow Domestic Service, May 27,
1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 18-20. For a discussion of
deputies' questioning of Luk'ianov, see Glasnost' Vo Imia Perestroiki, supra note 237.
267. See Relay of USSR Congress of People's Deputies, Moscow Television Service,
June 8, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), June 12, 1989, at 33-43. Pravda
subsequently described this as a "truly wise decision." Sorokin, supra note 258, at 2.
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On the whole, however, their efforts amounted to little more than an
irritant, rather than an effective counterweight, to Gorbachev and the
party elite. 268
The source of their failure became readily apparent-the fluid legislative process imposed from outside the Congress. With few concrete standards and rules to govern legislative deliberation and decisionmaking, 69
deputies were consistently frustrated in their attempts to hold legislative
leaders and organs to a procedural yardstick. Congressional and party
authorities could easily run roughshod over minority views and objections and obtain decisive, if not unanimous, endorsement of CPSU policies and personnel.27 °
Two party-drafted documents served as the guiding regulations for the
first Congress of People's Deputies: the amended Constitution 71 and the
Provisional Standing Orders.2" 2 Neither adequately addressed fundamental issues of procedure and structure, such as formation of legislative
committees, preparation of draft resolutions and statutes, voting mechanisms and tabulation, legal status and rights of deputies, and even differ268. Legislative and party leaders denigrated deputies' preoccupation with procedural matters as an annoying distraction of Congress from its more important functions.
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 233-35. Interestingly, on May 15, Anatolii Luk'ianov,
the future first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, made a clear distinction between
"consolidation" and "procedure." He queried whether the first Congress of People's
Deputies "will be a Congress of society's consolidation that will work out the most pressing solutions, or whether it [will] be a Congress that will get bogged down in discussion
of many procedural and other such matters." Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Moscow Domestic
Service, May 15, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 16, 1989, at 51.
269. To make matters worse, the legislature easily disregarded or modified the few
existing procedures in practice. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text; Konstantin D. Lubenchenko, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25,
1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 16 ("The Congress possesses such supreme juridical force that, on the whole, temporary standing orders are no
obstacle. And during examination of whatever questions, we can instantly and immediately introduce changes to it if they bother us.").
270. See P. Gutionov, Den' Dvenadtsatyi [Day Twelve], IzvESTIA, June 10, 1989,
at 1; Iudin, supra note 231; Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Interview with Boris N. El'tsin,
Moscow Television Service, May 25, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 25, 1989,
at 56. For a defense of Congress leadership's treatment of minority views, see N.
Bodnaruk & V. Zakhar'ko, S'ezd, Obshchestvo, Vlast' Sovetov [The Congress, Society,
Power of the Soviets], IzvESTIIA, June 24, 1989, at 2 (interview with Anatolii I.
Luk'ianov).
271. See Constitutional Amendments ,Law, supra note 28.
272. ProvisionalStanding Orders, supra note 218. Several deputies protested the
speed with which Congress adopted these crucial regulations. See, e.g., Anatolii N.
Saunin, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25, 1989), translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 26, 1989, at 15.
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entiation of Congress and Supreme Soviet functions and jurisdiction.2 73
These gaps provided fertile ground for control of Congress' discussions
and determinations. 4
For deputies intent on establishing a rule-of-law state, these early
brushes with Gorbachev-style procedure boded ill for the future development of the Soviet legislature as a genuinely autonomous, professional
lawmaking body. 75 Accordingly, by the end of the Congress on June 9,
they had resolved to play an active role in the formulation of the new
procedures and machinery that would henceforth govern Congress and
Supreme Soviet legislative work.2 7 6 They planned to devise a set of de-

273. For a discussion of these omissions, see Evgeich (?), Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 25, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May
26, 1989, at 10-11.
274. The most significant leadership manipulation of procedural lacunae was the
formation of the Supreme Soviet. Neither the Constitution nor Provisional Standing Orders provided any concrete stipulations regarding choice of such deputies from among the
ranks of Congress. Thus, Gorbachev was able to dictate selection and voting mechanisms
that ensured creation of "a Supreme Soviet which [sic] heeds the will of the apparatus."
Popov, supra note 213, at 55. In protest and frustration, progressive deputies from the
Moscow delegation officially founded on May 27 an interregional, independent deputy
group and invited participation of all like-minded legislators. Id.
275. See Saunin, supra note 272, at 15.
[R]egarding the standing orders: We want to build a state based on the rule of
law, and so presumably 'we want to live in accordance with laws and decisions.
Any haste in adopting standing orders and other documents could mean that we
will again have to return to them, to their imperfectness and their unfinished state,
just as we did before. And, therefore, I believe that the democratic process is a
difficult one. We have to gather our patience, and thoughtfully and attentively
listen to all points of view-both for and against-and then make the decision.
See also Kazannik, cited in Kozlov, supra note 253, at 1 (positing that deputies' disorganization will make it "easy ... to erode the Congress' future decisions and in the end
adopt resolutions that suit the bureaucratic apparatus.")
276. There was a serious formal impediment, however, to progressive deputies' participation in the upcoming drafting activity. Pursuant to a Congress resolution, the Supreme Soviet had the legal authority to draft procedural laws for Congress and Supreme
Soviet work. See Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsial-

isticheskikh Respublik 0 Podgotovke Proektov Nekotorykh Zakonov SSSR Reguliruiushchikh PoriadokDeiatel'nostiS'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSSR i Ikh Organov [Resolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies On
Preparationof Certain USSR Draft Laws Governing the Procedure of the Activity of
the USSR Congress of People'sDeputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Their Organs],
PRAVDA, June 11, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Resolution on ProceduralLaws]. Many of the
dissident legislators had been denied seats in the Supreme Soviet. See supra notes 248,
265, 274 and accompanying text. While all deputies were promised the opportunity to
work (but not vote) in Supreme Soviet commissions and committees, see supra note 246,
at 61 and Luk'ianov, May 26 Report, supra note 239, at 34, no concrete legal guidelines
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tailed, orderly rules and structures that would limit outside influence on
the lawmaking process, protect minority interests, and produce effective
legislation.2 7 7 Thus, creation of procedural "regulations [that would]
themselves reflect democracy in its living form' '2'7 became the major task
for the new Supreme Soviet.
B.

The First Supreme Soviet Lawmaking Scheme

The new Supreme Soviet began its tenure inauspiciously. From June
3 to June 10, the leadership asked deputies to approve uncontested7
and preselected28 0 nominees for the top positions in the two legislative

or guarantees ensured that nonmembers of the Supreme Soviet would have a meaningful
voice in drafting activities. See Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Soiuza
Sovetskikh SotsialisticheskikhRespublik 0 Podgotovke Proektov Zakonov SSSR o Statuse
Narodnykh Deputatov v SSSR [Resolution of USSR Congress-of People's Deputies On
the Preparationof Draft USSR Laws On the Status of People'sDeputies in the USSR],
PRAVDA, June 16, 1989, at 3 [hereinafter Resolution on Deputy Status] (broad statement
of deputies' rights).
277. See, e.g., Iurii N. Afanas'ev, June 8, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 14, 1989, at
57; Kashnikov, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 29, 1989),
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), May 31, 1989, at 38; Viktor A. Pisarenko, Speech
to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV
(Supp.), May 30, 1989, at 27-28.
278. Chernyshev, supra note 212, at 38.
279. For deputy criticisms of the lack of alternative candidates, see Vladimir D.
Iudin, Comments at USSR Supreme Soviet (June 7, 1989), in IZVESTIA, June 9, 1989,
at 6; Ledzher M. Veiser, Comments at Soviet of Nationalities session (June 10, 1989), in
IZVESTIIA, June 12, 1989, at 3. But see Fedor M. Burlatskii, Comments at USSR Supreme Soviet (June 7, 1989), in IZVEsTIA, June 9, 1989, at 6 (arguing that choice of
candidates "deprives the president of his right and violates the constitutional principle").
Burlatskii, however, did not support a broad interpretation of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Chairman's right to propose single candidates. He believed that chairmen of committees
and commissions should be determined first by those bodies and then submitted for confirmation by the full USSR Supreme Soviet. See Fedor M. Burlatskii, Zametki Deputata.

Pervyi, No Vazhnyi Shag [Notes of a Deputy-A First, but Important Step], LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, June 14, 1989, at 1.
Deputies successfully introduced additional candidates for 6ne of the positions as deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities. As a result, no candidate received sufficient
votes for election. See Soviet of Nationalities session (June 10, 1989), in IZVESTIIA, June
12, 1989, at 2-4.
280. The Councils of Elders of the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities
considered nominees for chairmen of the Supreme Soviet chambers on June 3. See
Evgenii P. Velikhov, Report of the Council of Elders to Soviet of the Union session
(June 3, 1989), in IZVuSTIIA, June 5, 1989, at 1; Rimadzhon M. Khudaibergenova,
Report of the Council of Elders to Soviet of Nationalities session (June 6, 1989), in
IZVESTIIA, June 8, 1989, at 7. Gorbachev, in consultation with CPSU leaders, selected
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chambers,"' legislative commissions and committees,2 82 and highest executive2" 3 and judicial organs.2" 4 Once again, the communist party
played the major role in designation of candidates.28 5 Similarly, deputies
received lists of commission and committee assignments compiled by the
Presidium and chamber chairmen supposedly on the basis of personal
requests of deputies and in consultation with deputy groups.28 As subsequent speeches by Supreme Soviet legislators revealed, however, committee membership failed to reflect actual deputy preferences28 or discus-

the prospective chairmen of the Council of Ministers, see Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech
to USSR Supreme Soviet (June 7, 1989), in IZVESTIIA, June 9, 1989, at 2, and Committee of People's Control, see Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet
(June 7, 1989), id. at 4. He chose the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court at a
meeting of the party group of deputies. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to USSR
Supreme Soviet (June 7, 1989), id. at 9. The chairmen of the two Supreme Soviet chambers proposed candidates to serve as deputy chairmen of the chambers, see Evgenii M.
Primakov, Speech to Soviet of the Union session (June 10, 1989), in IZVESnA, June 11,
1989, at 9, and as chairmen of legislative commissions and committees, see Anatolii I.
Luk'ianov, Comments at Soviet of the Union session (June 10, 1989), id. at 11. These
practices led one deputy to protest that "the leadership was chosen by the apparat principle and no agreement was sought from the deputy groups." Mikhail A. Bocharov, Comments at Soviet of the Union session (June 10, 1989), id.
281. For transcripts of Supreme Soviet selection of the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, see IZVESrnA, June 5,
1989, at 1-2; IZVESTIIA, June 8, 1989, at 7-9; IZVESTnA, June 11, 1989, at 9-10; IzvESTnA, June 12, 1989, at 2-3.
282. See IZVESTRIA, June 11, 1989, at 10.
283. For discussion of Ryzhkov's candidacy for Chairman of the Council of Ministers, see IZVESTIIA, June 9, 1989, at 2-4.
284. See id. at 9 (discussing election of Evgenii A. Smolentsev as Chairman of the
USSR Supreme Court).
285. For example, Gorbachev publicly acknowledged that he had consulted with the
CPSU Central Committee about the nomination of Ryzhkov as Chairman of the USSR
Council of Minsters. See Gorbachev, June 7 Speech, supra note 280, at 9.
286. See Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Speech to Soviet of the Union session (June 3, 1989),

in IZvESTIIA, June 5, 1989, at 2; Evgenii M. Primakov, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (June 10, 1989), in IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), June 12, 1989, at 2. The plan instituted four standing commissions in each chamber and fourteen committees formed on a
parity basis by both chambers. See Luk'ianov, supra. For a list of approved committees,
see IZVESTIIA, June 9, 1989, at 9.
287. See, e.g., Comment by unidentified deputy at USSR Supreme Soviet (June 10,
1989), in IZVSTIIA (evening ed.), June 12, 1989, at 2. The deputy was a retired Estonian military officer who "suddenly ended up on the Committee on Glasnost' and Citizens Rights and Appeals [hereinafter Glasnost' Committee]," rather than the Committee
on Defense and State Security [hereinafter Defense Committee], he complained that he
"ha[d] nothing to do with this."
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sion with groups unsympathetic to leadership views. 288
The early June Supreme Soviet sessions, like their Congress counterparts, contained numerous procedural glitches. The most obvious
problems arose in election of candidates, where there were no settled
rules regarding the conduct"8 9 or tabulation of votes.290 The Supreme
Soviet leadership resolved most of these procedural debates in its favor
through the simple expedient of requiring deputies to abide by the standing orders that had governed previous Supreme Soviets. 2 1 Not surpris-

ingly, then, presiding chairmen followed Gorbachev's example at the
Congress of People's Deputies 29 2 by strongly dominating Supreme Soviet

proceedings. There were all-too-familiar interruptions, recapitulations,
and terminations of deputy discussion29 and allegations by legislators of
outside manipulation, deceit, and control.29 4
When the Supreme Soviet reconvened on June 19 to consider candidates for government ministry and department posts, informality and
disorganization remained the standard.2 95 According to first-hand observ288. See, e.g., Bocharov, supra note 280 (noting that the Moscow deputy group was
never consulted). But see Evgenii M. Primakov, Comments at Soviet of the Union session, IZVESTIIA, June 11, 1989, at 11 (claiming discussions with several Moscow
representatives).
289. The lack of specifications regarding use of secret versus open ballots posed one
basic problem. See IZVESTIIA, June 9, 1989, at 6.
290. For an example of difficulties with the actual process of counting votes and the
interpretation of results, see IZVESTIIA, June 11, 1989, at 10 (reporting the failed candidacy of Nodar M. Mgaloblishvili as deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union).
291. See Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Comments at Soviet of the Union session (June 10,
1989), id. Sergei M. Riabchenko unsuccessfully attempted to prevent this imposition of
the preexisting procedural rules, arguing that "[a] major shortcoming in our chamber's
actions is that we have not adopted generally even any initial procedural steps and for
this reason . . . we are not stuck on this question ....

."

Sergei M. Riabchenko, Com-

ments at Soviet of the Union session (June 10, 1989), id.
292. See supra notes 219-35 and accompanying text.
293. See Comments by unidentified deputy at Soviet of the Union session (June 3,
1989), in IZVESTIIA, June 5, 1989, at 3 (critizing Primakov's interference in deputy
discussion); Interchange between Primakov and unidentified deputy, Soviet of the Union
session (June 10, 1989), in IZVESTIIA, June 11, 1989, at 11 (addressing Primakov's ad
hoc termination of debate).
294. See, e.g., Bocharov, supra note 280; Comments by unidentified deputy at USSR
Supreme Soviet (June 10, 1989), in IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), June 12, 1989, at 2;
Sakharov, cited in Rost, supra note 230; Veiser, supra note 279. The leadership of the
Supreme Soviet vigorously denied these claims. See, e.g., Comments by Evgenii M.
Primakov and Anatolii I. Luk'ianov at USSR Supreme Soviet (June 10, 1989), in IzvEsTIIA (evening ed.), June 12, 1989, at 2.
295. The hearings on appointment of the Minister of Culture provided a prime illustration of these deficiencies. Three hours into the discussion one of the commissions in-
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ers, the preliminary review of nominees by commissions and committees
operated "virtually without any fixed procedural rules or any restrictions
on the list of speakers." 29 Discussion of prospective officials was also
significantly complicated by the lack of advance information on the nominees 28 7 and the vagaries of a scheduling system imposed from outside
the committee structure. Those in charge made no attempt to coordinate
the times and candidate lists with the actual committees involved in the
process."' As a result, committee members often found themselves assigned to simultaneous hearings29 9 or, alternatively, excluded from the
very sessions of most direct interest to them.300 Many deputies viewed
these "foulups" as deliberate attempts to subject the legislature to "administrative will apparatus work methods."30 1
Despite these impediments, Supreme Soviet deputies ultimately had a
discernible impact on government appointments. For nearly three weeks,
first in commissions and committees and then in full sessions of the Supreme Soviet, 302 legislators grilled candidates about their qualifications,

volved "suddenly" realized that its membership had never been formally approved by the
Supreme Soviet. This raised a serious question.about the legal validity of any decision it
might reach on the nominee. The commission ultimately resolved to proceed with the
vote with the understanding that its decision could subsequently become void if the Supreme Soviet failed to approve the commission. Several deputies refused to participate in
the final voting with the result that the candidate was unable to obtain sufficient votes for
recommendation as Minister of Culture. See T. Iakhlakova, Neprostaia
Nauka-Demokratiia [A Complicated Science-Democracy], Sov. KULTURA, June 24,
1989, at 2.
296. V. Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, V Komitetakh i Komisiiakh Verkhovnogo Soveta

SSSR. Kto Voidet v Pravitel'stvo? [In the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions: Who Will Be in the Government?], IZVESTIIA, June 22, 1989, at 1, 1.
297. See E. Gonzal'ez et al., Khoroshee Nachalo-Poldela. Komitety i Komissii
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Pristupili k Rabote [A Good Beginning Is Half the Job:
USSR Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions Have Set to Work], IzvEsTia (evening ed.), June 20, 1989, at 1; A. Vasinskii, Glasnost' Pod Zashchitoi [Glasnost' DeIzvEsTHA, July 1, 1989, at 2.
298. See Iakhlakova, supra note 295.

fended],
299.

See id.; Miroslav Buzhkevich, ParlamentskaiaNedelia [The Week in Parlia-

ment], PRAvDA, July 23, 1989, at 1. In some instances this led to the ludicrous result of
candidates being forced to nominate themselves. See Iakhlakova, supra note 295.
300. For example, the Committee on Science, Public Education, Culture, and Upbringing was not invited to participate in the hearings regarding appointment of the
Minister of Culture. Committee members attended the sessions and took part in discussion of the nominee but had no voting rights. See Iakhlakova, supra note 295.
301. Id.
302. On June 26, 1989, the Supreme Soviet began its formal consideration of nominees recommended by commissions and committees.
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views, and programs. in a "parliamentary purgatory."" 4 Supreme Soviet deputies rejected numerous candidates.3 0 5 Even ad hoc leadership
changes in procedure failed to save those nominees deemed unsuitable by
legislators.3 0 6 By the end of the process, Prime Minister Ryzhkov had

See generally G. Alimov et al., Ispytanie Demokratiei [Trial by Democracy],
(evening ed.), June 30, 1989, at 1; Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 296;
Interview with Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Moscow Television Service, Aug. 7, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 9, 1989, at 26.
304. TASS, June 19, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 21, 1989, at 44.
305. See Moscow Domestic Service, June 21, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
June 23, 1989, at 32, 34 (reporting rejection of Gramov for Chairman of USSR State
Committee for Sport); L. Grafova, Poka Eshche Diletanty, No ...[ForNow, Beginners,
But.. .],
LITERATURNAIA GAZETA, June 28, 1989, at 10 (reporting rejection of "procurator with more than a quarter century in tenure [who] said cheerfully that he had never
been aware of or known about such rule ['rule by telephone call from on high']"); A.
Murtazaiev et al., Ministry i Vremia. Razmyshleniia Pri Obsuzhdenii Kandidatov v
Chleny Pravitel'stva[Ministers and the Times: Reflections on the Discussion of Candidatesfor Members of the Government], PRAVDA, June 30, 1989, at I (reporting rejection
of Rozenova for Chairman of State Committee for Prices).
306. On June 30, only 246 deputies voted in favor of Vladimir Kamentsev,
Ryzhkov's chosen appointee for deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and
Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission. This number constituted a majority of deputies in attendance but a minority of the full Supreme Soviet membership. See
303.

IZVESTIIA

Marina Novitskaia, Moscow Domestic Service, July 4, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, July 5, 1989, at 53. As a result, on July 3, 1989, the Supreme Soviet formally
amended its regulations to provide for approval of candidates for high government positions based on the majority of voters present rather than the total number of Supreme
Soviet deputies. See TASS, July 3, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 3, 1989, at 53. Operating under this new rule, the Supreme Soviet reconsidered Kamentsev's candidacy on July
3. In a result that was "truly dramatic," deputies once again failed to elect him. Novit-

skaia, supra, at 53.
Supreme Soviet leaders interfered in the discussion of nominees through the use of
numerous techniques. These included ad hoc changes in the order of candidate consideration, see, e.g., Alimov, supra note 303, and "some invisible hand [that] was periodically
switching the [microphones] off." A. Liutyy et al., Formiruet'siaSovetskoe Pravitel'stvo.
Korrespondenty "Pravdy" Rasskazyvaiut 0 Rabote Komitetov i Komissii Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSSR [The Soviet Government Is Being Formed. Pravda CorrespondentsReport
on the Work of USSR Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions], PRAVDA, June 23,
1989, at 1.
The most notorious example of leadership intervention in legislative consideration and
selection of officials was the case of Nikolai Konorev. Less than one month after the
Supreme Soviet rejected Konorev for the position of Minister of Railways, Prime Minister Ryzhkov reinstated his candidacy in a letter read by Gorbachev to the assembled
deputies. The legislators then responded by approving Konorev by a more than twothirds margin. See Egor Iakovlev, Learning to Hold Counsel, Moscow NEWS, Aug. 20,
1989, at 4 (expressing concern "over the precedent of revision of the Supreme Soviet
decision").
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begun to consult commissions and committees directly for recommendations of appropriate appointees.3 0 7 With the formation of the Soviet government, the legislature finally embarked on the critical "second stage,
the stage of lawmaking."308

Gorbachev himself provided the initial impetus for the 1989 reforms
of the federal lawmaking process. At the Congress of People's Deputies
he proclaimed that "[a] renewed society should rely on renewed legislation." ' 9 Use of traditional lawmaking methods during Gorbachev's first

four years in office had resulted in legislation that had actually deteriorated in quality, clarity, consistency, and effectiveness.3 1 0 This led Soviet
reformers to conclude that successful implementation of perestroika and
establishment of a rule-of-law state required a fundamentally new lawmaking process. 3 ' As Sergei Alekseev, Chairman of the Committee for
Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order (Legislation
Committee), remarked, "We must begin making laws virtually from
scratch." '12
The Congress of People's Deputies provided only the broad outlines
for a new legislative system. In its Basic Guidelines for the Domestic and
Foreign Policy of the USSR it directed that:
[Tihe main bulk of legislative acts should be drafted, discussed, and
adopted by the permanently operating USSR Supreme Soviet with the
active participation of its committees and the commissions of the chambers, in conformity with the carefully formulated democratic procedure
providing for glasnost' and openness in discussion and presentation of al-

307.
308.

See Iakovlev, supra note 306.
Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Report of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to USSR

Supreme Soviet (July 19, 1989), translated in F.BI.S.-SOV, July 20, 1989, at 59, 63.

309. Gorbachev, supra note 246.
310. See Iurii Kh. Kalmykov, in Gonzal'ez et al., supra note 297 (citing laws on
state enterprise, cooperatives, and individual labor activity as examples).
311. See, e.g., Aleksandr M. Obolenskii, cited in Zhelnorova & Novikova, supra

note 260, at 3: "[Iln our country, restructuring's cutting edge runs through the legislative
sphere. It is necessary to lay a foundation for a rule-of-law state, for we now are practically without rights, and each bureaucrat does as he wishes." Accord Editorial, Stanovlenie Narodovlastiia [EstablishingPeople's Power], PRAVDA, June 21, 1989, at 1;

V. Danilenko, Vybiraem Demokratiiu [We Opt for Democracy], IzvEsTnA (evening ed.),
June 15, 1989, at 3; S. Shishkin, Zakonna Li Zabastovka?Neobkhodima Iuridicheskaia
Reglamentatsiia [Is a Strike Legal? Legal Regulation Needed], IZVESTnA (evening ed.),
July 14, 1989, at 3.
312. L. Shinkarev, Zhit' Po Zakonu [Living by the Law], IzvESTnA (evening ed.),
June 30, 1989, at 3 (comment by Sergei Alekseev).
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In a separate resolution on deputy status, 14 the Congress set forth general guarantees to ensure the "active participation" of committee members. These included rights of legislative initiative, amendment, and approval,315 receipt of draft documents at least two weeks prior to their
formal consideration, 316 and access to essential information 17 and support services.31 Unfortunately, the Congress failed to offer a similar
elaboration of what precisely it envisioned as a "carefully formulated
democratic procedure." On the contrary, it explicitly delegated full responsibility to the Supreme Soviet to devise appropriate standing orders
for both legislative bodies. 19
The Supreme Soviet responded immediately when it reconvened on
June 26. In separate sittings, both the Soviet of Nationalities and the
Soviet of the Union examined an agenda prepared by the Supreme Soviet Presidium for the upcoming session that included consideration of
several draft laws and Presidium decrees. 2 Per custom, the chambers
formally endorsed the agenda as submitted. 2 ' It was clear, however, that
this was not intended as precedent for future legislative work. For example, when Anatolii Luk'ianov presented the official report on the agenda
he emphasized that henceforth the Presidium would have no legal authority to issue binding legislative norms. Instead, this right would pass
"wholly and entirely to the Supreme Soviet."3'22 Deputies followed this
statement by agreeing to a new approach for the discussion and enactment of the proposed laws. They decided that, "as a rule," they would
examine the drafts in two readings. The plan was for the deputies to
submit the drafts after the first reading to the relevant committees and
commissions for "finalization" and to publish them simultaneously in the

313. Basic Guidelines, supra note 246, part IV.
314. Resolution on Deputy Status, supra note 276.
315. Id. points 4 & 5.

316. Id. point 7.
317. Id. points 6 & 7.
318.

Id. points 9, 10 & 11.

319. See Resolution on ProceduralLaws, sdpra note 276.

320. For a discussion of Supreme Soviet Presidium preliminary approval of the
agenda, see TASS, June 23, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 26, 1989, at 40.
321. See M. Buzhkevich & G. Ovcharenko, Vremia Peremen. Na Pervoi Sessii
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Times of Change: At the FirstSession of the USSR Supreme
Soviet], PRAVDA, June 29, 1989, at 1; TASS, June 26, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 27,
1989, at 33.
322. See TASS, Na Pervoi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [At the FirstSession of
USSR Supreme Soviet], Soy. RossniA, June 27, 1989, at 1.
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press for public information and comment.3 2
On July 19 the Supreme Soviet fleshed out its skeletal framework for
lawmaking when it enacted the Temporary Rules for Presenting to the

USSR Supreme Soviet and Examining in the Committees of the Supreme Soviet and in the Standing Commissions of its Chambers Drafts
of USSR Laws and Proposals for the Adoption of USSR Laws (Temporary Rules). 24 This document, which was intended to guide lawmaking
activity until formulation of new Supreme Soviet standing orders, 325 set
out a general six-stage process: (1) initiation of legislation; (2) preparation of the draft in commissions and committees; (3) first reading of the
proposed measure in the Supreme Soviet; (4) return of the document to
committee for revision and possible publication for national comment
and criticism; (5) second reading of the bill by the Supreme Soviet; and

(6) adoption.
In the first stage, organs or individuals with the formal constitutional
right of legislative initiative3 26 presented to the chairmen of the chambers
or Supreme Soviet Presidium a copy of the draft law and supporting

323.
at 39.

See id. at 1; TASS, June 26, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 26, 1989,

324. Postanovienie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Vremennykh Pravilakh SSSR i
Rassmotreniiav Komitetakh Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i PostoiannykhKomissiiakh Ego
Palat Proektov Zakonov SSSR i Predlozhenii o PriniatiiZakonov SSSR [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On Temporary Rules for Presentingto the Supreme Soviet and
Examining in the Committees of the Supreme Soviet and in the Standing Commissions
of its Chambers Drafts of USSR Laws and Proposalsfor the Adoption of USSR Laws]
(July 19, 1989), 7 Vedomosti SSSR, item 171 (1989) [hereinafter Temporary Rules].
Anatolii Luk'ianov introduced the draft Temporary Rules at the July 19 morning session
of the Supreme Soviet and urged their immediate approval to "permit us to conduct our
legislative work more precisely and consistently, even before standing orders have been
adopted." Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Report to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 19, 1989),

translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 20, 1989, at 59, 62. After several criticisms and suggestions, the Supreme Soviet at its afternoon session approved the Temporary Rules and
a separate resolution that officially accepted and submitted eighteen draft laws to specified committees and commissions for examination. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta

SSSR 0 Peredache Na Predvaritel'noeRassmotrenie Komitetam Verkhovnogo Soveta
SSSR i Postoiannym Komissiiam Ego PalatProektov Zakonov SSSR [USSR Supreme
Soviet Resolution On the Submission of Drafts of USSR Lawsfor PreliminaryExamination by Committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Standing Commissions of Its
Chambers] (July 19, 1989), 7 Vedomosti SSSR, item 172 (1989) [hereinafter Preliminary Examination Resolution]. For a report on adoption of these measures, see Moscow
Domestic Service, July 19, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 20, 1989, at 70.
325. Temporary Rules, supra note 324, preface.
326. Id. point 1. These bodies and persons could also present drafts prepared by
private individuals or by government and social organs not possessing the right of legislative initiative. Id.
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documentation regarding such matters as the necessity for the law, its
goals, tasks, and relationship to existing and future statutes, and anticipated socioeconomic and other consequences. 27 The Secretariat then officially registered the draft. 28
Following registration, the Presidium or chamber chairmen either
submitted the draft directly to the Supreme Soviet for consideration or
sent it to the "appropriate" committees and commissions, including the
Legislation Committee, for examination and preparation.32 During this
second stage, the assigned committees had extensive authority to devise
relevant procedures and structures for their work. According to the Temporary Rules, the committees could "independently" determine their
own rules and schedule. 330 Moreover, they had full discretion to create
preparatory subcommittees, which could be composed of not only committee members but also other people's deputies, representatives of government agencies, social organizations, and scientific institutes, specialists, and scholars.33 ' Similarly, when several committees or commissions
(or both) had responsibility for a single statute, they could form a joint
preparatory committee. 3 2 Finally, if desirable, preparatory committees
had the option of sending the draft law to outside labor, academic, social,
or citizens' groups for discussion and criticism.33 3
After the committee or commission prepared the draft, the Temporary
Rules called for its submission to the Presidium. 34 The Presidium then
determined the appropriate point in the Supreme Soviet agenda for consideration of the statute and distributed copies of the text and supporting
materials to people's deputies no later than two weeks prior to the scheduled examination session.3 35 The third stage, the so-called "first reading"
of the draft, began at this point. 3 6 During this period, deputies heard
speeches by the draft initiators and preparatory committees, discussed
the text, supplementary reports, and other materials, 3 7 and then either
approved the law in principle and set a date for its second reading, re-

327. Id. points 1 & 2.
328. Id. point 2.

329. Id.
330.

The only restriction was that these arrangements had to conform with the ex-

isting USSR legislation and the Temporary Rules. Id. point 3.
331.

Id.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id. point 4.
Id. point 5.
Id.
Id. point 6.
Id.
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jected it altogether, or formally enacted it as USSR legislation.33
If legislators chose the first option (approval in principle), they commenced the fourth stage of the lawmaking process, dorabotka or "refinement" of the statute. The legislators could choose to return the draft to
the original preparatory committees, additional committees, or entirely
new committees for supplementary examination and rewriting. 3 ' Simultaneously, they could order publication of the text for nationwide discussion and criticism.

340

Once the Presidium (or chamber chairmen) and the main drafting
committee deemed the law suitably revised, they presented it to the Supreme Soviet for a second reading.3 41 During this fifth stage, legislators
could choose to consider the text as a whole or on a clause-by-clause
basis. 42 Moreover, at any point during discussion of the draft, they
its entirety to the appropricould return individual clauses or the text34in
3
refinement.
additional
for
ate committees
At the conclusion of this second reading, the Supreme Soviet settled
the fate of the draft law. In this sixth and final stage, legislators
"adopt[ed] the USSR law, reject[ed] it or reach[ed] a decision about the
procedure for its subsequent examination.

3

44

The deputies then deter-

mined in each case whether to conduct the vote on the text in its entirety
or on an individual clause-by-clause basis. 45 The Temporary Rules contained neither further information on the enactment process nor any
guidance whatsoever regarding subsequent publication or entry into
force of the new USSR statute.3 46
The Temporary Rules, therefore, represented a notable improvement
over prior Soviet lawmaking schemes. They offered a degree of detail

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. point 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. point 8.

346.

On July 31, the Supreme Soviet passed a law dealing specifically with issues of

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

publication and entry into force. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik

0 Poriadke Opublikovaniia i Vstupleniia v Silu Zakonov SSSR i Drugikh Aktov,
PriniatykhS'ezdom Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, Verkhovnym Sovetom SSSR i Ikh Organami [USSR Law On Proceduresfor the Publicationand Entry Into Force of USSR

Laws and Other Acts Adopted by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR
Supreme Soviet, and Their Organs] (July 31, 1989), PRAVDA, Aug. 4, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Law on Publication and Entry into Force]. See infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
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and specificity conspicuously absent in both the pre-Gorbachev 3 7 and
the 1988 amended constitutional provisions. 4 s The rules placed unprece3 49
dented emphasis on legislative preparation and refinement of drafts
and expanded the opportunities for deputy and public participation in
the lawmaking process.3 50 They significantly enhanced the stature and
role of legislative commissions and committees, granting these bodies
broad authority and discretion over the organization and completion of
their assigned tasks. 5 1
Unfortunately, however, the Temporary Rules also contained a number of linguistic and conceptual flaws that promised to undercut the effectiveness and autonomy of the new Supreme Soviet as lawmaker. Most
disturbing was the presence of several built-in loopholes for bypassing
stages of the formal legislative process. Thus, the Temporary Rules stipulated that the legislature could adopt a law after only one reading35 2 or
even, if the Supreme Soviet Presidium or chamber chairmen so decided,
immediately upon its initiation and registration. 3 This effectively re-

duced or, in the latter instance, eliminated committee and commission
participation in the lawmaking process. Yet the Temporary Rules failed
to provide any concrete definition or restriction on the exercise of these
options.
Similarly, the new scheme offered only possibilities, not guarantees,
for public involvement in legislative activity. The Temporary Rules did
not mandate consultation with citizens' groups or dissemination of drafts
in the mass media. Rather, they permitted the Supreme Soviet and its
committees to enlist outside organizations and individuals in preparatory
work354 and to publish drafts in preliminary 5 5 or approved forms, 56 or
both. Another related problem was the continued fluidity of lawmaking
procedures. For example, the Temporary Rules contained only vague
guidelines regarding the preparation of drafts, giving committees and
commissions virtually complete discretion to determine their own rules,

347. See Foster-Simons, supra note 80.
348. See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text.
349. In fact, the Temporary Rules devoted more space to draft preparation and refinement than to any other stage of the legislative process. See Temporary Rules, supra
note 324, points 3, 4 & 7.
350. See id. points 1-4 & 7.
351. See id. points 3, 4 & 7.
352. Id. point 7.
353. Id. point 2.

354. Id. points 3-4.
355.
356.

Id. point 4.
Id. point 7 (publication after first reading).
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agendas, and structures. 3 57 In addition, they gave no explanations as to
when the legislature should properly refer a draft for dorabotka to its
original preparatory committees, additional committees, or new committees.358 Moreover, the Temporary Rules did not delineate the appropriate instances in which to discuss or vote for a statute in its entirety or on
a clause-by-clause basis. 59 If the Congress of People's Deputies was any
guide,3 60 such imprecise procedural provisions were likely to lead to serious delays and outside domination of the upcoming Supreme Soviet legislative work.
In fact, the Temporary Rules expressly licensed extensive control of
the lawmaking from above. Most notably, they gave the Presidium broad
supervisory and decisive powers throughout the process. Presidium involvement could potentially36 ' include receipt of the initiated draft,3 62 assignment of the appropriate preparatory committees,363 determination of
the schedule for the first and second readings, 6 4 distribution of the text
and supporting materials to deputies, 6 5 and final judgment regarding
the draft's suitability for formal Supreme Soviet enactment. 36
Finally, the Temporary Rules failed to address many of the most criticized aspects of the lawmaking process. They made no inroads into the
longstanding practice of anonymous, secret drafting of legislation.367
They dealt in only the most cursory manner with the origination of legislation 368 and did not require identification of draft authors by name as

urged by Soviet reformers.

69

The Temporary Rules also contained no

357. Id. point 3.
358. Id. point 7.
359. Id. points 7 & 8.
360. See supra part III.A.
361. The word "potentially" is appropriate because in many instances the Presidium
shared these powers with the chairmen of the chambers.
362. Temporary Rules, supra note 324, point 2.
363. Id.
364. Id. point 5.
365. Id.
366. Id. points 2 & 8.
367. See Foster-Simons, supra note 80, at 336, 340-44.
368. The only mention of the preinitiation development of legislation appeared in
point 1, which described formal presentation to the Supreme Soviet of drafts prepared
either by bodies with the right of legislative initiative or by organs or private citizens
without such right. There was no discussion of drafting procedures or techniques prior to
official presentation and registration. Temporary Rules, supra note 324, point 1.
369. See, e.g., Comments by deputies at USSR Supreme Soviet session (July 19,
1989), cited in Moscow Domestic Service, July 19, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
July 20, 1989, at 67 [hereinafter Comments by Deputies]; Danilenko, supra note 156.
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mention, let alone formal guarantee, of legislative consideration of alternative versions of draft laws. Thus, official departmental drafts were
likely to remain the determinative basis for new Soviet legislation370
Moreover, because of their lack of a detailed, binding timetable for
draft preparation and approval, the Temporary Rules provided little relief for party and administrative "mothballing 37 1 of prospective legislation. The sole time requirements appeared in points five and six, which
mandated respectively that deputies receive draft texts and supporting
materials "as a rule" no later than two weeks prior to the first reading
and that they consider a law for its first reading within six months after
its original presentation to the Presidium or chamber chairmen. Even
this first requirement had two serious defects. Like a similar provision in
the Provisional Standing Orders of the Congress of People's Deputies
that had been attacked by legislators, 7 2 it offered deputies inadequate
time for examination of crucial documents. Exacerbating the situation,
the Temporary Rules qualified the minimal two-week period with the
phrase "as a rule." The dangers of such language were well known by
Soviet legislators and citizens. As one Supreme Soviet deputy remarked
at the first Soviet of the Union session on June 3, "[t]he quality of the
law will depend on these formulas. You and I have been convinced, I
hope, that the essence suffers, the cause suffers because of all these 'as a
' 3 73
rule's' and various reservations.

Two other significant problems remained untreated by the Temporary
Rules: ad hoc amendment of formally enacted statutes3 74 and lack of
public access to Soviet legislative acts. 7 5 The new scheme failed to indicate whether its-procedures applied to amendment as well as to original
adoption of legislation. This left the extent of possible deputy involvement in the amendment process unsettled. 37 6 Similarly, the Temporary

370. See Comments by deputies at USSR Supreme Soviet (July 19, 1989), cited in
Moscow Domestic Service, July 19, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 20, 1989,
at 70; L. Nikitinskii, Ploshchad' Pered Parlamentom: Volia Narodom Ili Emotsii
Tolpy? [ParliamentSquare: The Wilt'of the People or the Emotions of the Mob?], KOMSOMO.'SKAIA PRAVDA, July 11, 1989, at 2 (interview with Sergei S. Alekseev).

371.

V. Gatov & V. Dolganov, Diskussii Obostriaiutsia [The Debate Intensifies],

IZVFSTIIA (evening ed.), Sept. 28, 1989, at 1 (citing A.S. Pavlov).

372. ProvisionalStanding Orders, supra note 218, art. 19. For an example of deputy criticism, see Pisarenko, supra note 277, at 27.
373. Viktor A. Shekhovtsov, Speech to Soviet of the Union session (June 3, 1989), in
IZVESTIIA, June 5, 1989, at 3.

374. See Foster-Simons, supra note 80, at 337.
375. Id. at 337, 352.
376. See Comments by Deputies, supra note 369.
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Rules did not mention any official mechanisms for statutory publication
and entry into force of laws and acts. This second gap was eliminated on
July 31 when the Supreme Soviet passed legislation specifically covering
these issues.3 7 The new law mandated publication of USSR laws and
acts no later than seven days after their adoption by the Congress of
People's Deputies, Supreme Soviet, Constitutional Oversight Committee,
or Supreme Soviet Chambers, Presidium, and Chairman. 8 It stipulated
that all such acts would become legally effective ten days after their publication unless otherwise specified by the enacting body. 7 9 To ensure the
increased dissemination of legislation to the Soviet citizenry, the July 31
law required publication in two sources: the official bulletin of the legislature380 and the newspaper Izvestiia. 8 '_
The Supreme Soviet adjourned only two weeks after enactment of the
Temporary Rules. By August 4, 1989, it had adopted nearly one hundred decisions.3 82 This activity by no means reflected a concrete application of the lawmaking reforms, however. Deputies generally followed the
familiar, truncated legislative process by endorsing acts drafted and prepared in outside channels.3 8 Two unanticipated developments delayed

377. Law on Publication and Entry Into Force, supra note 346.
378. Id. art. 1. It should be noted, however, that the law exempted Supreme Soviet
Presidium decrees and resolutions "with no general significance" from publication requirements. Id. art. 4.
379. Id. art. 3.
380. Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR.
See id. arts. 1-2, 6-7.
381. Id. arts. 1-2.
382. See A. Krutov & L. Shvedova, Interview with Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Moscow
Television Service, Aug. 7, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 9, 1989, at 26, 3233. For a list of Presidium decrees approved by the Supreme Soviet, see Zakon Soiuza

Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob Utverzhdenii Ukazov Prezidiuma
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i Vnesenii Izmenii i Dopolnenii v Zakonodatel'nye Akty SSSR
[USSR Law On Approving USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decrees and Making
Amendments and Additions to USSR Legislative Acts] (July 31, 1989), IzvEsrIA, Aug.
5, 1989, at 1.
383. A prime illustration was Supreme Soviet treatment of the Council of Ministers
Law amendments. Zakon Souiza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Vnesenii
Izmenenii v Zakon SSSR "0 Sovete Ministrov SSSR" [USSR Law On Making Amend-

ments to the USSR Law "On the USSR Council of Ministers"] (June 27, 1989),
PRAVDA, July 6, 1989, at 1. Even Pravda commentators criticized the "ineffective" dis-

cussion and abbreviated time for committee elaboration of the draft. Buzhkevich &
Ovcharenko, supra note 321. For deputy criticisms of first session Supreme Soviet lawmaking procedures, see, e.g., Fedor Burlatskii, cited in A. Kozlov, Metod Prob i Oshibok
Nedopustim [The Trial and Error Method Is Intolerable], Soms. INDUSTRIIA, June 6,
1989, at 1; M. Novitskaia, Moscow Domestic Service, June 26, 1989, translated in
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Soviet legislative activity: the unexpectedly lengthy Supreme Soviet examination of government candidates"8 4 and the Donbass miners strike, a
national crisis that required immediate governmental and legislative response.38 5 Thus, any full exploration, trial, and rdadjustment of the new

F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 26, 1989, at 40; TASS, supra note 322.
One possible counter-example was the Supreme Soviet's discussion and approval on its
first reading of the draft Law On the Economic Autonomy of the Lithuanian SSR, the
Latvian SSR, and the Estonian SSR [hereinafter Draft Baltic Autonomy Law]. At the
Congress of People's Deputies, the Lithuanian and Estonian Supreme Soviets formally
exercised their right of legislative initiative in proposals to introduce a system of economic accountability into their republics. The Congress formally instructed the Supreme
Soviet to consider these proposals, which were then assigned to the Economic Reform
Committee and other "relevant" commissions. On July 26, the Economic Reform Committee presented a draft law to the Supreme Soviet for its first reading. After a stormy
debate and discussion, legislators approved the draft on July 27 and scheduled a second
reading for no later than October 1. See TASS, Na Pervoi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta
SSSR [At the USSR Supreme Soviet First Session], Soy. RossHA, July 27, 1989, at 1;
Ludmila Semena, Moscow Domestic Service, July 27, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
July 28, 1989, at 46. Although Anatolii Luk'ianov described the procedures as "correspond[ing] to the provisional regulations on passing draft bills recently adopted by the
Soviet parliament." TASS, July 27, 1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 27, 1989, at
35, in fact there were some serious discrepancies. Most notably, deputies had no opportunity to consider copies of the text and supporting documents in advance of formal
legislative deliberations. They received only an oral report on the law because the draft
was completed literally on the very day of its first reading. See Anatolii I. Luk'ianov,
Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 26, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 27,
1989, at 40. Not surprisingly, deputies were critical of this hasty submission. See, e.g.,
Vitalii I. Vorotnikov, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 26, 1989), translated in id.
at 42.
384. On July 3, Gorbachev chided deputies for their overly detailed examination of
candidates and called upon legislators to be more "rational" in their "use of the working
time of the Supreme Soviet" and more "focused" in their questions. See Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 3, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, July 5, 1989, at 39. See Remington, supra note 12, at 195.
385. For a brief description of the strikes and their impact on the Soviet legislature,
see URBAN, supra note 54, at 138-39. The strikes were responsible for two important

changes in the legislative agenda: (a) preparation of the draft Strike Law, PostanovIenie
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Proekte Zakona SSSR 0 Poriadke Razresheniia Kollektivnykh Trudovykh Sporov [Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet On the Draft Law
On Proceduresfor Resolving Collective Labor Disputes] (Aug. 2, 1989), PRAVDA, Aug.
3, 1989, at 1; and (b) amendment of the State Enterprise Law, Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh

Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Zakon SSSR "0
Gosudarstvennom Predpriiatii(Ob'edinenii)" [USSR Law On Making Amendments
and Additions to the USSR Law "On the State Enterprise"] (Aug. 3, 1989), PRAVDA,
Aug. 11, 1989, at 1. For information on the Strike Law, see Shishkin, supra note 311;

TASS, July 18, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 18, 1989, at 97. On the State
Enterprise Law amendments, see A. Pankov, Zakon Est', Nado Deistvovat' [The Law Is
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lawmaking scheme in practice had to await the next Supreme Soviet
session.

IV.

THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE AS LAWMAKER

The official legislative reforms transferred the major responsibilitym
for law creation to bodies that initially were unequal to the task. Su-

preme Soviet commissions and committees began their consideration and
preparation of draft legislation with only a vague idea of their functions, 3 17 competence, 8 8 and organization. 8 " They had no budget 390 and,

There, We Must Act], TRUD, Aug. 6, 1989, at 1. An unnamed Pravda commentator
praised the revision of the agenda to accommodate the Strike Law as an example of the
"living, creative process of the democratic exercise of power." Will and Law, PRAVDA,
July 19, 1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 20, 1989, at 84, 85. Similarly,
Gorbachev cited the unscheduled changes in the State Enterprise Law as demonstrating
that the legislature was "sensitive to impulses proceeding from life outside." Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, Rech' M.S. Gorbacheva Po Zavershenii Raboty Pervoi Sessii Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSSR [Speech of M.S. Gorbachev On the Conclusion of the Work of the First
USSR Supreme Soviet Session] (Aug. 4, 1989), PRAVDA, Aug. 5, 1989, at 1. In marked
contrast, Fedor Burlatskii warned of "a danger of improvising laws." Fedor Burlatskii,
Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 25, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 25,
1989, at 50, 51.

386. See Igor Beliaiev, Akademik E.M. Primakov: "S'ezd Pozvolil Nashemu
Narodu Luchshe Poznat' Sebia" [Academician E.M. Primakov: "The Congress Made It
Possible for Our People To Understand Themselves Better"], LiTERATURNAIA
GAZETA, June 21, 1989, at 10.
387. See V. Tolstoy, Reshenie Sotsial'nykh Problem-Neotlozhno [The Solution of
Social Problems Is Crucial],IZVSTnsA (evening ed.), July 20, 1989, at 3 (interview with
Boris N. El'tsin regarding Committee for Questions of Construction and Architecture).
388. A particular problem existed with overlapping competence of committees. As a
result, drafts would be submitted simultaneously to several committees with no clear
delineation of responsibilities or rights. See E. Leont'eva, "Ostat'sia v Storone Ia Ne
Mog.. ." ["I Could Not Remain On the Sidelines.. ."], SorS. INDUSTRIIA, Aug. 16,
1989, at 2 (interview with Sergei B. Stankevich); Vasinskii, supra note 297, at 2.
Anatolii Luk'ianov warned of the dangers of just such a development at the June 6
Soviet of Nationalities session: "[Plractice shows that as soon as a contentious issue falls

within the competence of two commissions, the situation that arises is that 'everyone's
business is no one's business.'" Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Comments at Soviet of Nationalities session (June 6, 1989), in IzvEsTiIA, June 8, 1989, at 10.
389. For discussions of committee disorganization and lack of procedures, see supra
notes 295-301 and accompanying text. See also A. Pankov, Bol'she Dela [More Work],
TRUD, Aug. 1, 1989, at 2 (interview with Boris N. El'tsin). Another serious difficulty
was the inadequate time allotted to committee sessions. See V. Dolganov, Obsuzhdaiutsia
Plan i Biudzhet Strany [The Country's Plan and Budget Are Discussed], IzvEsnTsA,
Sept. 20, 1989, at 3.
390. See Buzhkevich, supra note 299.
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despite formal guarantees to the contrary, 91 poor support services"9 2 and
access to information.39 3 Few committee members had the specialized legal training required for formulation of sophisticated, precise statutory
norms and rules. 394 Even the Legislation Committee, the "coordinating
center of all lawmaking in the country, 3 9 5 contained only twenty

lawyers.3 9 6
Deputies' personal lives were fraught with uncertainty and material
deprivation. They arrived at the first Supreme Soviet session with their
employment status unsettled.3 97 They worked nearly a mile away from
the Supreme Soviet in offices that remained under construction throughout the summer of 1989.98 They labored long hours with inadequate

food

9

and compensation."' Some deputies claimed that these hardships

undermined Supreme Soviet authority and independence by making leg401
islators susceptible to leadership "taming and feeding.2
Poor living and working conditions constituted only one threat to deputies' lawmaking autonomy, however. In fact, through a combination of
indirect and direct powers, party and legislative authorities could poten-

391.

See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.

392. Deputies operated largely without staff, consultants, advisers, printing facilities,
computers, or fax machines. See V. Dolganov & R. Lynev, Sdelan Vazhnyi Shag [A
Major Step Has Been Made], IzvEsTIrA (evening ed.), Aug. 7, 1989, at 1; Pankov,

supra note 389.
393. See Buzhkevich, supra note 299; Leont'eva, supra note 388.
394. See Grafova, supra note 305. According to an Izvestiia correspondent, an alltoo-familiar refrain at committee meetings became "Oh,.would that we had a qualified
lawyer to help us formulate amendments with the utmost accuracy ... ." V. Dolganov,
Zaglianem v Zavtra [Looking Ahead to Tomorrow], IzvF-snilA (evening ed.), Nov. 9,

1989, at 1.
395. Sergei Alekseev, cited in TASS, supra note 385.
396. See Shinkarev, supra note 312, at 3.
397. Deputies generally had no notion of whether they were to be part-time or permanent legislators or of the impact of their Supreme Soviet service on their regular employment. See Gonzal'ez et al., supra note 297; Iu. Sorokin, Ischezaet Defitsit Lichnosti
[The Shortage of PersonalitiesIs Disappearing], KOMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA, June 7,
1989, at 1. Committee chairmen, deputy chairmen, and secretaries were expected to
devote themselves full-time to legislative activity. See Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Comments at
Soviet of Nationalities session (June 6, 1989), in IzvESrTIA, June 8, 1989, at 11.
398. See URBAN, supra note 54, at 137; TASS, supra note 322, at 2.

399. See TASS, July 13, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 13, 1989, at 49.
400.

See id.

401. Iurii Iu. Boldyrev, cited in TASS, supra note 399. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 13, 1989), Moscow Domestic Service, July 13;
1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 14, 1989, at 46; Moscow Domestic Service, July
13, 1989, translated in id. at 45.
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tially create a stranglehold on the legislative process. The CPSU center's
control of party members ensured it a decisive voice in the formulation
and adoption of statutes. A Pravda editorial in August reminded communist deputies that they were not "exempt from party discipline ....
Their duty [was] to take the same stance as the Central Committee...
and to pursue and to implement the party line" in the legislature.4" 2 The
chilling effect on Soviet lawmaking was evident. Deputies frankly acknowledged that, even under the reformed system, draft laws would
"continue to go by way of Staraia Ploshchad"4 0 3 (CPSU headquarters).
As amply demonstrated by early Supreme Soviet sessions, the leadership could also influence the lawmaking process through official legislative and governmental, as well as party, channels. It retained significant
powers to determine such key matters as committee composition,40 4 functions, 40 5 scheduling, 406 draft preparation assignments, 40 7 and media coverage. 408 Some suspected that party and legislative authorities actually
manipulated the committee structure to "drown" controversial issues and
laws. 4 9 For example, members of the potentially troublesome Commit402. Editorial, Partiiai Sovety [Party and Soviets], PRAVDA, Aug. 8, 1989, at 1. See
also Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika Raboty Partii-VazhneishaiaKliuchevaia
Zadacha Dnia. Doklad M.S. Gorbacheva na Soveshanii v TsK KPSS [The Restructuring of the Party's Work Is a Most Important Key Task of the Day: M.S. Gorbachev's
Report at the CPSU Central Committee Conference], PRAVDA, July 19, 1989, at 1, part
II ("We naturally cannot consider communist deputies free from party discipline or fulfillment of party decisions.").
403. Nikitinskii, supra note 370, at 2.
404. See, e.g., Boris N. El'tsin, cited in Tolstoy, supra note 387, at 3: "[A]s chairman I had no involvement in the committee's formation. I still do not know who selected
the deputies or on what basis. I was presented with a ready-made list by the Supreme
Soviet Presidium apparatus."
405. For a description of the officially designated functions of commissions and committees, see Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Speech to Soviet of Nationalities session (June 6,
1989), in IZvSTIIA, June 8, 1989, at 10.
406. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
408. See, e.g., Grafova, supra note 305, at 10 (reporting that militsiia were posted at
doors of Glasnost' Committee session "to protect the deputies from an 'unnecessary' correspondent"). Officials substantially restricted media coverage of Supreme Soviet meetings. See Moscow Domestic Service, June 26, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, June
26, 1989, at 36. Their justification was that the extensive broadcasts of Congress of People's Deputies proceedings had had a negative impact on the Soviet economy. "People
stopped working and sat in front of televisions or loudspeakers." Buzhkevich &
Ovcharenko, supra note 321, at 2.
409. See, e.g., Boris N. El'tsin, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 24, 1989),
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 25, 1989, at 33, 34. But see Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 24, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 25,
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tee for Questions of Glasnost' and Citizens' Rights and Appeals (Glasnost' Committee) repeatedly protested apparatus attempts to turn them
into a "complaints bureau. 441 They alleged that the leadership had deliberately prevented them from addressing fundamental reforms in the
human rights area by assigning them the overwhelming and unnecessary
responsibility for the "avalanche" of citizens' letters and appeals to the
legislature."
Despite these formidable obstacles, deputies made major strides toward becoming "fully empowered parliamentarians"4 12 in subsequent
months. They pressed for reorganization and subordination of the legislative administrative bodies traditionally appointed by and answerable to
the party leadership rather than the legislature.4 13 They formed political
groups independent of the CPSU that vigorously asserted minority rights
and views in committee and full Supreme Soviet sessions.41 4 They devel-

1989, at 39, 42-43 (rejecting El'tsin's claims).
410. Grafova, supra note 305, at 10.
411. Id. Note that a special Department of Letters already existed within the Supreme Soviet Presidium to handle the literally thousands of letters. Id.
412. Eugenii M. Primakov, cited in Sorokin, supra note 397, at 1.
413. Their particular target was the Secretariat, which they sought to transform into
an organ that would "work for the deputies, under the deputies, under their control, and

not vice versa." Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, cited in Krutov & Shvedova, supra note 382, at
32. But see Iu. Nikolaev, S Vershiny Goda [From the High Point of the Year], Sov.
RossnA, Dec. 28, 1989, at 1 (noting continued Secretariat and Presidium control over
distribution of deputies' statements).

414. From the very beginning, deputies resisted Gorbachev's scheme for controlled
identification and representation of interest groups. They organized their own independent legislative groups along territorial, professional, and ideological lines. See generally
Evgenii Panov, Ot Ch'ego Imeni [On Behalf of Whom?], Sos. INDUSTRIaA, June 3,
1989, at 2. The first evidence of this spontaneous formation of legislative groups was
offered at the Congress of People's Deputies. The so-called "new Moscow deputies,"
with Boris EI'tsin as their main spokesperson, announced their presence with a flourish
by publicly condemning the Congress agenda as prepared and approved by the CPSU.
See AFP, May 21, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 22, 1989, at 68. The new Moscow
deputies spawned and actively supported numerous other independent legislative collectives, placing special emphasis on "effective enlightenment work" with Baltic and other
republic groups. V. Mikhailov, Let's Be Optimistic, Sov. LrrvA, June 1, 1989, at 1,
translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, June 19, 1989, at 58 (interview with Kazimera Prunskene).
On May 27, deputies from the Moscow delegation officially declared the creation of
the "Interregional Deputies Group." See supra note 274. This organization took concrete form on July 29 when nearly 400 progressive deputies from throughout the USSR
met in Moscow to determine the basic goals, platform, and leadership of their group. See
Andrei Romanov & Vladimir Shevelev, The Minority Closes Rank, Moscow NEws,
Aug. 6, 1989, at 10; TASS, July 30, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 31, 1989, at 52. This
group represented the first official, independent political association established in the
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oped their own procedures, 41 5 structures,41 ' and agenda,4 17 and they acquired the rudiments of professional legislative support services.418 In the
process, Supreme Soviet deputies radically transformed and improved
every phase of the approved lawmaking scheme.

Soviet Union since Lenin's 1921 prohibition of factionalism in the CPSU. Francis Curta,

AFP, July 31, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 1, 1989, at 42.
During the second session of the Supreme Soviet, deputies' groups multiplied and
played an increasingly active role in the work of the legislature. They initiated and
drafted laws, prevented approval of unacceptable resolutions through such techniques as
public boycotts of voting sessions, and ensured representation of alternative, nonofficial
positions and interests. See A. Davydov et al., Sila Argumentov Ili Argument Sily [Force
of Arguments or Argument of Force], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Oct. 11, 1989, at 1; Marina Dimova et al., Moscow World Service, Oct. 23, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 25,
1989, at 59; L. Shevtsova, Oppozitsiia. Novoe Slovo v Nashem Politicheskom Slovare
[Opposition-A New Word in Our Political Vocabulary], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Feb.
27, 1990, at 3.
415.

See, e.g., Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 296 (first roll call vote).

416. See, e.g., Gonzal'ez et al., supra note 297 (creation of subcommittees by International Affairs Committee); TASS, supra note 385 (formation of five subcommittees by
Legislation Committee). Legislative committees also decided to determine their own
membership composition. See, e.g., Tolstoy, supra note 387, at 3.
417. See, e.g., E. Gonzal'ez et al., Obsuzhdaiutsia Ukazy v Komitetakh Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSSR i Komissiiakh Ego Palat [Decrees Are Being Discussed in USSR Supreme
Soviet Committees and Its Chambers' Commissions], IZVESTnA, July 20, 1989, at 4 (discussing the Legislation Committee's formulation of a long-range plan for its lawmaking
activity).
418. See, e.g., Dolganov, supra note 389, at 3; Eugene Huskey, Legislative-Executive Relations in the New Soviet PoliticalOrder,in PEESTROIKA-EBRA POLITICS, supra
note 12, at 153, 164. On November 14, legislators proposed the formation of the socalled "People's Deputies' Club." The goal was to improve their professional expertise
through lecture and roundtable discussions of foreign and domestic drafting procedures,
development of analytical skills, and examination of key immediate and long-term legal,
political, social, and economic problems. See Miroslav Buzhkevich, Klub Narodnykh
Deputatov [People's Deputies' Club], PRAVDA, Nov. 15, 1989, at 3. In February 1990
the Supreme Soviet announced the formation of a new Center for Analysis and Forecasting, which was supposed to become the equivalent of the United States Congressional
Research Service. See G. Alimov, Komanda Parlamentskikh Ekspertov Pri Verkhovnom
Sovete Strany Sozdaetsia Tsentr Analiza i Prognozov [A Team of ParliamentaryExperts: A Centerfor Analysis and ForecastingEstablished Under the Supreme Soviet of
the Country], IZVESTA, Feb. 2, 1990, at 3.
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Supreme Soviet Reforms of the Legislative Process

1. Generation of Prospective Legislation
In the latter half of 1989, there were dramatic changes in the initial
creation of legislation, a stage ignored by all formal Soviet lawmaking
schemes. The rigid CPSU monopoly on origination and preparation of

statutes yielded to a mort spontaneous, open, and participatory process.
The impetus for legislation-once virtually the exclusive responsibility of
the party and its General Secretary-rapidly extended to a wide variety
of official and unofficial sources. Thus, Supreme Soviet committees,41 9
independent deputy groups, 420 academic institutes,42 1 and priirate citizens422 proposed and developed many of the drafts subsequently considered by the Soviet legislature.
423
,Equally remarkable was the partial lifting of the "veil of secrecy
that had long obscured early preparation of statutes. In marked contrast
with the previous submission of anonymous drafts,42 4 there started to be
public disclosure of authorship in legislative sessions and in the mass

419. See, e.g., Miroslav Buzhkevich, Bez Kanikul [No Vacation], PRAVDA, Jan. 25,
1990, at 2 (reporting the Economic Reform Committee's proposed concept of the Law on
Joint Stock Companies).

420. See, e.g., 0 Razrabotke Antiinfiiatsionnogo Zakona [On Developing an AntiInflation Law], TRUD, Dec. 16, 1989, at 1 (reporting trade union deputies
preparation of anti-inflation law).
421. See, e.g., V. Liashenko, Source ofAll Blessings, Soy. RossirA, Nov.
1,translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov, 8, 1989, at 34 (draft Fundamentals of
Union Republic Legislation On Land [hereinafter Land Law] prepared by
All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences).

appeal for
7, 1989, at
USSR and
A.I. Lenin

422. See, e.g., V. Dolganov, Odobren Proekt Zakona o Pechati [Draft Press Law
Approved], IZV5THA, Sept. 21, 1989, at 1 (reporting that three legal scholars "for the
first time in Soviet legal practice" drafted and published their own proposed Law on the
Press and Other Mass Information Media [hereinafter Press Law]); Valentin Liashenko,

Debate on Land. Committee on Agrarian Questions and Food Concludes Work on New
Guidelines for Land Use, Soy. RossIIA, Oct. 10, 1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, Oct. 13, 1989, at 44 (reporting that peasant teacher formulated and published in
Sovetskaia Rossiia a draft land law); Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, Strategii Uglubleniia Rko-

nomicheskoi Refory-Novuiu Zakonodatel'nuiu Osnovu. Doklad N.L Ryzhkova Na
Vtoroi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [New Legislative Basisfor the Strategy of Deepening Economic Reform: Report by N.L Ryzhkov at the Second Session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet], PRAVDA, Oct. 3, 1989, at 2, 3 (noting that citizens' "new forms of
economic operation" inspired draft Socialist Enterprise Law).
423. Sergei S. Alekseev, cited in Nikitinskii, supra note 370, at 2.
424. See Foster-Simons, supra note 80, at 336.
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media.42 5 In fact, a member of the Legislation Committee revealed in
mid-August that the Supreme Soviet intended to codify this practice in
its new rules.426 His committee planned to introduce a requirement that
all draft laws must contain a list of authors to be accepted formally for
Supreme Soviet consideration.42 7
Similarly, there began to be extensive, unprecedented involvement of
outside experts and interest groups in the initial drafting process. For
example, in preparing its draft Law on Principles of Economic and Social Government in the Union Republics (Law on Republic Government), the Council of Ministers "[m]aybe for the first time in [Soviet]
legislative practice" 428 created a working group of republic leaders, federal government officials, scientists, and specialists.42 9 Some drafting bod430
ies also solicited and incorporated citizens' comments and criticisms,
even publishing early proposals and drafts for public discussion. 4 1 Other
significant changes included preparation and consultation of alternative
draft variants 43 2 and direct reference and use of foreign laws and

425.

See, e.g., Evgenii M. Primakov, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Nov. 21,

1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 24, 1989, at 55, 55 (listing by name major
individual and institutional participants in drafting new Standing Orders).
426. Sergei B. Stankevich, cited in Leont'eva, supra note 388.
427. Id.
428. Leonid I. Abalkin, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Oct. 10, 1989), translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 11, 1989, at 49.
429. Id. For other examples of expert involvement in preliminary drafting, see V.
Voronetskii, Pravovaia Baza Strany [The Legal Basis of the Country], ARGUMENTY i
FAKTY, Aug. 5-11, 1989, at 1 (discussing involvement of scientists in drafting Fundamental Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation On Leaseholding [hereinafter Lease Law]); Moscow Television Service, Nov. 1, 1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Nov. 2, 1989, at 57 (report of USSR Academy of Sciences President Gurii Marchuk on
his institute's reports for government on economic reform drafts).
430. See, e.g., Moscow International Service, Sept. 30, 1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.SOV, Oct. 10, 1989, at 50 (reporting religious community involvement in Freedom of

Conscience Law preparation); TASS, GotovitsiaPensionnaiaReforma [Pension Reform
Is Being Prepared], PRAVDA, Oct. 14, 1989, at 2.
431. See, e.g., Abalkin, supra note 428 (discussing publication and nationwide debate of Law on Principles of Economic and Social Government in the Union Republics
[hereinafter Law on Republic Government] proposals and drafts).
432. See, e.g., Ryzhkov, supra note 422, at 55 (reporting that the Council of Ministers made "maximum use" of alternative variants in preparing laws on ownership, land,
leasing, tax, and socialist enterprise); Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, Pensionnomu Obesnecheniiu

Grazhdan-NadezhdyePravovye i Sotsial'nye Garantii.Doklad N.L Ryzhkova na Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Reliable Legal and Social Guaranteesfor Pension Provision for Citizens: Report by N.L Ryzhkov at USSR Supreme Soviet Session], PRAVDA,
Nov. 3, 1989, at 1 (Pension Law).
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experiences.43 3
Despite these positive developments, there remained serious problems
in the early formulation of legislation, especially in the human rights
area. Administrative agencies, most notably the Council of Ministers and
Ministry of Justice, continued to prepare these sensitive laws behind
closed doors. They refused to disclose to the general public or even the
relevant legislative committees the list of authors, the content, and the
concrete provisions of preliminary drafts or to offer explanations for
their delayed submission to the Supreme Soviet. 4' 4 Those drafts that
were eventually publicized had major flaws. Generally, they were incomplete, superficial, and "in line with the command-and-administer tradition. ' 43 5 Thus, an early version of the law on unofficial organizations, in
direct violation of the USSR's recent international law commitments,'3 6
enhanced state authority by granting administrative bodies comprehen-

sive powers to regulate all activities and matters affecting the interests of
social organizations. 3 7 These experiences led progressive deputies to advocate a new legislative procedure far beyond that set forth in the Tem433. See, e.g., Moscow Television Service, Nov. 2, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, Nov. 3, 1989, at 59 (reporting on the Law on Appealing to the Courts Unlawful
Actions "by State Organs and Officials Infringing Citizens' Rights [hereinafter Official
Interference Law]).
434. See Gatov & Dolganov, supra note 371; I. Korol'kov, Den'gi Dlia Respublik.
Delit' Mozhno Tol'ko To, Chto Zarabotano [Money for the Republics: One Can Only
Share What Has Been Earned], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Oct. 12, 1989, at 1; A. Ostal'skii, Zakony Zapazdyvaiut. Mnenie Odnogo iz Komitetov Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
0 Khode Vypolneniia Nashei Stranoi Venskikh Dogovorennostei[Laws Lagging Behind:
Opinion of One of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees on the Progressof Our Country
in Fulfilling the Vienna Accords], IzvEsIIA (evening ed.), Oct. 19, 1989, at 3.
435. Nina Beliaeva, Form Unions According to the Law. An Attempt at an Open
Commentary on a Hushed-Up Draft Law, Moscow NEWS, Aug. 20, 1989, at 12. For
discussion of problems with human rights laws, see, e.g., M. Kozhukov, 0 Prave Na
Vyezd i V'ezd v SSSR [On the Right of Exit From and Entry Into the USSR], IzvSTIIA
(evening ed.), Oct. 19, 1989, at 3 (draft Exit-Entry Law); Leont'eva, supra note 388
(draft Press Law).
436. On January 1, 1989, the USSR and other members of the CSCE signed the socalled Vienna Accords, pledging to bring all internal legislation into conformity with
international human rights treaties by the end of 1989. See Gatov & Dolganov, supra
note 371. The draft law on unofficial organizations violated the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights because it expanded the exhaustive list of limitations on exercise of citizens' rights and freedoms. Beliaeva, supra note 435. See Sergei Kosenko, Znat'" Ponimat', Vynolniat' [Know, Understand, Implement], LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, Dec. 13,
1989, at 14 (arguing that few Soviet citizens know the fundamental international human
rights agreements and, thus, are unable to understand or enforce their "real rights and

duties").
437. See Beliaeva, supra note 435.
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porary Rules. They called for nothing short of a complete transfer of all
drafting responsibility to Supreme Soviet commissions and committees.4 38
Under this recommended approach, government departments could participate in the process only under the firm control of legislative
committees.

2.

43 9

Initiation

Most of the statutes considered by the second session of the Supreme
Soviet had been formally initiated and accepted during the first meetings
of the Congress of People's Deputies440 and Supreme Soviet. 441 As a re-

sult, they generally derived from traditional administrative channels,
such as the Council of Ministers, 442 Supreme Court, 443 and Ministry of
Justice."' In at least one case, the October 2 Council of Ministers' request for broad emergency powers, 445 authorities failed to observe even
the minimal requirements for initiation of legislation. As Andrei
Sakharov reported, "[w]ho was the initiator of these measures [was] not
entirely clear and the mechanism for [their] appearance [was]
44
unknown."'
There was, however, a promising increase in the number of drafts
originating withiih the legislature itself. Legislative committees 447 and,

438.
439.

See Ostal'skii, supra note 434 (comments of Fedor M. Burlatskii).
Id.

440. See, e.g., Basic Guidelines, supra note 246; Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh
Deputatov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialistcheskikh Respublik 0 Podgotovke Proektov
Nekotorykh Zakonov SSSR, Reguliruiushchikh Poriadok Deiatel'nosti S'ezda
Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i Ikh Organov [Resolution of
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on the Preparationof Several USSR Laws
Regulating the Procedure of the Activity of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies,
USSR Supreme Soviet, and Their Organs], IZVESTHA, June 11, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter

Resolution on ProceduralLaws].
441. Preliminary Examination Resolution, supra note 324.
442. See, e.g., Vladislav Fliarkovskii, Moscow Television Service, Oct. 19, 1989,
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 20, 1989, at 26 (draft Exit-Entry Law).

443. See G. Ovcharenko, Kakoi Sud Nam Nuzhen [The Kind of Court We Need],
PRAVDA, July 16, 1989, at 2.

444. See V. Iakovlev, From Instructions to Law,

EKONOMICHESKAA GAZETA,

Dec.

1989, at 9, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 5, 1990, at 97.
445. See supra note 6.

446. Andrei D. Sakharov, cited in Leont'eva, supra note 6.
447. See Buzhkevich, supra note 419; S. Karkhanin, Formula Initsiativy [Formulation of Initiative], Soy. RossnA, Oct. 19, 1989, at 1; TASS, Oct. 26, 1989, translatedin
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 30, 1989, at 49.
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most significantly, unofficial deputy groups44 were credited with several
of the draft statutes and resolutions discussed by the Supreme Soviet.
Among the influential associations were groups representing agrarian,
ecological, nationalist, veterans', workers', women's, and youth concerns. 449 Not surprisingly, there began to be a groundswell of suppbrt for
formal legal recognition of such groups and guarantees for their participation in the legislative process.45
3.

Preparation

The most remarkable innovations in the Soviet lawmaking process occurred at the stage of preparation of actionable drafts. Here, the "center
of gravity" 451 shifted to Supreme Soviet commissions and committees to a
degree unanticipated by framers of the Temporary Rules. Deputies
freely criticized, modified, or even rejected once sacrosanct governmental
drafts. 4 1 In sharp contrast to past practice, the preferred approach was

448.

See Interview with Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Moscow International Service, Dec. 8,

1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 11, 1989, at 102, 103 (draft resolutions and laws
initiated by deputy groups).
449. See id.; Marina Dimova et al., Moscow World Service, Oct. 23, 1989, in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 25, 1989, at 59. Ironically, the Interregional Deputies Group, which
had been predicted to become a major opposition force to the CPSU, played virtually no
role in initiation (and formulation) of legislation. See S. Karkhanin, Zakon Surov, No
On-Zakon [The Law Is Stern, but It Is the Law], Sov. RossIA, Dec. 20, 1989, at 2;
Andrei D. Sakharov, cited in Per Dalgard, Old Fighter, DEr FRI AKTUELT, Nov. 25,
1989, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 1, 1989, at 94.
450. See, e.g., Igor N. Griazin, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Nov. 21, 1989),
Moscow Television Service, Nov. 21, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 24, 1989,
at 58; Aleksei Kazannik, cited in Narodnye Deputaty: Slavo Pered S'ezdom, supra note
21. See also Marina Shakina, Interview with Eduard Ivanian, Moscow NEWS, Nov.
26-Dec. 2, 1989, at 10 (discussing proposal to legalize legislative lobbyism).
451. V. Doglanov & A. Stepovoi, Sessiia Zavershilas'. Vpered-S'ezd. [The Session
Is Over: The Congress Lies Ahead], IZVEST1IA, Nov. 30, 1989, at 1. It should be noted
that there was extensive committee involvement in the review and formulation of treaties
as well as statutes. See 0. Losoto & A. Cherniak, Shag K Narodovlastiiu[Step Toward
People's Power], PRAVDA, Dec. 1, 1989, at 4; TASS, July 22, 1980, translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 24, 1989, at 71.
452. See, e.g., Valerian S. Advadze, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Oct. 16,
1989), Moscow Television Service, Oct. 16, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 17,
1989, at 65 (detailing reasons Soviet of Nationalities Commission On Social and Economic Development of Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblast's and
Okrugs rejected government draft Law on Republican Government); N.A. Pivovarov,
Report to USSR Supreme Soviet (Oct. 18, 1989), in IZVEST1IA, Nov. 23, 1989, at 2
(reporting rejection of Council of Ministers draft Law On the General Principles of
Local Self-Management and Local Economy in the USSR [hereinafter Draft Self-Management Law] by the Committee on the Activity of Soviets of People's Deputies and the
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to consult not one but a variety of proposed drafts and then to choose the
best single or combined option. 53 In some instances, committees found
all versions unsuitable and elected to create their own draft virtually
from scratch.45 4
Committees began to make extensive use of specialists, especially lawyers, economists, and sociologists. 55 Furthermore, they consulted foreign
examples in preparing draft laws. For example, they based the self-government law in part on Canadian, British, French, Italian, German, and
United States precedent.4 6
In the spirit of glasnost' and demokratizatsiia, committees involved
both the general and concerned publics in the formulation of legislation.
They accomplished this through open hearings, 457 publication of early
Development of Management and Self-Management [hereinafter Self-Management
Committee]).
453. See, e.g., TASS, Sept. 29, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 2, 1989, at 43. "[Flor
the first time a parliamentary comnmittee, alongside a draft law tabled by the country's
government analyzed on an equal basis other draft laws worked out by research institutes, associations of enterprises, and groups of scientists" (on Economic Reform Committee's work on draft Law On Ownership [hereinafter Ownership Law]).

454. See, e.g., Liashenko, supra note 421 (Land Law); TASS, Sept. 27, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Sept. 28, 1989, at 35 (Self-Management Law).
455. See, e.g., TASS, Oct. 12, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 13, 1989, at 50 (Language Law). Committees and commissions were entitled to call upon any expert, specialist, or consultant to assist them in their legislative work. There were reports of practical
problems, however. Chairmen complained of a "complicated" procedure for obtaining
the services of experts, including the lack of a fee provision for single appearances. See
Dolganov, supra note 394.

456. See M. Buzhkevich, Kakoi Byt' Vlasti Na Mestakh [What Power Should Be
Like at the Local Level], PRAVDA, Nov. 13, 1989, at 2; Moscow Television Service, Oct.
18, 1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 20, 1989, at 20. But see Moscow Domestic
Service, Dec. 5, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 6, 1989, at 57, 58 (Evgenii M.
Primakov "stress[ing] the significance of learning from foreign models in the legislative
sphere while not necessarily taking on board everything that is done in other countries").
457. See, e.g., Dolganov, supra note 422, at 1 (noting that all interested parties
could participate in committee hearings on draft Press Law).
Committee hearings often were characterized by tough, uncompromising questioning
of administrative officials regarding the specific details of proposed drafts. This was particularly evident in hearings on draft Laws on the State Plan and Budget. For example,
the Defense Committee closely scrutinized (in closed hearings) the military budget and
report submitted by Defense Minister Dmitrii Iazov and demanded a specific breakdown
of figures. See S.P. Golovin, cited in Moscow Domestic Service, Oct. 6, 1989, translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 10, 1989, at 55. Similarly, in a joint session, three of the notorious
"strictest examiners," Gatov & Dolganov, supra note 371, at 1, including the Soviet of
the Union Commission on Labor, Prices, and Social Policy [hereinafter Labor Commission], the Committee on Women's Affairs, and Family, Mother, and Child Protection,
and the Committee on Veteran and Invalid Affairs, interrogated at length Gosplan and
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draft proposals and variants,45 and predictive tools, such as forecasting
and opinion polling.459 In some cases, deputies even travelled to obtain
directly the views of affected constituents.46 0
The product of these labors was a noticeable improvement in the
quality of drafts submitted for initial legislative endorsement. 4 1l At the
same time, however, this unexpectedly painstaking4 62 drafting approach
presented problems for overall Supreme Soviet legislative activity. It

Finance Ministry officials. Deputies openly challenged Gosplan calculations, asked for

information about plans to reverse the disastrous effects of the antialcohol campaign and
to increase production of scarce goods, and directly criticized draft budget provisions raising wages of Komsomol and OPSU personnel as "contradict[ing] the emergency antiinflation measures that society needs." V.I. Samarin, cited in Iu. Bersenev et al., 0
Pol'ze Konstruktivnykh Somnenii [On the Benefit of Constructive Doubts], KRASNAIA
ZVEZDA, Sept. 28, 1989, at 1. See V. Romaniuk, Finansy i Zdorov'e Ekonomiki [Finances and the Health of the Economy], IzvEsnIA (evening ed.), Oct. 5, 1989, at 1;
TASS, Oct. 4, 1989, in F.B.I.S., Oct. 5, 1989, at 49.
458. See, e.g., V. Bezbrezhnyi et al., Odnoznachnykh Otvetov Net [No Simple Answers], Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 29, 1989, at 1 (reporting decision to publish draft Press
Law in Sovetskaia Kultura and Zhurnalist). To facilitate public information on the
drafting process, the Supreme Soviet decided to reorganize its journal Narodnyi Deputat.

Beginning January 1990, the journal was to appear eighteen times a year and to include
views of deputies, officials, lawyers, activists, and citizens regarding legislative activity,
draft laws, and alternative variants. See Predstavliaem Zhurnal "Narodnyi Deputat"

[We Introduce the Journal "Narodnyi Deputat"], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Oct. 2, 1989,
at 6.
459. See Grafova, supra note 305; Voronetskii, supra note 429.
460. See, e.g., S. Karkhanin, Shlagbaum Pered Tupikom [BarrierAcross the Blind
Alley], Soy. RosSu1A, Sept. 29, 1989, at 1 (Laws on State Plan and Budget); Anatolii I.
Luk'ianov, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (July 19, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, July 20, 1989, at 64 (Self-Management Law); Moscow Television Service, July
20, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, July 21, 1989, at 81 (Strike Law).

461. See V. Dolganov, Vremia Otvetstvennykh Reshenii. Zametki s Plenarnykh
ZasedaniiVtoroi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Time of Responsible Decisions: Notes
From the PlenarySittings of the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet], IZVE.STIiA
(evening ed.), Nov. 3, 1989, at 1; V. Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, Vremia Zrelykh Reshenii.

Zametki 0 Plenarnykh Zasedaniiakh Vtoroi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Time of
Mature Decisions: Notes on the Plenary Sittings of the Second Session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Nov. 16, 1989, at 1. But see Kazannik, cited
in Narodnye Deputaty: Slovo Perd S'ezdom, supra note 21, at 3 (criticizing as "dry and
weak" statutes submitted to Supreme Soviet); A. Sobchak, Doroga K Pravu [The Path
Towards Law], PRAVDA, Dec. 5, 1989, at 3 (noting continuing flaws in legislation).

462. See V. Dolganov & V. Kurasov, Shag K Pravovomu Gosudarstvu [Step Toward Law-Governed State], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Nov. 2, 1989, at 1 (reporting existence of nine versions of Voters' Instruction Law in committee stage); TASS, Oct. 13,

1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 16, 1989, at 38 (observing that seven variants of
Ownership Law were submitted to committees).
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made unrealizable the timetable and tasks predetermined in August by a
Supreme Soviet Presidium 3 accustomed to the stage-managed, rubberstamp legislatures of the past. In late September of 1989, deputies responded by increasing the percentage of time devoted to committee
work" and prioritizing the sixty laws scheduled for discussion.4 6 It
rapidly became apparent that even these changes would be insufficient to
accomplish the overly ambitious goals of the Presidium.4"6 Obviously,
there would have to be a major readjustment in future Supreme Soviet

procedures and agenda to accommodate an increasingly professional,
working legislature.
4.

Supreme Soviet Readings

Under the new Supreme Soviet, there was no longer mechanical
processing of draft laws. From the very start of the second session, deputies proved to be unusually prepared and interested in a thorough examination of legislation submitted for their approval. 4 7 For example, 120
speakers signed up to participate in the Supreme Soviet discussion of
draft laws on the state plan and budget.46 There was an appreciable

463.

See TASS, Aug. 16, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 17, 1989, at 25; TASS,

Zakon-Osnova Zhizni Pravovogo Gosudarstva [The Law-Foundation of Life in a
Law-Governed State], PRAVDA, Aug. 17, 1989, at 2.
464. See Dolganov, supra note 389.

465. See Nachala Rabotu Vtoraia Sessiia Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [The Second
Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Has Begun Its Work], IzvEnsIA (evening ed.),
Sept. 25, 1989, at 1. Note, however, that there was some disagreement among deputies as
to which laws should be included in the "urgent questions" category. See Proekt Zakona

Prochitan.ParlamentskaiaGruppa "Pravdy" Peredaet iz Kremlia [Reading of Draft
Law Completed: Pravda Parliamentary Group Reports from the Kremlin], PRAVDA,
Sept. 27, 1989, at 1 (reporting that Ukrainian deputy B. Oleynik considered laws on
nationality and ecology of top priority). For a list of laws in order of priority, see A.

Davydov & V. Dolganov, Moskva, Kreml'. Na Vtoroi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
[Moscow, The Kremlin: At the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet], IzvESrIA
(evening ed.), Sept. 26, 1989, at 1.
466. TASS, Oct. 31, 1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 31, 1989, at 50. In fact,
throughout the fall of 1989 there were several further schedule changes. For example,
the final session of the Supreme Soviet, at Gorbachev's request, began one hour early. V.

Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, Parlament Zavershaet Rabotu [Parliament Completes Its
Work], IZVESTIA (evening ed.), Nov. 28, 1989, at 3.

467. See Viacheslav Shchepotkin, Dva Dnia v Sentiabre Pervye Vpechatleniia o
Nachale Raboty Vtoroi Sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Two Days in September: First
Impressions of the Start of the Work of the Second USSR Supreme Soviet Session],
IzvEsTIIA, Sept. 28, 1989, at 1 (describing debate on Cooperative Law amendments).

468. V. Dolganov & V. Kurasov, Plan i Biudzhet Strany Priniaty [The Country's
Plan and Budget Have Been Adopted], IZVETA (evening ed.), Nov. 1, 1989, at 1. For
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improvement in the quality of discussion as well. While there continued
to be the occasional emotional outbursts, irrelevant comments, and demagoguery,4 6 9 the legislature made major strides toward constructive, professional consideration of legislation.47 0
In both the first and second reading stages, deputies closely scrutinized
and debated statutes on an article-by-article, and often clause-by-clause,
basis. 47 1' They interrogated draft authors, sponsors, and experts at length
about the broad goals, likely consequences, and specific wording of each

proposed law.4" 2 They made numerous recommendations regarding appropriate changes in statutory language and focus. 473 On occasion, they
even formally rejected official government drafts. The Council of Ministers' Law on Republic Government had the unenviable distinction of two
47 4
Supreme Soviet refusals on the first reading.
Although deputies ultimately endorsed most laws on the first 47 5 or second 47 6 readings, they did so in a manner that diverged markedly from

time reasons, not all of the 120 deputies were able to address the Supreme Soviet from
the podium. All were invited to submit their recommendations for publication in the
Supreme Soviet stenographic report, however. Id.
469. See Davydov et al., supra note 414; Losoto & Cherniak, supra note 451;
TASS, Nov. 24, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 27, 1989, at 67.
470. Viktor Liubovtsev, Interview with Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, Moscow Television
Service, Nov. 29, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 30, 1989, at 53; TASS, Nov.
29, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 30, 1989, at 55.
471. A prime illustration was Supreme Soviet consideration of the Strike Law,
praised by commentators as a model for future legislative discussion of draft laws. See
Sergei Alekseev, cited in TASS, Oct. 9, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 17, 1989, at 50; L.
Nikitinskii, Bastovat'-Ne Buntovat' [Striking-Not Rioting], KOMSOMOL'SKAIA
PRAVDA, Oct. 11, 1989, at 1.
472. See, e.g., N. Musienko et al., Trudnyi Finish [Difficult Finish], PRAVDA, Nov.
28, 1989, at 1; Shchepotkin, supra note 467.
473. For example, deputies proposed forty-eight amendments to the Strike Law. See
A. Davydov & A. Stepovoi, S Uchetom Mneniia Izbiratelei [Considering the Voters'
Opinion], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Oct. 9, 1989, at 1; Nikitinskii, supra note 471.
474. See TASS, Oct. 16, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 17, 1989, at 65;
TASS, Nov. 20, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 20, 1989, at 57.
475. See, e.g., Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Proekte Zakona 0 Pen-

sionnom Obespechenii Grazhdan v SSSR [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On the
Draft Law On Pension Provisionfor Citizens in the USSR] (Nov. 2, 1989), PRAVDA,
Nov. 4, 1989, at 1; Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Proekte Osnov Zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i Soiuznykh Respublik 0 Zemle [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On the Draft Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Land]
(Nov. 27, 1989), Izvzsr.nA (evening ed.), Dec. 6, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Land Law
Resolution].
476. See, e.g., Zakon Souiza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Poriadke
Razresheniia Kollektivnykh Trudovykh Sporov (Konfliktov) [USSR Law On the Proce-

19931

LEGACY OF THE PERESTROIKA PARLIAMENT

that of their rubber-stamp predecessors. In legislative voting as well as
discussion, unanimity was a thing of the past. 47 Disagreement became
so commonplace that when the Supreme Soviet adopted the Draft Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on the Judicial
System without a single dissenting vote, Izvestiia correspondents were
moved to exclaim that this was "a rarity in the work of this Supreme
Soviet."

41 7 s

On a less positive note, the fall 1989 Supreme Soviet sessions revealed
several practical and conceptual defects in the reformed scheme for discussion and enactment of legislation. There were early difficulties with
the much-touted modern electronic voting equipment installed in late
August. 79 Once functional, however, it generally facilitated more efficient and accurate legislative decisionmaking. 8 0 At the same time, the

new technology raised interesting, unanticipated issues of "voting glasnost'."' ' x Now that the Supreme Soviet had the technical capability to
identify and record individual deputies' votes, it would have to consider
the merits and mechanisms for public disclosure of voting results to constituents.48s Similarly, because the voting equipment operated in three
modes-open, secret, or by name, 8 the legislature would need to balance the competing concerns of deputy anonymity and accountability. 4 4

durefor Resolving Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)] (Oct. 9, 1989), PRAVDA, Oct.
14, 1989, at 1; Zakon Souiza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob Ekonomicheskoi Samostoiatel'nostiLitovskoi SSR, Latviiskoi SSR i Estonskoi SSR [USSR Law On
the Economic Autonomy of the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR, and the Estonian
SSR] (Nov. 27, 1989), PRAVDA, Dec. 2, 1989, at 1.
477.

In fact, on October 9 the USSR Supreme Soviet experienced its first tied vote.

See A. Davydov et al., Zabastovka-V Ramkakh Zakona [Strikes-Within the Framework of the Law], IZVESTnA (evening ed.), Oct. 10, 1989, at 1.
478. V. Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, PriniatZakon 0 Sudoustroistve [Law On Judicial
System Adopted], IZVESTIA (evening ed.), Nov. 13, 1989, at 1.
479. See TASS, Aug. 18, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Aug. 21, 1989, at 87; S.
Prokoshenko, Session Sets Priorities,Soy. LATVIIA, Sept. 27, 1989, at 3, translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 16, 1989, at 33.
480. In some cases the results were embarrassing. For example, when Gorbachev
forgot to vote on September 26 all assembled were immediately aware of the fact. See

Proekt Zakona Prochitan,supra note 465, at 2.
481. S.Karkhanin, Stroka v Zakon [ParagraphAdded to the Law], Soy.

RoSSIHA,

Oct. 10, 1989, at 1.

482. Id.
483. See TASS, supra note 479.
484. Karkhanin, supra note 481; L. Telen, Rasstanovka Sil [Arrangement of
Forces], SoTs. INDUsTRIIA, Dec. 22, 1989, at 1. The lack of guidelines in either the
Provisional Standing Orders or Temporary Rules to govern use of secret ballots only
compounded the problem.
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Supreme Soviet administrative bodies and even the deputies themselves
also provided occasional obstacles to effective legislative discussion and

adoption of legislation. As in the past, the Presidium and Secretariat had
a less than impressive record in distributing draft texts and supporting
materials to deputies in a sufficiently timely fashion prior to Supreme
Soviet deliberations." 5 Deputies most obviously disrupted the process by
nonattendance of critical sessions. In several instances, the resulting lack
of quorum necessitated a formal delay in the final debate and decision on
draft laws. 8 Another troublesome issue was illegal voting by Supreme
Soviet members. Komsomol'skaia Pravda illustrated this problem graphically on October 19, 1989. It published an article entitled "View From
the Balcony," complete with photographs of a legislator pressing the voting button of his absent neighbor. 8 7
More important and instructive were the repeated procedural flaws
that marred and delayed Supreme Soviet lawmaking activity. Nearly all
these flaws originated from the incomplete and inprecise language of the
July 1989 Temporary Rules. As expected, there was significant confusion and debate over such key voting issues as the definition of "majority" approval488 and the appropriate instances of voting on a clause-byclause basis rather than on the text as a whole. 4 s Also problematic was
the virtually undefined distinction between the first and second reading
stages. This led to significant disagreement over the purpose and scope of
the first reading. Many legislators insisted on a lengthy, detailed examination and criticism of specific draft wording. Others, in contrast, called
for a more abbreviated discussion of general conceptual bases only. 9
Even the second reading stage presented serious difficulties. For exam-

485. See Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 461.
486. See, e.g., V. Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, ObsuzhdaetsiaProekt Zakona 0 Pechati
[Draft Law On the Press Under Discussion], IZVESTnA, Nov. 26, 1989, at 1, 2. See
generally TASS, Dec. 18, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 19, 1989, at 57 (noting that
Rafik Nishanov claimed 120 out of 542 Supreme Soviet members were "regularly absent" and more than 70 deputies missed nearly half of the sessions). In some cases, deputies failed to attend, vote as a political protest, or both. See, e.g., Tsena i Rynok [Prices
and the Market], PRAVDA, Oct. 11, 1989, at 1 (Armenian walkout); Vilnius Domestic
Service, Nov. 21, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 24, 1989, at 77 (Lithuanian
protest).

487. S. Kiselev, Vzgliad S Balkona [View From the Balcony], KoMSOMOL'SKAIA
Oct. 19, 1989, at 1. The author recommended giving deputies upon registration

PRAVDA,

personal keys to their desks to remove "temptation" from their colleagues. Id.
488. See, e.g., Davydov & Stepovoi, supra note 473; Davydov et al., supra note 477.

489. See, e.g., Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 466; Moscow Domestic Service, Oct.
3, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 4, 1989, at 70.
490. See, e.g., Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 461.
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ple, during the final consideration of the Baltic Autonomy Law, it became increasingly apparent that the scheme for last-minute individual
amendments from the floor had major disadvantages. It had the potential
to distort and weaken the internal consistency of a law that had been
carefully formulated and refined for months in committee. 91
Finally, during their second session, Supreme Soviet deputies received
a first-hand lesson in the dangers of statutory loopholes. The Temporary
Rules' provisioni granting Soviet leaders unlimited flexibility and power
to bypass legislative channels became a reality. As discussed earlier,"9 2
the Council of Ministers submitted a request for immediate emergency
powers on October 2, 1989. Neither legislative committees nor separate
or joint sittings of the Supreme Soviet had previously reviewed the document. Nonetheless, the legislature passed an only slightly amended version twenty-four hours later. 9 " Likewise, on November 23, the Supreme
Soviet formally enacted the Principles on the Leasing System after a single day's discussion by the full legislature.' 9 ' A TASS correspondent
conceded that this was "[c]ontrary to the established parliamentary practice in keeping with which bills are first approved in the first reading
and are adopted only after extra editing in committees and
commissions."' 95
5. Nationwide Discussion
During its second session, the Supreme Soviet began to give serious
consideration to transforming the hitherto largely pro forma nationwide
discussion of drafts into a meaningful mechanism for popular input into

the legislative process. Most of the laws approved on the first reading
were published in the mass media and formally issued for nationwide
discussion. 9 ' In a remarkable break with past tradition, deputies occa-

491. See Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 466, at 3.
492. See supra notes 445-46 and accompanying text.
493. See supra note 6.
494. Osnovy Zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i Soiuznykh Respublik Ob Arende [Fundamental Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Leaseholding] (Nov.
23, 1989), PRAVDA, Dec. 1, 1989, at 3.
495. TASS, Nov. 23, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 24, 1989, at 72, 73.
496. It should be noted that while most statutes were formally submitted for "nationwide discussion," see, e.g., Land Law Resolution, supra note 475, others were published

only for "discussion." See, e.g., Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Proekte
Zakona 0 Pechati i Drugikh Sredstvakh Massovoi Informatsii [USSR Supreme Soviet
Resolution On the Draft Law On the Press and Other Mass Information Media] (Nov.
27, 1989), IZVESTnA, Dec. 4, 1989 at 1, point 3. See A. Pankov, GarantiiaGlasnosti
[Guaranteeof Glasnost'], TRUD, Jan. 18, 1990, at 2.
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sionally opted to submit for public comment and comparison not only the
endorsed draft but also the most significant variants. For example, in
November 1989 the legislature voted to publish both the official version
of the Ownership Law and the alternative drafts and proposals prepared
by the Ecology Committee, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, the Autono-

mous Oblast' deputies group, and an individual deputy. 97
The Supreme Soviet also made notable efforts to improve its techniques for collation and examination of nationwide discussion results.
Initially, legislative committees and the Academy of Sciences played the
major role.4 8 Later, the Supreme Soviet created special groups to monitor the process and to analyze public comments and criticisms. 499 There
was increasing use of independent opinion polls to ensure a more representative sample of views. 00° Eventually, legislators were able to expedite
their work considerably through computer processing of citizens' letters
and proposals.5 0 1
Despite these advances, there remained a widespread concern about
leadership manipulation of nationwide discussion. Some deputies main497. See Moscow Television Service, Nov. 14, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Nov. 15, 1989, at 46. For the text of the draft Ownership Law, see Proekt Zakon Soiuza
Sovetskikh SotsialisticheskikhRespublik 0 Sobsivennosti v SSSR Draft USSR Law On
Ownership in the USSR, PRAVDA, Nov. 18, 1989, at 3. For variants see Draft USSR
Law On Ownership, Soy. ROSSIIA, Nov. 21, 1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV.,
Dec. 5, 1989, at 92 (Ecology Committee version); Draft USSR Law On Ownership, Soy.
RossnA, Nov. 21, 1989, at 1 translatedin F.B.I.S-SOV, Nov. 29, 1989, at 100 (Lithuanian version); Proposals on Draft Law On Ownership in the USSR Submitted by a
Group of People's Deputies Representing Autonomous Formations, Soy. RossiHA, Nov.
21, 1989, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 24, 1989, at 60; Predlozheniia K
Proektu Zakona [Draft Law Proposals],PRAVDA, Dec. 9, 1989, at 3 (discussing Deputy
Plotnieks' proposed changes to articles 23-25). Interestingly, the Supreme Soviet did not
choose to publish the original Council of Ministers' draft, a move that one commentator
criticized as "a parody of 'nationwide discussion.'" V. Vorob'ev, Bublik Kazhdomu
Deciatomu? [A Roll for Every Tenth Person?], Soy. RossnA, Dec. 16, 1989, at 3.
498. See Buzhkevich, supra note 456; S. Karkhanin, Zakonotvortsy Zhdut Soveta
[Lawmakers Waitingfor Advice], Soy. RoSSIA, Nov. 15, 1989, at 1.

499. In the case of the Ownership Law, however, the Presidium was entrusted with
formation of the special group. See Moscow Television Service, supra note 497.
500. See V. Petrunia, Ozhidaniia i Otsenki. 0 Chem Svidetel'stvuiut Rezul'taty
Oprosa Obshchestvennogo Mneniia V Sviazi So Vtorym S'ezdom Narodnykh Deputatov
SSSR [Expectations and Assessments: Results of the Public Opinion Poll on the Second
USSR Congress of People'sDeputies], TRUD, Jan. 3, 1990, at 1; TASS, Feb. 8, 1990, in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 13, 1990, at 40, 41. Some deputies argued that the best way to obtain the people's opinion was a referendum rather than nationwide discussion. See, e.g.,
Gavril K. Popov, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (Dec. 13, 1989), in
PRAVDA, Dec. 15, 1989, at 2.
501. See TASS, Jan. 10, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 17, 1990, at 60.
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tained that the process was as "fictitious ' ' 0' as ever and, accordingly,
should be avoided at all costs. 50 3 The required reforms were legislative
formulations of precise, binding procedures and establishment of independent bodies, accountable solely to the Supreme Soviet, to collect, supervise, and analyze nationwide discussion results.50 4
6.

Refinement

In the fall of 1989 Supreme Soviet committees made discernible progress in their reworking of statutes. This legislative dorabotka activity
occurred at two points in the lawmaking process: (1) during the first or
second reading stage, and (2) between readings.
As described earlier,50 5 deputies frequently raised criticisms and suggestions in the course of formal Supreme Soviet consideration of drafts.
For example, legislators proposed forty-eight amendments to the Strike

Law. 0 6 In such cases, the Supreme Soviet customarily elected to delay
voting and to refer the bill back to committee for reexamination and

revision in light of deputy recommendations. 0 7
What followed was an extremely grueling process. The Supreme Soviet formed a "working group"50 8 or "coordinating commission. 50 9 This
body had the onerous task of analyzing and evaluating not only deputy
amendments but also recent letters, telegrams, and appeals from citizens
and then preparing an appropriate new text for presentation to the legislature. 510 The time frame for completion was usually unreasonable-three days appeared to be the norm.5 1 Nonetheless, the results
502. Pankov, supra note 496 (comment by Nikolai V. Fedorov).
503. See E. Leont'eva, Obsuzhdaem Proekty Zakona 0 Sobstvennosti. Ukrepliat' Li
Stoikost' K Bedstviiam? [We Discuss the Draft Law On Ownership: To Strengthen Stability Against Misfortune?], SOTS. INDUSTRIIA, Dec. 12, 1989, at 2 (interview with
Iaroslav Kuzminov); Moscow World Service, Dec. 27,1989, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Dec. 28, 1989, at 78 (comments of Boris N. El'tsin).
504. See Moscow World Service, supra note 503; Moscow Television Service, Nov.
13, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 14, 1989, at 61.
505. See supra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
506. See Nikitinskii, supra note 471.
507. See, e.g., Moscow Television Service, Nov. 1, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, Nov. 2, 1989, at 60 (Law On Status of Deputies); Moscow Television Service,
Nov. 22, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 24, 1989, at 65 (Land Law).
508. See, e.g., Karkhanin, supra note 481 (Strike Law).
509. See, e.g., Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 466 (Baltic Autonomy Law).

510. See Davydov & Stepovoi, supra note 473; Moscow Domestic Service, Oct. 9,
1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 10, 1989, at 62.
511. See TASS, Nov. 27, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 27, 1989, at 68 (discussing
bills deferred from November 24 to November 27 to permit "further elaboration").
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were often extraordinary. In several instances, the working group produced a revised draft that was so precise and "well considered"5 12 that it
could be adopted with dispatch. A prime illustration was the Draft Law
on the Procedure for Appealing to the Courts Unlawful Actions by State
Organs and Officials Infringing Citizens' Rights.5 13 In a mere twentyfour hours, the Legislation Committee (with the assistance of the Supreme Court) managed to compose a final draft that encountered criti514
cism on only one point, its date of entry into force.
According to the Temporary Rules, dorabotka would most commonly
occur between first and second readings of a draft.515 The second session
of the Supreme Soviet presented few opportunities to view this process in
action because most laws received only a first reading. The Strike Law
and the Baltic Autonomy Law experiences, however, gave early indications of the likely contours of such activity in the future.
In both cases, the working groups responsible for dorabotha made
substantial changes in the scope and language of texts that had been
approved on their first reading by the previous session of the Supreme
Soviet. 16 Thus, when submitted for their second readings, the Strike
Law broadened representation of work collective interests, 517 and the
51 8
Baltic Autonomy Law amended provisions on commercial banking.
Because of the magnitude of their task, the two legislative working
groups drew on the expertise of other deputies and numerous outside
institutions and individuals. For example, the Strike Law working
group, headed by the Soviet of the Union Labor Commission, received
assistance from specialists in the Council of Ministers, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and various scientific and academic establishments. 5 " Not surprisingly, disagreement arose in the pro-

512. S. Karkhanin, Arbitrom Stanet Zakon [The Law Will Arbitrate], Sov. RossInA,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 1. Accord Dolganov, supra note 461; Losoto & Oherniak, supra note
451 (comments by Anatolii I. Luk'ianov).
513. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Poriadke
Obzhalovaniia v Sud Nepravomernykh Deistvii Organov Gosudarstvennogo
Upravleniia i Dolzhnostnykh Lits, UshchemliaiushchikhPrava Grazhdan [USSR Law
On the Procedurefor Appealing to the Courts Unlawful Actions by State Organs and
Officials Infringing Citizens' Rights] (Nov. 2, 1989), IzvEsTIiA, Nov. 12, 1989, at 2.
514. Dolganov, supra note 461.
515. See Temporary Rules, supra note 324, point 7.
516. The Baltic Autonomy Law and the Strike Law were approved on the first reading on July 27 and August 2 respectively. See supra notes 383 & 385.
517. See TASS, Oct. 3, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Oct. 4, 1989, at 71.
518. See Moscow Television Service, Nov. 24, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Nov. 27, 1989, at 55, 56.
519. Karkhanin, supra note 481.
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cess. Once again, the Strike Law provided an instructive precedent.
Apparently, at one point, the Labor Commission and the Legislation
Committee reached different conclusions as to the most suitable arbitral
was to resort to
body to decide collective labor disputes.5 20 Their solution
521
a special conciliation procedure to resolve the issue.
The second session of the Supreme Soviet revealed three main flaws in
the dorabotka process. First, it allotted working groups insufficient time
for the meticulous analysis and elaboration required for effective, complete legislation. As a result, legislators failed to anticipate key problems.
For example, the Strike Law was cited as a model product of the new
lawmaking scheme,522 but it turned out to be virtually unworkable in
practice because of its lack of specific rules or enforcement mechanisms.523 Second, the hasty revision of drafts, particularly during Supreme Soviet readings, facilitated outside intervention in the lawmaking
process. As illustrated by the Baltic Autonomy Law, administrative authorities could prevail upon working groups to introduce last-minute
amendments that would significantly alter the content and blunt the impact of a draft law. 524 Third, the vague guidelines regarding formation
of dorabotka working groups proved predictably troublesome. The October 17 Supreme Soviet sittings provided dramatic evidence of the problem. When Anatolii Luk'ianov announced the predetermined composition of the Ownership Law "editorial commission," deputies protested so
vociferously that the chairman adjourned the session, admonishing participants to "moderate their emotions and approach the discussion calmly
and judiciously. '52 5 The final working group consisted of Gorbachev,
Ryzhkov, and the chairmen of all Supreme Soviet commissions and
committees.526
7.

Redaction and Publication

A draft law, once approved, required a final edit to reflect deputy
amendments followed by publication. As in the dorabotka case, there

520. The Labor Commission favored a judicial arbitration organ. The Legislation
Committee supported an independent arbitration body. Id.
521. Id.
522. See supra note 471.
523. See Buzhkevich, supra note 419, at 2.
524. See Moscow Television Service, Nov. 24, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Nov. 27, 1989, at 56.
525. See V. Dolganov & V. Kurasov, Ot Proekta K Zakonu [From Draft to Law],
IzvESTIIA, Oct. 19, 1989, at 1.

526.

Id.
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were no clear standards to govern legislative activity in this last lawmaking stage.52 7 The second session of the Supreme Soviet demonstrated the
very real threat to legislative autonomy occasioned by this procedural
deficiency.
On November 27, 1989, deputies approved the Draft Law on the
Press and Other Mass Information Media (the Press Law) on the first
reading.2 s They formally resolved to publish the "elaborated" version in
the press for discussion.52 9 The text that eventually appeared in Izvestiia
on December 4, however, was not the approved bill but the government's
variant draft that had been previously rejected by the Supreme Soviet.530
This unannounced substitution sent deputies an unmistakable warning.
B.

Lessons of the Second Session

By the conclusion of its second session, the Supreme Soviet had confirmed in practice the critical importance of precise, regularized procedures for creation, discussion, approval, and enactment of statutes. Procedural lacunae and defects explained many of the delays and flaws in
Supreme Soviet lawmaking. Origination, initiation, and preparation of
drafts were largely spontaneous and disorganized. Discussion of legislation in committee hearings and on the floor of the legislature was a cumbersome process of virtually unstructured and unlimited debate. There
was insufficient lead time for deputies to consider legislative proposals or
for committees to refine drafts for reconsideration. The few rules that did
exist frequently proved unmanageable and easily circumvented.
In addition, the lack of procedures was a significant obstacle to legislative autonomy. It permitted continued administrative intervention in the
527. The one definite stipulation was article 1 of the Law on Publication and Entry
Into Force, which entrusted the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with publication of
USSR laws and other acts adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies and the Su-

preme Soviet. Law on Publication and Entry into Force, supra note 346, art. 1.
528. See Moscow Television Service, Nov. 27, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Nov. 28, 1989, at 71.

529. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 0 Proekte Zakona 0 Pechati i
Drugikh Sredstvakh Massovoi Informatsii [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On the
Draft Law On the Press and Other Mass Information Media] point 3 (Nov. 27, 1989),
IZVESTIIA,

Dec. 4, 1989, at 1.

530. Proekt Zakona Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Pechati i
Drugikh Sredstvakh Massovoi Informatsii [Draft USSR Law On the Press and Other
Mass Information Media] (Nov. 27, 1989), IzvEsnIA, Dec. 4, 1989, at 3. See L. Nikitinskii, Kto Pechetsia 0 Pechati. Vse Smeshalos': Zakonoproekty Stanoviatsia Imennymi,,
a Popravki-Anonimnymi . . . [Who Is Concerned About the Press. Everything Is

Mixed Up: Draft Laws Are Becoming Signed, While Amendments Are Anonymous],
KoMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA, Jan. 10, 1990, at 1.
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lawmaking process. Thus, even under the reformed scheme, the Supreme
Soviet made few inroads into longstanding governmental dominance of
the preliminary drafting stages. Moreover, despite major advances, it
failed to eliminate administrative influence on subsequent legislative discussion, refinement, and publication of statutes. Bitter experience taught
legislators to be constantly vigilant against subversive bureaucratic efforts
to promote departmental interests at the expense of effective, democratic
legislation. 531
Most importantly, the new reforms were unable to dislodge the communist party as the key figure in Soviet lawmaking. Throughout the
second session, legislators continued to submit drafts for CPSU imprimatur and to vote in accordance with party diktat. Theoretically, there was
now a fundamentally different relationship between party and legislature. The CPSU confined its lawmaking activities to definition of the
legal policy and political concepts underlying legislation while the legislature had exclusive responsibility for formulation, debate, and adoption
of statutes. 53 2 Practice fell well short of this model, however.
Throughout 1989, the CPSU prepared and discussed legislation prior
to Supreme Soviet deliberation. One example was the Resolution on

Curbing Organized Crime, which was initially drafted and considered
by the CPSU legislative and control committees.533 In fact, there was
party intervention in every stage of the official lawmaking process. The
most dramatic illustration was the "mysterious and confused passage"53
of the draft Press Law. Through direct and indirect means, the CPSU
prevented publication of the original working draft,535 instructed com-

531. For example, at a joint legislative committee hearing in October, Vladimir
Boldyrev, the chief of Glavlit, proposed amending article 5 of the draft Press Law, which
prohibited censorship of publications. He argued that the statute should grant his organization broad authority to guard state and other secrets because otherwise journalists
would "be constantly in court." Supreme Soviet deputies and commentators roundly condemned this covert attempt to nullify guarantees and warned legislators to watch for
similar such maneuverings by administrative officials and organs. See Dmitrii Kazutin,

Will the Press Be Legally Recognized? Notesfrom a Joint Meeting of the USSR Supreme
Soviet, Moscow NEws, Oct. 8, 1989, at 12.
532. See Nikitinskii, supra note 370, at 2.
533. See TASS, Nov. 2, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 3, 1989, at 43. See generally
Hiroshi Oda, The Law-Based State and the CPSU, in ToWARD THE "RuLE OF LAW,"
supra note 3, at 163, 168.
534. Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 486, at 1.

535. See Nikolai V. Fedorov, Still Trying to Influence the Law-Makers Are Those
Who Should Implement the Laws. The Discussions Backstage Are Quite Often More
Significant Than What Is Done Openly, Moscow NEWS, Mar. 18, 1990, at 14.
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mittee members to revise their text,536 circulated an anonymous variant
to Supreme Soviet deputies twenty-four hours before formal debate,5"'
added unofficial wording to the approved law published in Izvestiia,53 8
and transferred the task of reworking the statute from the original legislative committees to a special Presidium commission sympathetic to party
views.5 3
Nonetheless, by its adjournment on November 28, 1989, the Supreme
Soviet had made a major contribution to Soviet legislative practice. It had
firmly established the feasibility and desirability of an effective, professional lawmaking body. Despite some cynicism and frustration about the
slow pace of accomplishment, the USSR had embarked on a program of
significant legislative reform and seemed committed to that end. The
next step was to develop an appropriate procedural framework to fulfill
the promise of the second session of the Supreme Soviet.
C.

"Bidding Farewell to Illusions" 540

On December 12, 1989, legislators reassembled in the Kremlin Palace
of Congresses for the Second Congress of People's Deputies. One of their

major tasks was to adopt detailed parliamentary standing orders that
would "enshrine" 541 the practical techniques developed by the Supreme
Soviet over the past six months. Progressive deputies became increasingly
convinced that Supreme Soviet experience had made more than lawmaking procedures obsolete. It had also called into question the very theoretical and structural bases of Gorbachev's prescribed model of legislative
reform.
1. Codification of Lawmaking
The Standing Orders of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and
USSR Supreme Soviet 542 (Standing Orders) were an exemplary product
536. See Nikolai V. Fedorov, cited in Kakim Byt' Zakonu o Pechati [What the Draft
Press Law Is to Be Like], ARGUMENTY i FAKTY, Dec. 2-8, 1989, at 1.
537. See Dolganov & Stepovoi, supra note 486, at 1.
538. See supra notes 528-30 and accompanying text.
539. See Fedorov, supra note 535. For an excellent summary of the Press Law experience, see Remington, supra note 12, at 186-94.
540. Moscow Domestic Service, Jan. 13, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 23,
1990, at 84.
541. Evgenii M. Primakov, 0 Proekte Reglamenta S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov
SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [On the Draft Standing Orders of the Congress of
USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet], PRAVDA, Dec. 17, 1989, at 3,
3.
542. Reglament S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
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of the process they sought to codify."

3

The statute was originally drafted

specialists 544

and initiated by the Congress of People's Depuby legal
5
54
ties. A working draft was circulated to deputies in August.5 46 It was
54 7
formally revised by the Legislation and Self-Management Committees

on the basis of numerous hearings 548 and proposals from legislators,
committees, jurists, state organs, and scientific institutes.54 9 It was
presented for a first reading with a list of key participants in the drafting
process.55 It underwent considerable discussion, dorabotka, and amendment at the first and second reading stages. 551 The final text submitted to
the Congress in mid-December represented a significant advance over
earlier versions and directly incorporated recommendations from individual deputies55 2 and legislative committees. 55 3 Nevertheless, its formal enactment was delayed several days to permit further refinement. 5 4
The new statute generally tracked the lawmaking stages set out in the
July Temporary Rules. It provided for initiation by organs and persons

[Standing Orders of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet], IZVEsTIIA (evening ed.), Dec. 28, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Standing Orders].
543. See Primakov, supra note 541, at 3 (praising the "scrupulous work" on the
Standing Orders as a signal that the Soviet legislative process had "left behind the traditional pattern, whereby draft legislative acts, as a rule, were formulated outside the Supreme Soviet and submitted to the Supreme Soviet only for voting").
544. A "rather voluminous draft," Luk'ianov, supra note 324, at 62, was prepared
by specialists in the Institute of Soviet State Structure and Legislation and the Institute
of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. See Primakov, supra note 425.
545. Resolution on ProceduralLaws, supra note 440. The Supreme Soviet endorsed
this resolution on July 24. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob Organizatsii
Raboty Po Vypolneniiu Poruchenii, Dannykh Verkhovnomu Sovetu SSSR S'ezdom
Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution On the Organizationof
Work to Fulfill the Instructions Given to the USSR Supreme Soviet by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies] point 4 (July 24, 1989), PRAVDA, July 27, 1989, at 1.
546. See Dolganov & Kurasov, supra note 462, at 1.
547. See Moscow Television Service, Nov. 1, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Nov. 2, 1989, at 58, 59 (citing Rafik N. Nishanov).
548. See Primakov, supra note 425.
549. See id. at 55. More than sixty deputies submitted proposals. See Dolganov &
Kurasov, supra note 462, at 1. The Ecology and International Affairs Committees also
provided recommendations. Primakov, supra note 425.
550. See Primakov, supra note 425.
551. See Primakov, supra note 541.
552. For a discussion of such proposals, see id.
553. For example, the Ecology and Science Committees recommended mechanisms
for formation of deputies' groups. Id.
554. At the end of his December 16 report, Primakov called for a postponement in
final debate of the Standing Orders and asked deputies to submit their comments and
recommended changes to the Editorial Commission. Id.
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with the constitutional authority to do so. 55 5 It followed the previous pat-

tern of assigning the bulk of draft preparatory work to Supreme Soviet
commissions and committees.5 5 6 It envisioned a process of two readings
by the Supreme Soviet "unless decided otherwise by the Congress and
the USSR Supreme Soviet in regard to a specific draft. ' 557 It left nationwide discussion to the discretion of legislators 558 and provided opportunities for dorabotka between, during, and after formal Supreme Soviet
consideration of bills. 559 Finally, it referred to the July 31 Law on Publication and Entry Into Force to govern these two final stages.58
Unlike the Temporary Rules, however, the Standing Orders covered
each lawmaking stage in detail. In all, the statute contained 185 articles,
more than 40 of which dealt specifically with formulation and approval
of laws, treaties, and other legislative acts. 581 This was an obvious improvement over the sketchy eight-point outline of the Temporary Rules.
Not surprisingly, then, the Standing Orders offered greater precision regarding such crucial matters as draft preparation, 5 2 amendment, 5 3 and
enactment. 56 4 Moreover, they extended their scope to encompass Congress as well as Supreme Soviet lawmaking 8 5 and to include limited
treatment of the respective tasks and competencies of the two Supreme

555. See Standing Orders, supra note 542, art. 124.
556. Id. arts. 128-32.
557. Id. art. 133.
558. Id. arts. 135 & 137.
559. Id. arts. 137, 140, 141, 142, 143. An interesting revision in dorabotka practice
appears in Article 142, which allows for return to committee to ensure no intrinsic contradictions in a bill amended on the second reading.
560. Id. art. 147.

561. Id. §§ IX-XI.
562. See id. arts. 128-32. For example, the new Standing Orders provided for participation by bill sponsors, id. art. 130, distribution of working drafts to deputies, id. art.
128, expert scientific analysis, id. art. 131, open discussion of drafts, id. at art. 132, and
notification of individual deputies regarding the committee disposition of proposed

amendments. Id.
563. See, e.g., id. arts. 138-42. The Standing Orders introduced a requirement of
written submission of amendments to the Presidium, chairman of the chambers, or head
preparatory committee. Id. art. 138. Deputies had the right to explain their recommendations during committee discussions and, if rejected, during full legislative sessions. Id.
arts. 139 & 140. Any rejected amendments were to be included with the text when
presented for a second reading. Id. art. 139.
564. The Standing Orders addressed the problem of majority voting. In cases of
USSR legislation, they required a majority of the total number of USSR people's deputies. Id. art. 144. Decisions on procedural matters, in contrast, were to be decided by a
majority of deputies present. Id. arts. 150 & 151.

565. See generally id. § IX.
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Soviet chambers." 6 '

Even more striking were the radical additions and changes inspired by
Supreme Soviet practical experience. Most notably, the Standing Orders
formally authorized the creation and participation of independent deputies' groups,56 required identification of preliminary draft authors,568
and stipulated examination of alternative drafts in both committee' and
full legislative sessions.5"' The new procedures also increased republic
rights and influence in the legislature. 57 1 At the same time, they introduced reforms designed to constrain and supervise the powers of the Presidium," 2 Secretariat,5"' and even the Supreme Soviet Chairman him57 1
self. 57 4 Finally, in conjunction with a specific law on deputy status,
the Standing Orders addressed basic concerns of legislators, such as
guaranteed participation in Supreme Soviet and Congress activity and

debate, 576 access to information,57 7 media coverage,

78

support services, 571

566. See id. art. 136.
567. See id. art. 39. The Standing Orders permitted creation of permanent or temporary deputies' groups. Article 39 guaranteed groups with at least one hundred members
full rights to participate in legislative activity provided they notify in writing the Supreme Soviet Chairman of their formation, composition, goals, and official spokespersons.
It also provided to groups with at least twenty members the right to distribute material
as official documents of the legislature.
568. Id. art. 125.
569. Id. art. 130.
570. Id. art. 135.
571. See, e.g., id. art. 13 (providing rights to insist on inclusion of item in agenda)
and art. 70 (addressing republic representatives' rights in termination of debate).
572. For example, article 83 required the Presidium to admit outside observers to its
meetings (if invited by the Supreme Soviet Chairman), provide advance notice of meetings, make minutes and stenographic reports of meetings accessible to deputies, and publish decisions in the mass media. Id. art. 83. Moreover, the Standing Orders transferred
many previous Presidium controls over the lawmaking process to the full legislature,
such as inclusion of drafts on the agenda, id. art. 129, and submission for first reading,
id. art. 133.
573. See id. arts. 184-85.
574. For example, articles 12 and 24 introduced a formal written application and
notification process for deputies to speak in legislative sessions. The Standing Orders
granted the Chairman the right to alter the sequence of speeches but only with permission of the Presidium and with an official explanation of the reasons for the change. Id.
art. 25.

575. Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Statuse Narodnykh
Deputatov v SSSR [USSR Law On the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR] (Dec.
21, 1989), IZVEsTIIA, Dec. 27, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Law on Status of Deputies].
576. See, e.g., id. arts. 10-16; Standing Orders, supra note 542, arts. 29, 39, 44, 54,
67, 92, 132, 176.
577. See, e.g., Law on Status of Deputies, supra note 575, arts. 32, 34; Standing
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5 80
and outside employment security.
While a major step forward, the Standing Orders 'still failed to remedy
many of the areas identified for reform by Supreme Soviet members.
Thus, they continued to provide overly fluid procedures for preparation
and approval of statutes. 8 They contained no requirement or concrete
rules for nationwide discussion. 82 They allowed inadequate time for
deputies' receipt and review of documents prior to legislative deliberations.5 8 3 They retained loopholes for bypassing stages of the lawmaking
process. 84 Most importantly, the new scheme included no clear definition of the relationship or distinct functions of the Supreme Soviet and
the Congress. 58 5 As customary, it modified even its vague statement with
"as a rule" language. 8 6 Ironically, at the very time that deputies were

considering the Standing Orders, they were in the midst of a disagreement over precisely this crucial issue.
2.

Rejection of the Gorbachev Model

The Second Congress of People's Deputies came as a rude awakening
to legislators and commentators accustomed to the increasing maturity
and professionalism of the Supreme Soviet.5 87 They witnessed a dramatic
reversion to old-style Soviet legislative practice, with a Congress carefully stage-managed from start to finish. Despite the involvement of
eighty deputies in the special Congress preparatory commission, the ulti-

Orders, supra note 542, arts. 4, 57, 58, 83-86, 128.
578. See, e.g., Law on Status of Deputies, supra note 575, art. 31; Standing Orders,
supra note 542, arts. 16-17, 57, 58, 132.
579. See, e.g., Law on Status of Deputies, supra note 575, arts. 32, 34, 85-86, 184.
580. See, e.g., id. arts. 33, 36.
581. For example, the Standing Orders continued to permit preparatory committees
to determine their own procedures and structure. See id. arts. 130-31.
582. See id. arts. 131 & 135.
583. See, e.g., id. art. 134 (providing for distribution of text and supporting materials not later than three days prior to first reading).
584. See, e.g., id. art. 133 (providing for two readings unless otherwise determined
by legislature) & art. 137 (allowing adoption without second reading).
585. See, e.g., id. art. 145 ("The USSR Congress of People's Deputies may accept
for its examination the draft of any USSR law.").
586. Id. art. 133 ("[Drafts] affecting the interests of union republics and their relations with USSR state organs are accepted for examination by the USSR Congress of
People's Deputies, as a rule, after these drafts have been examined in the USSR Supreme Soviet").

587. See, e.g., Miroslav Buzhkevich, Vremia-Delu [Time-For Work), PRAVDA,
Dec. 15, 1989, at 1.
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mate agenda contained only items approved by the leadership. 5 8 There
was restricted, taped media coverage of sessions to avoid the "deplorable
experience"5 89 of the First Congress. Deputies' speeches were so uninspired and formulaic that they appeared as recorded as the television
59 0
broadcasts.
Gorbachev unabashedly controlled congressional proceedings. This
was evident from the first day. When deputies voted by a two-thirds
margin to change the agenda, an obviously startled Gorbachev stared at
the electronic voting panel, asked deputies if they understood their decision, and then launched into a detailed reexplanation of the issue at

hand. Legislators eventually "appreciated the Chairman's position" and
revoted in the desired manner. 59 ' Congress' administrative bodies reinforced this leadership control. For example, Georgii Kriuchkov, head of
the Congress Secretariat, openly acknowledged that the Presidium and
Secretariat refused to distribute deputy materials that could have "comamong groups of depplicated the Congress' work, exacerbated 5relations
92
passions.
fueling
to
contributed
or
uties,
588. For a description of the special commission, see Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech
to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (Dec. 12, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Dec. 13, 1989, at 51, 51. The Congress' agenda was initially discussed and cleared by
the CPSU Central Committee, see Informatsionnoe Soobshchenie o Plenume Tsen-

tral'nogoKomiteta Kommunisticheskoi PartiiSovetskogo Soiuza [Information Report on
the CPSU Central Committee Plenum], IZVESIA, Dec. 10, 1989, at 1; Vystuplenie M.S.
Gorbacheva Na Plenume TsK KPSS Po Voprosma II S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov
SSSR [M.S. Gorbachev's Speech to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Second
USSR Congress of People's Deputies], IZVESTIIA, Dec. 10, 1989, at 1, and the Supreme
Soviet Presidium, see TASS, Zasedanie Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Session
of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium], IZVESTIIA (evening ed.), Dec. 11, 1989, at 1.
On the day before the formal convocation of the Congress, it was also endorsed by representatives of official deputies' groups. See TASS, Sobranie Predstavitelei Grupp

Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [Meeting of Representatives of USSR People's Deputies'
Groups], IzvEsTIA (evening ed.), Dec. 11, 1989, at 1. For the text of the final agenda,

see Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh
Respublik 0 Povestke Dnia Vtorogo S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [Resolution of
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies On the Agenda for the Second USSR Congress
of People's Deputies] (Dec. 12, 1989), IzvrsTIA, Dec. 14, 1989, at 1.
589.

TASS, Dec. 12, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 13, 1989, at 69.

590. Al'bert Plutnik, Sbudutsia Li Nadezhdy? [Will Hopes Be Fulfilled?], IzvEsT1iA,

Dec. 16, 1989, at 1. Accord Buzhkevich, supra note 587; P. Voshchanov & S.

Kiselev, Ni Grozdei, Ni Idei [No Highlights, No Ideas], KoMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA,
Dec. 14, 1989, at 1; Iurii Zarechkin, Varianty Peremen [Variants of Changes], LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, Dec. 20, 1989, at 1.

591.

Vladimir Iadov, Izbirateli U Teleekrana [Voters at the Television Screen],

KOMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA, Dec. 15, 1989, at 1.
592. Nikolaev, supra note 413, at I (interview with Georgii K. Kriuchkov).
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If the Second Congress was a "set scenario," 593 its legislators were an
excellent supporting cast. They successfully completed the predetermined
agenda,59 4 even endorsing the important Law on Constitutional Oversight, which had never been discussed or approved by the Supreme Soviet.5" 5 The Congress concluded on a singularly appropriate note. From
the rostrum, Mikhail Gorbachev formally declared the session over and
then reminded party members of the next day's CPSU Central Committee Plenum. 9 6
For many deputies and outside observers, the Congress confirmed and
reinforced a growing sentiment that real legislative reform would be impossible within the confines of the Gorbachev model. There were early
efforts to reduce internal party and administrative filters. Thus, December constitutional amendments eliminated at the republic level reserved

legislative seats for social organizations,597 licensed direct popular election of republic Supreme Soviet members, 599 reduced powers of electoral
commissions, 599 and enhanced opportunities for equal electoral participation by candidates.60 0
Direct challenges to party supremacy over the legislative process also
arose. Citizens and commentators increasingly targeted communist deputies for criticism, citing the chilling effect of party discipline on legislative
performance. 60 ' Even high CPSU leaders publicly repudiated long-sacrosanct notions of party unity and obedience. For example, one Politburo

593. Interview with Egor K. Ligachev, Moscow Domestic Service, Jan. 13, 1990,
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 23, 1990, at 84, 84 (quoting Komsomol deputies). Ac-

cord Iurii Ryzhkov, cited in Vitalii Tretiakov, Second Congress; Discussions in Kremlin, Moscow NEws, Dec. 31, 1989, at 4.

594. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies
(Dec. 24, 1989), PRAVDA, Dec. 25, 1989, at 1.
595. See I.D. Khadyrke, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (n.d.),
LrrERATURNATA GAZETA, Dec. 27, 1989, at 4; Kazimer V. Moteka, Speech to USSR
Congress of People's Deputies (Dec. 22, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 27,
1989, at 65. For the text of the Constitutional Oversight Law, see Zakon Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialistcheskikh Respublik 0 Konstitutsionnom Nadzore v SSSR [USSR Law On
Constitutional Oversight in the USSR] (Dec. 23, 1989), IzvEsTIA, Dec. 26, 1989, at 1.
596. Gorbachev, supra note 594.
597. 1989 Constitutional Amendments on the Electoral System, supra note 181,
arts. 95, 96, 97.
598. Id. art. 91.

599. Id. art. 100.
600. Id.
601. See, e.g., Aleksandr I'in, Mesto Kommunista-Na Perednem Krae [A Communist's Place-In the Forefront], PRAVDA, Dec. 11, 1989, at 1; G. Ovcharenko & V.
Shirokov, Kommunist Na S'ezde [A Communist at the Congress], PRAVDA, Dec. 12,
1989, at 2.
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member stated unequivocally that party-affiliated legislators were not

"duty-bound" to support the policies of CPSU organs or leaders, including the "topmost." 0°2 He claimed that no legislator had ever been ac03
cused of violating party discipline for views expressed in parliament.1
Other party officials explicitly acknowledged the jurisdiction and author-

ity of the new Constitutional Oversight Committee to override unconstitutional CPSU decisions.60 4 Progressive legislators went even further and
called for immediate repeal of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the
formal legal recognition of CPSU monopoly of political power. 60 5 In
fact, right before his death, Andrei Sakharov organized a pre-Congress
strike in support of such action.60 6
Finally, based on their practical experience, Soviet legislators started
to question the embodiment of Gorbachev's demokratizatsiiapolicy-the
two-tiered legislature. Many concluded that the Congress had demonstrated itself to be organically and effectively incapable of formulating
and adopting legislation.6 0 7 The kindest critics praised its original function as a political forum but acknowledged that it had exhausted even
that role. 0 8 To most progressive deputies, the dual legislative scheme
made it virtually impossible for the more promising60 9 Supreme Soviet to
realize its full potential. Three aspects were particularly troublesome.

602. Interview with Aleksandr Iakovlev, Moscow World Service, Dec. 20, 1989,
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 22, 1989, at 52, 52-53 [hereinafter Iakovlev Interview]. See also "Ia Veriu v Etu Programmu" ["I Believe in This Programme"], KRASNAIA ZVEZDA, Dec. 24, 1989, at 1 (interview with Nikolai I. Ryzhkov).
603. Iakovlev Interview, supra note 602, at 53.

604. See, e.g., TASS, Dec. 21, 1989, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 22, 1989, at 48.
605: See Iurii Afanas'ev, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (Dec. 21,
1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 22, 1989, at 40; AFP, Nov. 27, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 27, 1989, at 80.
606. See Moscow World Service, Dec. 7, 1989, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 8,
1989, at 40; Boris Zverev & Aleksandr Borisov, TASS, Dec. 10, 1989, translated in
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 11, 1989, at 70.

607. See, e.g., I.P. Ilinskii, cited in Dostatochno Li Vlasti U Vlasti? [Does the Power
Have Enough Power?], IZVESTIIA, Feb. 4, 1990, at 2; Roy Medvedev, cited in Gavrilov
et al., S'ezd Zavershen: Zadanie Na Zavtra [The Congress Is Ended: Mission for Tomorrow], PRAVDA, Dec. 26, 1989, at 4.

608. See, e.g., B.N. Topornin, cited in DostatochnoLi Vlasti U Vlasti?, supra note
607.
609. See E. Evtushenko, cited in Gavrilov et al., supra note 607. In terms of political
debate and culture, Deputy V.I. Iarovoi evaluated Supreme Soviet deputies at the fifthgrade level and their Congress counterparts at the second-grade level. V.I. Iarovoi, cited

in Iu. Nikolaev, V Poze Oppozitsii. Kollektivnaia Ekspertiza Zaiavleniia Ot Litsa Mezhregional'noiGruppy [Opposition Posture:Collective Assessment of Statement in Name
of InterregionalGroup], Soy. RossInA, Dec. 24, 1989, at 3.
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First, the Congress' exclusive power to amend the USSR Constitution

stymied Supreme Soviet efforts to introduce radical reforms in Soviet legislation. For example, the second session of the Supreme Soviet found
itself compelled to delay enactment of much-needed economic statutes
until the Congress formally updated the Constitution.' l Second, as
demonstrated by the Constitutional Oversight Law,6 1' the Congress
could adopt legislation completely independent of established Supreme
Soviet lawmaking channels and procedures. Third, the Congress could
effectively subordinate and undermine the more mature Supreme Soviet
6 12
through its power to supersede and nullify that body's enactments.
The Second Congress partially remedied the first problem by temporarily expanding Supreme Soviet powers to include amendment of the
Constitution. 3 To address the second flaw, reformers recommended
granting the Supreme Soviet a veto over all laws considered by the Congress that had not been prepared in Supreme Soviet commissions and
committees.6 4 The third issue appeared to require a more drastic response-the elimination of the dual legislature altogether. By early 1990,
there was strong support for casting off the shackles of the Gorbachev
model and instituting a more modern, autonomous Western-style system. 5 As one legal reformer proclaimed in February, "We must have a
proper parliament." 1 6 Gorbachev swiftly picked up the gauntlet.

610. See Vadim V. Bakatin, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (Dec.
22, 1989), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 27, 1989, at 46, 54; TASS, Nov. 13, 1989,

in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Nov. 14, 1989, at 69.
611.
612.

See supra note 595 and accompanying text.
See A.A. Mishin, cited in DostatochnoLi Vlasti U Vlasti?, supra note 606, at

2.
613. Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Soiuza Sovestskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 PorucheniakhVerkhovnomu Sovetu SSSR i Konstitutsionnoi Komissii
Po Nekotorym Konstitutsionnym Voprosam [USSR Congress of People's Deputies Resolution On the Assignments to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the ConstitutionalCommission of Several Constitutional Questions] (Dec. 19, 1989), IZVESTIrA, Dec. 23, 1989, at
1. For a criticism of this decision, see Telen, supra note 484, at 1.
614.

See Khadyrke, supra note 595, at 4.

615. See, e.g., V. Danilenko, UtverzhdaiaNovuiu Formu Pravleniia[Strengthening
the New Form of Government], NARODNYI DEp trAT, no. 2, 12 (1990); 0. Losoto & G.
Ovcharenko, Perestroikai Vlast [Perestroikaand Power], PRAVDA, Jan. 31, 1990, at 1.
At the opening session of the Third Congress in March 1990, Sergei Alekseev declared,
"We have become prisoners of the slogan: All power to the Soviets!" Moscow Television
Service, Mar. 12, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, 'Mar. 13, 1990, at 44.
616.

Boris P. Kurashvili, cited in Dostatochno Li Vlasti U Vlasti?, supra note 607.
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"At Historic Crossroads":61

7

The Third Congress of People's

Deputies
On February 7, 1990, the CPSU Central Committee formally proposed the institution of a strong executive presidency to contain the "uncontrolled revolution from below."6 1 By mid-March, the Third Congress of People's Deputies had duly amended the Constitution and
elected Mikhail Gorbachev as the first President of the USSR."1 " In so
doing, the legislature legitimized the formal concentration of political
and legal authority in the hands of a single individual. Among the many
sweeping powers it assigned to Gorbachev were the unilateral rights to
declare a state of emergency, establish temporary presidential rule, issue
binding decrees, veto laws, dismiss top government officials, and dissolve
the legislature.62
Perhaps symbolically, the federal legislature endorsed this retreat to
authoritarian rule in an accelerated, truncated process that violated both
spirit and letter of the Standing Orders enacted only a few months earlier. In a manner decidedly reminiscent of the past, the CPSU inspired
and initiated the presidency amendments. 1 A special working group

handpicked by the Presidium then prepared in two weeks a draft with-

22
out any participation of Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.
Supreme Soviet deputies received the text a mere twenty-four hours
prior to its first and final reading on February 27, 1990.62' The justification of this last-minute circulation was the "exceptional nature of the

617. Aleksandr N. Iakovlev, Speech to USSR Supreme Soviet (Feb. 27, 1990), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 28, 1990, at 45.
618. A. Mishin, cited in L. Nikitinskii, Pervoe Litso [Top Man] KoMsOMOL'SKAIA
PRAVDA, Feb. 24, 1990, at 1. See K Gumannomu, Demokraticheskomu Sotsializmu
(PlaformaTsK KPSS K XXVIII S'ezdu Partii)[Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism (CPSU Central Committee Platform for 28th Party Congress)], PRAVDA, Feb. 13,
1990, at 1, part IV [hereinafter CPSU Platform]. See Vladimir N. Kudriavtsev, Speech
to USSR Supreme Soviet (Feb. 27, 1990), Moscow Television Service, Feb. 27, 1990,
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 28, 1990, at 41.
619. On March 14, 1990, the Third Congress amended the USSR Constitution to
allow introduction of a presidential system and to repeal the formal "leading" role of the
CPSU. See March 1990 ConstitutionalAmendments Law, supra note 6. The following
day, it elected Mikhail Gorbachev, the sole candidate for the position, as the USSR President. See TASS, Mar. 15, 1990, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 15, 1990, at 49.
620. KONST. SSSR arts. 127(3) & 127(7) (as amended Mar. 14, 1990).
621. CPSU Platform, supra note 618, part IV.
622. See Kudriavtsev, supra note 618, at 41.
623. See Moscow Television Service, Feb. 27, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Feb. 28, 1990, at 34, 35.
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'
situation."624
Supreme Soviet discussion of the amendments was abbreviated and constrained by Gorbachev. The Chairman silenced dissenters,
interjected his own views, and eventually shortened debate on grounds
62 5
that "points of view and arguments [were] already being repeated.
Despite serious deputy concerns about the draft and frequent requests
for postponement of voting to permit further refinement,6 26 Gorbachev
insisted on an immediate vote.6 2 When the Supreme Soviet approved the
amendments for submission to an extraordinary session of the Congress
on March 12, one deputy
warned his colleagues that they would be
626

"ashamed of this later.)

Not until endorsement of the amendments were Supreme Soviet committees and the public finally given a voice in the lawmaking process.
Unfortunately the time allotted was so brief as to permit only nominal
participation. Legislative committees had a mere two weeks to consider
and repair the flawed draft.' 2 The Soviet citizenry had only a single
week for comment and criticism of the published text.6 30 To make mat-

624.
lated in
625.
1990, at

Iurii Iu. Boldyrev, cited in Moscow Television Service, Feb. 27, 1990, transF.B.I.S-SOV, Feb. 28, 1990, at 34, 35.
Moscow Domestic Service, Feb. 27, 1990, translatedin F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 28,
37. For" a discussion of Gorbachev's "incorrect" behavior, see Andrei Nuikin, V

Tom Li Meste My Vozvodim Barrikadu? Trevogi Publitsista v Den' Okrytiia S'ezda

[Are We Erecting the Barriers in the Right Place? Publicist's Fears bn the Day the
Congress Opens], IZVESTIIA, Mar. 13, 1990, at 6.
626. See, e.g., Comment by Aleksei Emel'ianov, in Moscow Television Service,
supra note 624, at 35; Comment by unidentified deputy, Moscow Television Service,
Feb. 27, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.- SOV, Feb. 28, 1990, at 36.
627. Moscow Television Service, supra note 626, at 36.
628. Id. (comment by Iurii Iu. Boldyrev). Another procedural criticism was the failure to submit the presidential amendments first to the Soviet of Nationalities for consideration. Baltic deputies claimed that this move represented a "complete disregard" for
republic views and refused to participate in the final Supreme Soviet vote. See Lithuanian broadcast, Feb. 27, 1990, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 1, 1990, at 57.

629, See Obsuzhdaetsia Vopros o Prezidentstve [Presidency Issue Under Discussion], IZVESTIIA, Mar. 4, 1990, at 1. Deputies criticized several aspects of the draft,
including mechanisms for presidential election, vague eligibilty requirements, weak
checks and balances, and presidential powers to declare war, institute presidential rule,
and propose election of new Supreme Soviet members. See, e.g., V. Tso et al., I Vlast, i
Demokratiia [Both Power and Democracy], PRAVDA, Mar. 2, 1990, at 1; Vsia Presidentskaia Vlast' [All PresidentialPower], Soy. KULTURA, Mar. 10, 1990, at 2.
630. The draft was published on March 5, 1990. See Proekt Zakona Soiuza Sovet-

shikh SotsialisticheskikhRespublik Ob Uchrezhdenii Posta Prezidenta SSSR i Vnesenii
Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu (Osnovoi Zakone) SSSR [Draft USSR Law On
Establishing the Post of USSR President and Making Amendments and Additions to
the USSR Constitution (FundamentalLaw)], IzvsTiiA (evening ed.), Mar. 5, 1990, at
1. Interestingly, the Supreme Soviet did not mandate nationwide discussion of the text.
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ters worse, this public discussion bore little resemblance to the reform
ideal of an objective evaluation of draft merits and deficiencies. Rather,
as in the past, it consisted largely of a mass media propaganda campaign
to publicize and exalt the new presidential system.6 31
The Congress of People's Deputies proved an even greater parody of
the legislative process. From the very start, congressional approval of the
presidency was a foregone conclusion. In fact, when deputies arrived in

Moscow, they received an agenda that included "Election of the President of the USSR.16 3 2 Gorbachev dominated the subsequent proceedings
633
with scant regard for the Standing Orders. He interrupted speakers,
terminated debate,6" 4 and required written submission of deputy remarks
to a specially created Editorial Commission.63 5 Gorbachev consistently
violated voting rules. He routinely bypassed formal procedures in favor
of a personal determination of congressional views on key issues.6 36 He
unilaterally rejected deputy requests for voting on an article-by-article
basis6 17 and openly proclaimed the power of Congress to change estab-

See Postanovlenie Post Prezidenta SSSR i Vnesenii Sootvetstvuiushchikh Izmenenii i
Dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR [USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution
On Establishing the Post of USSR President and Making Appropriate Amendments
and Additions to the USSR Constitution (FundamentalLaw)] point 3 (Feb. 27, 1990),
PRAVDA, Feb. 28, 1990, at 1.
631. See E. Gonzal'ez, Comrade President,IzvESTIIA, Mar. 13, 1990, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S-SOV, Mar. 13, 1990, at 70.
632. Postanovlenie S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Povestke Dni Vneocherednogo Tret'ego S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov
SSSR [USSR Congress of People's Deputies Resolution On the Agenda for the Extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies] point 3 (Mar. 12, 1999), PRAVDA,
Mar. 13, 1990, at 1. For a criticism of point 3, see N. Petrov, cited in N. Musienko,
Pozitsiia Deputatov [Deputies' Position], PRAVDA, Mar. 13, 1990, at 2.
633. See, e.g., Interchange between Afanas'ev and Gorbachev, USSR Congress of
People's Deputies (Mar. 12, 1990), in IZvSTHA, Mar. 14, 1990, at 2.
634. Only 19 out of 288 people registered were able to speak on March 12. Nonetheless, Gorbachev decided to end formal discussion of the amendments after only two

hours of further debate on March 13. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to USSR Congress
of People's Deputies (Mar. 13, 1990), in id. at 4.
635. See Moscow Television Service, Mar. 12, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Mar. 13, 1990, at 45. Deputies criticized the Editorial Commission for not responding to
their criticisms and amendments. See Moscow Television Service, Mar. 13, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 14, 1990, at 53.
636. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to USSR Congress of People's Deputies (Mar. 12, 1990), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 14, 1990, at 48, 49 (reporting
that Gorbachev determined voting procedures, turned to the hall and asked, "Comrades,
do we share these ideas?," and then concluded, "Good.").
637. See Moscow Television Service, Mar. 13, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Mar. 14, 1990, at 53, 54 (noting that Gorbachev rejected the request on grounds of
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lished rules, including the very definition of a two-thirds vote for tabulation purposes. 618
On March 14, 1990, the Third Congress formally enacted the presidency amendments in a process that contravened fundamental Standing
Orders' stipulations regarding voting sequence139 and final approval on a
single reading. 4 ° Despite the new constitutional requirement of a popularly elected President, 41 the Congress itself chose the country's first
holder of the office. Not surprisingly, it turned to the CPSU Central
Committee's nominee and sole candidate for the post, Mikhail
Gorbachev. 642 Several deputies protested these procedural irregularities,
even citing relevant provisions of the Standing Orders.6 43 One deputy
appealed to broad principles of the law-based state: "[T]he main argument for introducing presidential rule is that we want legality to be observed within the country. But if we want legality to be observed within
the country, we must clearly begin with ourselves. ' 4 Yet, all these last
desperate defenders of. legislative procedure received for their efforts
were labels as obstructionist and unpatriotic. 4 5 The consequences were
predictable.
Adherents of the presidency repeatedly promised that the new system
would not "encroach on the role of the representative organs of
power."6 6 In fact, there was an immediate, noticeable reduction in the

insufficient time).
638. See Moscow Television Service, Mar. 13, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
Mar. 14, 1990, at 46, 47 (noting calculation of two-thirds from roll call rather than total
number of deputies).
639. The Congress violated articles 140 and 142 by failing to discuss and vote on
proposed amendments prior to a final vote on the articles and draft law as a whole.
Standing Orders, supra note 542, arts. 140 & 142.
640. Pursuant to article 137, a draft could be adopted on the first reading only if the
Congress (or Supreme Soviet) determined that it did not require amendments. Id. art.
137.
641. KONST. SSSR art. 127(1) (as amended Mar. 14, 1990).
642. TASS, Mar. 14, 1990, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 15, 1990, at 53. The Soiuz deputies' group also nominated Nikolai Ryzhkov and Vadim Bakatin. Both withdrew their
names from consideration, however.

643. See N. Krivomazov et al., S'ezd Golosuet Za Prezidenta [The Congress Votes
for the President], PRAVDA, Mar. 15, 1990, at 1.
644. Iurii Iu. Boldyrev, Comments at USSR Congress of People's Deputies (Mar.
13, 1990), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 14, 1990, at 47.
645. See, e.g., V. Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, Vybory Prezidenta Sostoialis': Strana
Zhdet Rezul'tata [The Electionsfor President Took Place: The Country Awaits the Result], IZVESTnA, Mar. 15, 1990, at 1.
646. Anatolii I. Luk'ianov, 0 Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR i Uchrezhdenii Posta Prezidenta SSSR [On the Introduction of
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stature, functions, and independence of the federal legislature and its
deputies. Television stations introduced air-time quotas restricting access
and coverage of radical legislators.6 47 The communist party expelled
members in direct retaliation for their activities as deputies." 8 The government began to show blatant disregard for legislative authority,"' and
the Presidium regained significant power "to lighten the work of the
Supreme Soviet. ' 650 The President increasingly issued decrees that
amended, supplemented, and even supplanted formal legislation. 51
These combined practices led to the rapid decline of the Soviet legisla6 52
ture. In 1990 and 1991 there were mass resignations of deputies,

marked decrease in public interest and participation in parliamentary
sessions and elections,653 and frequent calls for outright abolition of the
Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (BasicLaw) and the Establishment of the Post of USSR President], PRAVDA, Mar. 13, 1990, at 1. Accord Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, cited in Moscow Domestic Service, Mar. 15, 1990, translated in F.B.I.S.SOV, Mar. 15, 1990, at 51, 52.
647. See Andrei Borodenkov, Limits for Deputies, Moscow NEws, Feb. 18, 1990, at
14.
648. See Aleksandr Ruvinskii, Moscow Domestic Service, Apr. 29, 1990, translated
in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 3, 1990, at 49 (case of Vadim N. Lopatin).
649. See E. Rakhmadiev, cited in V. Dolganov & A. Stepovoi, Povyshenie Tsen Otsrocheno [Price Rise Postponed], IZVEST11A, June 16, 1990, at 1.
650. S. Karkhanin, Faktor Professionalizma [The Professionalism Factor], Soy.
ROSSUA, June 27, 1990, at 1.
651. Gorbachev made extensive use of his presidential emergency powers and increasingly resorted to military, KGB, and police organs to enforce his orders. Two particularly apt examples are Gorbachev's presidential decrees of January 26 and 29, 1991.
The first decree assigned the Soviet militsiia [police] and KGB broad emergency authority to "combat economic sabotage and other crimes in the economic sphere." Ukaz
Prezidenta Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0 Merakh Po Obespecheniiu
Bor'by s Ekonomicheskim Sabotazhem i DrugimiPrestupleniiamiv Sfere Ekonomiki [Decree of the USSR President On Measures to Combat Economic Sabotage and Other
Crimes in the Economic Sphere], PRAVDA, Jan. 28, 1991, at 1. The second decree created joint militia-army patrols to maintain law and order in city streets and "public
places." Ukaz Prezidenta Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik 0
Vsaimodeistvii Militsii i Podrazdelenii Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR Pri Obespechenii
Pravoporiadhai Bor'be s Prestupnost'iu[Decree of the USSR PresidentOn Joint Action
of the Militia and Subunits of the Armed Forces to Maintain Law and Order and
Struggle Against Crime], PRAVDA, Jan. 30, 1991, at 1.

652. See S. Sokolov, Po Sobstvennomi Zhelaniiu [At Their Own Request], KoMSOmOL'SKAIA

PRAVDA,

Dec. 27, 1990, at 1.

653. See Anatolii I. Luk'ianov Interview, Moscow Central Television, Jan. 6, 1991,
translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV (Supp.), Jan. 10, 1991, at 32, 36; Pavel Voshchanov, Natiagivaia Vlast', Kak Odeialo . . . [Hogging Power, Like a Blanket . . .], KoMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA, Nov. 23, 1990, at 2.
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Congress and the Supreme Soviet. 54 On December 26, 1991, the federal
legislature finally was pronounced legally as well as factually dead.6 55
Thus, the Third Congress of People's Deputies was indeed an historic
crossroads. It marked the effective end of meaningful legislative reform
in the USSR. By March 1990, deputies had made impressive progress
towards legislative autonomy and professionalism. Nonetheless, they ultimately proved unable to realize these goals because they failed to institutionalize a mechanism to protect their "perestroika parliament" against
its progenitor.6 56 In the words of a former Supreme Soviet deputy, "Let
65 7
those who follow us be bolder and wiser.)

V.

THE PERESTROIKA PARLIAMENT REVISITED: GUIDANCE FOR
THE POST-SOVIET ERA

In Moscow of 1993, legislature and president once again are locked in
mortal combat.6 58 Although the country is new and the protagonists are
different,6 59 the issue is essentially the same-the future of democracy
and the rule of law.

654. See Liudmila Aleksandrova, TASS, June 6, 1991, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV,
June 6, 1991, at 18; Miroslav Buzhkevich, Poslushaem Spory v Kuluarakh [We Hear
Quarrelsin Corridors], PRAVDA,May 11, 1991, at 2; Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to
USSR Supreme Soviet (Jan. 15, 1991), Moscow Domestic Service, Jan. 15, 1991, translated in FBIS-SOV, Jan. 16, 1991, at 25.
655. See Anuar Alimzhanov, Speech to Extraordinary and Final Session of the
USSR Supreme Soviet (Dec. 26, 1991), translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 26, 1991, at 9;
Moscow Radio, Dec. 26, 1991, translated in F.B.I.S.-SOV, Dec. 26, 1991, at 9.
656. Accord Nuikin, supra note 625, at 3.
657. Emel'ianov, supra note 9, at 2.
658. See Celestine Bohlen, Yeltsin Survives a Vote in Legislature on His Powers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at 14. One of the most recent publicized disputes between
EI'tsin and the Russian parliament was prompted by the Supreme Soviet's unilateral
decision to take over ownership of the newspaper Izvestiia. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo
Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii0 Gazete "Izvestiia" [Russian FederationSupreme Soviet
Resolution on the Newspaper "Izvestiia"] (July 17, 1992), ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA, July
29, 1992, at 4. See Mikhail Poltoranin & Viacheslav Bragin, Reshenie Po Pechati
Nakonets-To Doshlo Do Pechati [Decision on the Press Has Finally Gone to Press],
KOMSOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA, July 29, 1992, at 1; Liudmila Telen, Power vs. Power,
Moscow NEWS, July 26-Aug. 2, 1992, at 6; Vitalii Tret'iakov, Ruslan Khasbulatov
Nuzhen Vsem i v Bor'be s "Izvestiiami" On Lish' Demonstriruet Svoiu Silu [All Need
Ruslan Khasbulatov and in the Struggle with "Izvestiia" He is Demonstrating His

Strength], NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA, July 21, 1992, at 1.
659. Arguably, the roles are reversed as well with El'tsin serving as a force for
change and the Russian parliament providing conservative resistance. See Serge Schmemann, Aid to Russia: Should Yeltsin Be the Focus?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at 1
(describing El'tsin as "reformist" and the Russian Congress as "reactionary").
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In today's Russia, however, there is an additional player, the Constitutional Court. 660 This body has the potential and the commitment to
perform the roles so needed in 1990 as neutral arbiter and guarantor of
institutional independence. With only the vaguest of charters, 6 1 but loftiest of missions, Constitutional Court members have pledged to hold
Russian legislature and president alike to the highest standards of legality.66 2 Thus far, they have concentrated largely on review of content and

660. See supra note 17. A detailed discussion of the Constitutional Court is both
premature and beyond the scope of the article.
661. For Constitutional Court judges' descriptions of the inadequacies of the Russian
Constitution that guides their work, see Esli Vas Uvolili Po Starosti, Otkazalis'

Propisat'Ili Lishili Liubimoi Gazety ... [If You Have Been FiredBecause of Your Age
or Deprived of Your Favorite Newspaper.. .], LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, Mar. 4, 1992,
at 11; Interview with Valerii D. Zor'kin, SELSKAIA ZHIZN', Jan. 23, 1992, at 3.
662. See, e.g., U Nas, Kazhetsia, PovliaetsiaTret'ia Vlast' [A Third Power Appears
to Be Emerging For Us], LrrERATURNAIA GAZETA, Jan. 22, 1992, at 10 (interview with
Judge Ernest M. Ametistov). In early decisions, the Constitutional Court has already
demonstrated its willingness to call both president and legislature to account for their
actions. For example, on January 14, the Court declared unconstitutional Boris El'tsin's
presidential decree of December 19, 1991, which merged the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the Federal Security Agency into a single megasecurity organ. For text, see supra
note 17. The Court subsequently has ruled against legislative efforts to create an "AllRussian Agency for Authors' Rights [Copyrights]," see Mikhail Karpov, Konstitutsionnomu Sudu Rossii Skuchat' Ne Prikhoditsia [Russia's Constitutional Court Does Not
Need to Be Bored], NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA, Apr. 15, 1992, at 2 and Mikhail Karpov,
Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VS Nekonstitutsionno [Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution
Is Unconstitutional],NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA, Apr. 29, 1992, at 2, to extend its rule over
Moscow city organs, see Konstantin Katanian, Court Investigates, KURANTY, May 20,
1992, at 1, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 22, 1992, at 28, and to enact a new antimonopoly law,
see Liudmila Ermakova, ITAR-TASS, May 20, 1992, in F.B.I.S.-SOV, May 21, 1992,
at 71. The latter case represented the first appeal by El'tsin to the Constitutional Court.
Id.
At the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies, the Constitutional Court significantly
expanded its authority to defend the Russian constitutional order against executive and
legislative action. On December 10, 1992, after eight days of repeated battles with the
Congress, Boris El'tsin called for a national referendum to decide whether president or
legislature should govern Russia. ObrashcheniePrezidentaB.I. El'tsinaK Grazhdanam
Rossii i Ko Vsem Isbirateliam [Appeal of President B.I. El'tsin to Citizens of Russia
and to All Voters] (Dec. 10, 1992), in RossnsK IA GAZETA, Dec. 11, 1992, at 1. Constitutional Court Chairman Valerii Zor'kin took the rostrum and formally demanded on
behalf of the Constitutional Court that President El'tsin and Supreme Soviet Chairman
Khasbulatov institute "immediate consultations" to resolve their political differences. Vystuplenie PredsedateliaKonstitutsionnogo Suda V.D. Zor'kina [Speech of Constitutional
Court Chairman V.D. Zor'kin] (Dec. 10, 1992), in ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA, Dec. 11,
1992, at 1. Under Zor'kin's direction, the two sides successfully reached a compromise
agreement on December 12, 1992. Postanovlenie VII S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Ros-
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enforcement of laws."' Recent Soviet history suggests that they should
expand their compass to include an equally compelling concern, the very
lawmaking process.
The preceding study highlights in bold relief the advantages of legislative procedure. It illustrates how regularized rules can promote legislative efficiency and professionalism, enhance public involvement in the
lawmaking process, safeguard minority participation and views, and restrict outside intervention and control. It provides telling support for theoretical hypotheses that the most effective procedures are those developed
64
within the institution itself.6
At the same time, the Soviet experience reveals the fragility as well as
the value of democratic procedures. It presents a strong case for their
utmost protection and continuing supervision at the highest levels. Accordingly, it suggests that if Russia is indeed to establish a democratic,
"rule-of-law" state, it should give serious consideration to making the
integrity of legislative procedure a constitutional mandate and guarantee.
One possibility is to introduce a constitutional requirement of "due process of lwmaking."' 66
The proposed approach would license formal review of legislation for
conformity with prescribed lawmaking procedures. In theory, a variety
of organs could undertake this task, 6 ' such as the Russian legislature,

siiskoi Federatsii0 StablilizatsiiKonstitutsionnogoStroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii[Resolution of the Seventh Congress of People'sDeputies of the Russian Federation On Stabilization of the Constitutional Order of the Russian Federation] (Dec. 12, 1992), in
RossilSKAIA GAZETA, Dec. 15, 1992, at 1.
663.

See Zor'kin Interview, supra note 661; Nadezhda Zhukovskaia, Sud Vysshii,

Bespristrastnym [The Court Supreme and Impartial], ROSSIISKAIA

GAZETA,

Apr. 21,

1992, at 2.

664. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights:
The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1, 96 n.510 (1990).
665. Linde, supra note 18. It should be noted that while the proposed approach
draws heavily on the language and analysis of Hans Linde, it rejects his final conclusion
that courts should judge legislation solely "as a process, not as a product." See id. at 25455. In this regard, it shares the view of Laurence Tribe that concern with the "due
process of lawmaking is an important supplement, not substitution, for existing review

standards." See Laurence H. Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of Individual Rights
and Institutional Design: Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking,
10 CREIGHroN L. REV. 433, 444 (1977); Tribe, Policy Science, supra note 19, at 82-83.
666. See Linde, supra note 18, at 244 (describing potential review by United States
legislative and executive branches). Based on his examination of the 1988 United States
budget process, one scholar concluded that, in fact, Congress is the body best suited to
guarantee "due process of lawmaking" and that "the judicial role in the lawmaking process should be de minimis." Neal E. Devins, AppropriationsRedux: A CriticalLook at
the Fiscal Year 1988 ContinuingResolution, 1988 DuE L.J. 389, 406 (1988).
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president, judiciary, or Constitutional Court. In practice, however, only
the Constitutional Court appears to be a likely candidate. 68 7 It stands
above the fray of legislative-executive conflict and, as a new body, is not
tainted by the historic weakness and low repute of the Soviet judiciary. It
has the legal competence to judge procedural violations"' and has even
made a preliminary foray into this territory. In February 1992 a mysterious misprint in the final version of the Russian budget led to a Constitutional Court inquiry into the very "legality of the passage of resolutions." '6 9 Should Russian legal reformers choose to proceed further in
this direction, they will need to add the following questions to their
agenda.
First, they must determine what constitutes a legitimate lawmaking
institution in the Russian context. Soviet precedent dictates that, at the
very least, such body should owe its primary allegiance to the electorate

667. This role would be consistent with European practice, where constitutional
tribunals, under the rubric of "formal" or "extrinsic" constitutionality, have long reviewed the compliance of statutes with established lawmaking procedures. See Gottfried
Dietze, Judicial Review in Europe, 55 MIcH. L. REV. 539 (1957).
668. See Zakon RSFSR. 0 Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR, supra note 17, art.
58(4).
669. Stanislav Oganian, Novaia Konstitutsiia-NashPoslednii Shans [A New Constitution-Our Last Chance], PRAVDA, Feb. 21, 1992, at 2, 2 (comment by Valerii D.
Zor'kin).
On January 14, El'tsin submitted a draft budget that included a sum of 16.3 million

rubles earmarked for the Constitutional Court. The legislature adopted the law, with a
reduced allocation to the Constitutional Court of 2 million rubles. On February 6,
Valerii Zor'kin, the Constitutional Court Chairman, requested the legislature submit all
relevant documents on the budget law. The legislature did not act accordingly. On February 13, the deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet informed Zor'kin that the
changed figure was "only a technical error" and that "someone had omitted the figure 1
in front of the figure 2." He assured Zor'kin that the error had been corrected and that
the document now reflected the correct figure of 12.8 million rubles. See V. Golovachev,
Taina Ischeznuvshei Tsifry [The Secret of the Figure That Disappeared],TRUD, Feb.
15, 1992, at 1.
The Constitutional Court, in its formal session on February 14, criticized the "superficial" response of the legislature and questioned the veracity of its explanation. More
importantly, it expressed concern about the very constitutionality of final editorial
changes in adopted laws, suggesting that such practices might not be "compatible ...
with a law-governed state." Oganian, supra, at 1. See also Konstantin Katanian, Even
the Very People's Deputies Who Adopted the 'Law On the ConstitutionalCourt' and
Elected the Very Judges,Most Likely, Did Not Expect That in the Country There Would
Appear So Quickly a Powerful Organfor Which the Law Comes First,KURA'TY, Feb.
25, 1992, at 4, translated in FBIS-USR, Mar. 20, 1992, at 78. The Constitutional
Court ultimately decided to broaden its examination to include all edited laws, not
merely the budget law at issue. Golovachev, supra, at 1.
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and the nation as a whole, not to any outside organization or individual.
It indicates several possible antidotes to external control, including genuinely free, contested election of all legislators by the citizenry; elimination
of the two-tier model; strict limits on parliamentary administrative organs and leaders; clear demarcation of legislative functions and competence both internally and vis-a-vis executive and judicial branches; and
restrictions on delegation of lawmaking authority. Which, if any, of these
factors are prerequisites for legitimacy? At what point does a legislature
become so infected by outside influence as to render its enactments invalid? These are crucial questions that await future decision.
Second, architects of the new system must also define what are legally
enforceable lawmaking procedures. Soviet practice confirms the desirability of "very concrete," "well understood," and "purposefully made"
procedures.6 70 Perhaps, then, the Constitutional Court should limit its
inquiry to published constitutional, statutory, and internal rules.
Third, reformers also must establish an appropriate standard for review. Should the Constitutional Court insist on absolute compliance with
prescribed procedures or, rather, enforce a minimal constitutional stan7 1 The preceding case illustrates in
dard of legislative decisionmaking?M
graphic detail the inexperience of Soviet legislators. This situation has
not improved markedly in the post-Soviet era. Legislative inexperience
sends conflicting messages. It appears to make an overly stringent compliance requirement unreasonable in the Russian context. Yet, it also
calls for a sufficiently high threshold to encourage orderly, predictable
formulation and adoption of laws.
Fourth, Russian reformers must address the issue of remedies. For
example, a basic question is whether to deem laws not fully in compliance with established procedures as void or voidable. It might be appropriate as well to reconsider the current two-stage invalidation process in
cases of individual complaints to the Constitutional Court. Under existing rules, the Constitutional Court has no authority in such instances
to order immediate nullification of an unconstitutional law. Instead, it
must formally request the Russian Legislature to review the statute's
possible invalidation. 2
Fifth, they must give serious attention to the enforcement of Constitutional Court rulings. From the very start, judges have expressed significant concern over the lack of concrete legal mechanisms to ensure execu-

670. Linde, supra note 18, at 241-42.
671. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61
647, 683 (1986).
672.

IND. L.J.

See Tamara G. Morshchakova, cited in Esli Vas Uvolili, supra note 661.
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tion of their decisions.67 3 To their great relief, 74 thus far, Russian
authorities have, in fact, voluntarily complied. Whether this becomes established practice, however, remains to be seen.
Admittedly, resolution of these five issues is an extraordinarily difficult
assignment for the young, inexperienced, and overburdened architects of
a new Russia. Nonetheless, if Alexander Bickel was correct that "[t]he
highest morality is almost always the morality of process," 67 5 then the
challenge is as noble as it is formidable.

673.

See, e.g., U Nas, Kazhetsia, Povliaetsia Tret'ia Vlast', supra note 661.

674. See, e.g., Esli Vas Uvolili, supra note 661 (discussing possible consequences if
Boris El'tsin had failed to recognize Constitutional Court invalidation of his security
agency merger decree). On April 1, Mikhail Mitiukov, Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee Chairman, proposed adoption of a law on compulsory compliance with Constitutional Court decisions. See Mikhail Karpov, A Sushchestvuet Li Federatsiia?[But Does
a FederationExist?], NEZAVISIMATA GAZETA, Apr. 2, 1992, at 1.
675. Alexander Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, 57 COMMENTARY 19, 25
(1974).

